Printed for the use of the Foreign Office. January 1869.

CONFIDENTIAL.

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424

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

BETWEEN

TURKEY AND GREECE.

1868-69.

29

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ERRATA.

No. 13, p. 7. Private No. should be 1,027 instead of No. 13.
No. 82, p. 42. In the heading, for "Lord A. Loftus," read "Lord Lyons."

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office. January 1869.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Correspondence respecting the Rupture of Diplomatic Relations between Turkey and Greece: 1868—69.

No. 1.

Mr. Elliot to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 446.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 25, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to inclose the copy of a despatch I have addressed to Mr. Erskine, stating that if any important departure of volunteers for Crete is connived at by the Greek Government, the rupture of relations and the expulsion of all Hellenic subjects from Turkey may be looked upon as inevitable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

Inclosures in No. 1.

Mr. Elliot to Mr. Erskine.

Sir, *Constantinople, November* 25, 1868.

I HAVE just received your telegram of the 23rd instant, stating that it is said that a 1,000 volunteers, of whom some are soldiers, are about to embark at Cerigo for Crete.

If it shall turn out that any important departure of volunteers takes place, with the apparent connivance of the Greek Government, a rupture with Turkey may be looked upon as inevitable.

The packet is upon the point of sailing, and there is no time for me to ascertain the information or learn the intentions of the Turkish Government; but the language which has been lately held to me by them convinces me that the rupture of relations, and the expulsion of all Hellenic subjects from Turkey may be calculated upon in the event of any gross violation of international duties by the Greek Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 2.

Mr. Erskine to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 174.)
My Lord, *Athens, November* 25, 1868.

I REGRET to inform your Lordship that the Greek Government are daily becoming more and more aggressive in their attitude towards Turkey. Volunteers are being openly enrolled here for an expedition to assist the insurgents in Crete, soldiers and even artillerymen from the regular army are encouraged to volunteer for this service, funds are being furnished to the Cretan Committee at Syra to enable the "Enosis" to convey supplies to the insurgents. Armstrong guns from the Government arsenal at Nauplia have been sent to arm the "Enosis" or to be landed in Crete, and the Commander-in-chief of North-western Greece, Colonel Scalzo Dimos, has been summoned to Athens, to place himself, as it is said, at the head of the insurgent forces in Crete.

On the 19th instant, the well-known Mainiote Chief Petropoulaki left Athens in the steamer "Panhellenion" for Gythion in Lakonia. He was accompanied by a considerable

body of volunteers, many of whom had been recruited from the regular army and were dressed in uniform. On his way to embark at the Piræus a Greek flag was displayed from the carriage, and everything appears to have been done to attract attention and to prove to the nation that the Government are in earnest in the support they are now affording to the insurrection. It is said that on its arrival in Maina the corps of Petropoulaki will be raised to about 1,000 men, and that it will then be transported to Cerigo or Cerigotto, whence it will proceed to Crete in the steamers "Crete," "Enosis," and "Panhellenion."

Mr. Consul Lloyd writes from Syra on the 18th instant:—"Money has been received from Athens by the Committee here; some 100,000 drachmas, I believe, in Treasury bills, which are discounted here at 16 and 17 per cent., and this is how some of the money goes. . . . . Yesterday there arrived here a small Greek Government steamer, ostensibly for the purpose of going to some of the islands to take the Deputies to Athens; but I hear she has on board two Armstrong guns (40-pounders), which it is intended to put on board the 'Enosis,' though for what purpose I can hardly imagine. . . . . They have been landed at the Greek Steam Navigation Company's works, to be adapted to the 'Enosis.'" On the 21st, he adds:—"On the evening of the 18th, the 'Enosis' left Syra for Crete, and has just returned; she reports having landed her cargo at Chryso of Selino, between Suja and Tripeti, without molestation, on Thursday night. Sawas Pasha was at Franco-Castelli, with troops, for an attack on Sphakia. The 'Panhellenion' has left for the Piræus, as it is said, to take on board Petropoulaki and a number of volunteers and small cannon. She will then go to Nauplia, to fetch more men; when the whole will be brought here to embark in the 'Enosis.'"

On the 23rd instant, Mr. Lloyd writes:—"The 'Enosis' again left Syra on Saturday evening, as is said, for Messara. . . . . The 'Panhellenion' has not yet returned. . . . . We hope she will go direct to Cerigotto, and not come here with her cargo of roughs. . . . . The two Armstrong guns for the 'Enosis' are still here. . . . . The Clerk of the Turkish Consul, Mr. Axelos, was beaten yesterday by some Cretans. Mr. Axelos has complained to the Nomarch, who has referred him to the Procureur du Roi and the Tribunals."

The Turkish Government have, as your Lordship is aware, chartered two merchant-steamers under the French flag, which are to be sent here to be placed at the disposal of any Cretan refugees who may be desirous of returning to their own country; but these vessels have not yet arrived, and from the turn which events are taking, I think it highly improbable that any considerable number of refugees will care or will be allowed to embark. The French Admiral is instructed to afford his "moral support" to any vessels under the French flag chartered for this purpose; but the Greek Government are too well aware of the real meaning of the Admiral's instructions to be deterred from the course they are pursuing by any apprehension of actual interference on the part of the French squadron in these waters.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

No. 3.

Mr. Elliot to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 6.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December* 5, 1868, 11·40 P.M.

THE Turkish Government had decided at once to break off relations with Greece, and to expel Greek subjects from the Empire; but to prevent the appearance of precipitancy they have resolved in the first instance to communicate their resolution to the three Protecting Powers.

I am consequently invited to state to Her Majesty's Government that the Porte are resolved to put this measure in execution on Saturday the 12th instant, unless in the meantime they receive assurances that Petropoulaki's band of volunteers shall be dissolved, that the departure of armed blockade-runners shall be prevented, and that efficient protection shall be afforded to the Sultan's Cretan subjects who wish to return to their island.

The Sultan's Government, in making this communication, trust that, if the Greek Government fail to give these assurances, the three Powers will recognize the right of the Porte to take the measures which have been unwillingly forced upon them.

Copy of this despatch has been sent to Her Majesty's Minister at Athens.

No. 4.

Mr. Erskine to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 178.)
My Lord, *Athens, November* 28, 1868.

AS I am informed by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople that, should the Hellenic Government openly connive at the departure of a large body of volunteers for Crete, the Porte is resolved to break off diplomatic relations with Greece, and to expel all the Hellenic subjects residing in Turkey, I think it advisable to place on record the circumstances which, in my opinion, tend to establish the fact that such connivance has taken place:—

1. For some time past it had been well known to every one in Athens that Petropoulaki was raising a body of volunteers to aid the insurgents in Crete; and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, when spoken to on the subject, contented himself with replying that Greek citizens had a right to go where they pleased; and that the laws of Greece did not authorize the Government to interfere, even with such an expedition as that of Petropoulaki.

2. On or about the 18th instant, a steamer called the "Panhellenion," belonging to the Greek Steam Navigation Company, was specially dispatched from Syra to embark the volunteers at the Piræus. The regular steamer touching at the different ports of the Peloponnesus leaves the Piræus on Monday, whereas this vessel started on Thursday evening from the Piræus, and, in a small place like this, it is impossible that her proceedings should not have attracted the attention of the authorities. On the 25th instant, Mr. Consul Lloyd further reported that the "Panhellenion" had just returned to Syra, after, as was stated there, landing 200 volunteers at Gythion, which is a small port at the southern extremity of the Peloponnesus, by which communication is kept up with Maina, a province of which Petropoulaki is a native, and whence it was said that the bulk of the recruits for his expedition was to be derived. I cannot state precisely how many volunteers left the Piræus in the "Panhellenion," but it is said about 180, and upwards of 100 were seen by the French Consul and others as they were about to embark. They were not, I believe, all armed with muskets; but many of them wore uniform, with large boots, and of course their arms could have been served out to them on board. I have further been informed, on what I consider good authority, that 50 artillerymen and 60 firemen ("pompiers") were induced to volunteer for this expedition; but as I have no proof, I will not insist on this point.

3. On the arrival of the steamer at Nauplia, Petropoulaki immediately placed himself in communication with the authorities, and was furnished by them with several small rifled guns, besides the stores of all kinds requisite for an expeditionary force of the sort. I am told, moreover, that he was joined by thirty or forty men at Nauplia, which would about raise the expedition to the strength mentioned by Mr. Lloyd.

4. A Government vessel (which I have ascertained to be the "Aphroessa") landed two 40-pounder Armstrong guns at the works of the Greek Steam Navigation Company at Syra, and it is understood that they will be mounted and placed on board the "Enosis."

Now, it appears to me that the body of evidence above mentioned is sufficient to prove, not merely that the Hellenic Government have done nothing to prevent the departure of this expedition, but that they have actually contributed to its equipment; nor can I doubt that they have furnished a part, at least, of the funds necessary for the payment of the men.

If, therefore, these 200 men, reinforced by others who may be raised by Petropoulaki in Maina, should succeed in effecting a landing in Crete, the Hellenic Government will undoubtedly have incurred a grave liability towards the Porte.

On the 22nd instant, the "Enosis" landed a cargo and ten Cretans at Miston, in the Province of Rhison, in the south-east of Crete, returning to Syra on the 24th.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

No. 5.

Sir A. Buchanan to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 272.)

St. Petersburgh, December 1, 1868.

My Lord,

THE speech which your Lordship addressed to the electors of King's Lynn has given great satisfaction here; and I have the honour to inclose the translation which appeared in this day's "Journal de St. Pétersbourg," of an article upon it, published in the "Moscow Gazette" of the 28th ultimo.

This article is, however, principally intended to do honour to Prince Gortchakoff, who, it says, held two years ago, in a despatch to Baron Brunnow, the same opinions now expressed by your Lordship, as to its being dangers from within, and not foreign aggression, which are likely to compromise the existence of the Turkish Empire.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 5.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of November $\frac{18}{30}$, 1868.

DANS son numéro d'avant-hier, Samedi, la "Gazette de Moscou" publie l'article suivant :—

"Depuis plus d'un demi-siècle les hommes d'Etat de l'Angleterre font tous leurs efforts pour cacher au monde la véritable signification et la seule issue possible de la question d'Orient. Depuis Pitt jusqu'à Lord Stanley il n'y a pas eu un seul Ministre Britannique qui n'ait cru de son devoir de mettre en jeu toutes les finesses de la dissimulation pour tenir le monde dans une complète ignorance au sujet du problème de l'Orient, qu'aucun d'entre eux n'a voulu placer consciencieusement sous son véritable aspect. Lord Palmerston s'est fait particulièrement remarquer par l'énergie et la persévérance avec lesquelles il a suivi ce système.

"Sous prétexte de la nécessité de s'opposer aux prétendus attentats de la Russie et de garantir l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman contre de soi-disant attaques du dehors, il a permis le développement du mal intérieur dont souffre cet empire et s'est appliqué à le cacher non-seulement à l'Europe, mais encore à la Turquie elle-même. Il n'y a pas plus de deux ans que Lord Derby, s'obstinant dans le même système, crut devoir déclarer en pleine Parlement que tous les malheurs qui accablent l'Orient se bornent à quelques désagrémens administratifs dont la population Chrétienne exagère l'importance. Mais *tempora mutantur!* Le fils de Lord Derby a convaincu son illustre père de n'avoir pas dit la vérité.

"Le discours qu'il a prononcé il y a deux semaines devant les électeurs de Lynn est un événement sur lequel le dernier mot n'a pas encore été dit. Nous avons déjà signalé ce discours et nous avons l'intention d'en parler plus longuement par la suite. En ce moment nous nous bornerons à appeler l'attention sur le passage qui est relatif à l'Orient.

"'Je crains bien,' a dit Lord Stanley en parlant de la Turquie, 'que personne, en jetant les yeux sur cette partie du monde, ne puisse douter qu'il ne s'amasse des nuages de ce côté. Cela peut venir promptement, cela peut être différé pendant des années, mais il est probable que cela viendra. Or c'est là un état de choses sur lequel nous ne devons pas fermer les yeux . . . . . .

"'Je ne pense pas que les dangers qui menacent l'Empire Turc viennent du dehors; c'est plutôt un péril intérieur qu'un danger extérieur qui menace cet Empire. Aucune alliance étrangère, aucune garantie Européenne ne saurait protéger un Gouvernement contre la prostration financière ou contre la révolte dans ces provinces.'

"Ces vérités incontestables, qui pendant si longtemps n'ont pas été reconnues en Angleterre et qui jusqu'à présent sont niées avec tant d'emportement, ont été formulées par Lord Stanley le 13 Novembre, 1868. Quels qu'aient été les motifs qui ont porté le Ministre Anglais à tenir ce langage, le sens direct de ces paroles est clair et ne peut être interprété de deux façons.

Mais il y a deux ans, le 12 Septembre, 1866, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'une autre grande Puissance s'exprimait sur la même question dans des termes dont il ne sera pas inutile de signaler la frappante analogie avec les paroles de Lord Stanley :—

"'Aucun danger ne menace la Porte de notre part,' écrivait ce Ministre. 'Mais, sans nous permettre de préjuger les décrets de la Providence, nous ne nous dissimulons pas les

périls auxquels est exposée l'existence du Gouvernement Ottoman par suite de sa désorganisation intérieure . . . . Nous sommes convaincus que la paix avec ses sujets Chrétiens, basée sur une satisfaction de leurs aspirations légitimes, est une condition de rigueur pour l'existence de ce pouvoir.'

"La première proclamation de ces vérités, alors si froidement accueillis à Londres et maintenant si hautement exprimées par Lord Stanley, appartient au Chancelier de l'Empire de Russie; les lignes ci-dessus ont été écrites par lui à l'Ambassadeur de Russie à Londres, et on peut les retrouver dans l'un des documents diplomatiques contenus dans le recueil officiel que notre Gouvernement a publié l'année dernière.

"Ce fait parle plus éloquemment que tous les arguments contre le système d'abstention préconisé chez nous par quelques personnes, système d'après lequel la Russie devrait assister les bras croisés et en silence à tout ce qui se fait et se fera en Orient, tant qu'elle ne se verra pas obligée d'opposer un million d'hommes à une coalition Européenne. L'indifférence à courte vue des partisans de ce système ne voit pas qu'une Puissance comme la Russie ne peut garder impunément le silence, de même qu'elle ne peut parler inutilement.

"L'emploi de la force est souvent une preuve de l'injustice de la cause qu'on est appelé à défendre. Celui qui a pour lui le droit et la raison ne doit pas renoncer à l'emploi d'une arme morale qui souvent est plus efficace que les canons et les baïonnettes.

"Il y a encore une autre question Européenne qui sort peu à peu de l'obscurité. Nous voulons parler de la question Polonaise.

"Nous avons récemment mentionné le bruit que le Gouvernement Français aurait l'intention de cesser les secours pécuniaires qu'il donne à l'anarchie dans la personne des émigrés Polonais. Ce bruit semble se confirmer et on croit qu'à la prochaine discussion du budget Francais les allocations affectées à ce sujet seront supprimées.

"Il faut donc croire que dans les sphères officielles de Paris on commence à juger sainement la funeste mystification connue sous le nom de question Polonaise. C'est déjà beaucoup de gagné dans l'intérêt de l'équilibre et de la tranquillité générale; mais chose encore plus digne de remarque, c'est que sous ce rapport la lumière commence à se faire non-seulement dans les sphères officielles, mais encore parmi les agitateurs Européens. Il n'y a pas longtemps que Mazzini adressait aux Polonais une lettre dont nous extrayons ce qui suit :—

"'Le sang qui coule dans vos veines est le sang Slave. Vous êtes les frères des hommes qui peuplent les terres Serbes, la Bosnie, l'Herzégovine, le Montenegro, et réclament la propriété du sol qu'ils cultivent. Ces hommes, ces Slaves, se soulèveront prochainement au nom du droit, sur lequel vous vous fondez au nom des mêmes traditions que vous, au nom d'une vie dont l'heure est venue, de la vie du monde Slave, vie dont vous devez être vous-mêmes les proclamateurs armés. Marcherez-vous contre eux? Combattrez-vous pour le croissant contre la croix, pour le fatalisme contre la liberté, pour l'immobilité contre le progrès, pour le fait contre le droit, pour l'asservissement étranger contre le travail indépendant, pour l'Asie contre l'Europe? Sacrifierez-vous le berceau à la tombe?'

"En laissant de côté le ton que Mazzini emploie en s'adressant à ses confrères en anarchie, on ne saurait cependant se dispenser de reconnaître tout le poids des accusations méritées qu'il fait peser sur les Polonais. Ils sacrifient le berceau à la tombe; ces deux mots renferment toute l'histoire et l'esprit de la Pologne Schliakhtique, cléricale et anarchique."

No. 6.

Mr. Erskine to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Athens, December 7, 1868.

I HAVE unofficially communicated to the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs the substance of Elliot's telegram of the 5th instant. The French Minister and Russian Chargé d'Affaires have made very similar communications, the latter recommending conciliations, but I cannot perceive the least disposition to recede.

French Minister is expecting instructions to act officially; and the Greek Government evidently think that time will be given them to reply to the Protecting Powers and to an ultimatum of the Porte, which they assume must precede a rupture.

No. 7.

*Lord Stanley to Mr. Erskine.**

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 7, 1868.

AS the matter is urgent and admits of no delay, I cannot hesitate to desire you to warn the Greek Government of the serious danger in which they are involving themselves, and of the certainty that they can expect no countenance or support from other Powers in a contest with Turkey wantonly provoked by Greece.

No. 8.

Lord Stanley to Mr. Erskine.

(N. 87.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 7, 1868.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 174 of the 25th ultimo, and to information which I have received from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, the substance of which he has communicated to you, respecting steps about to be taken by the Porte in consequence of the aggressive attitude of Greece towards Turkey, I have now to state to you that as the matter is urgent and admits of no delay, I feel it incumbent upon me to furnish you with instructions on the subject instead of, as I should have preferred, leaving the question to be dealt with by my successor.

Under the circumstances I cannot hesitate to instruct you, therefore, by the present despatch, as I have already done by telegraph, to warn the Greek Government of the serious danger in which they are involving Greece, and of the certainty that they can expect no countenance or support from other Powers in a contest with Turkey, wantonly provoked on the part of Greece.

I am, &c.

(Signed) STANLEY.

No. 9.

Mr. Elliot to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 7.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December* 7, 1868, 11 P.M.

AN ultimatum will be sent by telegraph to Athens to-night or to-morrow morning, demanding—

1. The dispersion of the bands of volunteers and the prohibition of the formation of new ones.

2. The disarming of the "Enosis," "Crete," and "Panhellenion," or at least the closing of the Greek ports against them.

3. Efficient aid and protection to the Cretan emigrants desirous of returning.

4 The punishment according to law of those guilty of aggression against Ottoman subjects, and indemnity to the families of the victims.

5. The engagement to follow a line of conduct in accordance with the Treaties and the law of nations.

If the Greek Government do not comply with the demands within a delay of five days, the Ottoman Minister is instructed to leave Athens with his whole Legation, and to direct all Turkish Consuls in Greece to return forthwith to Constantinople.

No. 10.

Sir A. Paget to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 7.)

(Telegraphic.) *Florence, December* 7, 1868.

ITALIAN Government has telegraphed to their Minister at Athens to counsel acceptance of terms proposed by the Porte, with a view to avoid rupture of diplomatic relations, and to avoid for the future just motives of complaint on part of Turkish Government.

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* Copy was sent to Lord Lyons.

No. 11.

Sir A. Buchanan to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 8.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, December* 8, 1868, 2 P.M.

I LEARN from the French Ambassador that he has been instructed to ask Prince Gortchakoff to join Western Powers in endeavouring to prevent a conflict between Greece and Turkey, and that his Excellency said he had already addressed pacific advice to both Governments, but could not support an ultimatum calling upon the King to violate the Greek Constitution which sanctions Greek subjects engaging in warfare except against their own country.

No. 12.

Lord Stanley to Sir A. Paget.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 8, 1868, 11·30 A.M.

THE information contained in your telegram of yesterday has given great satisfaction.

No. 13.

Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 13.)

My Lord, *Compiègne, December* 8, 1868.

THE Marquis de Moustier showed me yesterday a telegram which he had received from M. Bourée, the French Ambassador at Constantinople. He had, he said, lost no time in sending directions by telegraph to the Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne to communicate it to your Lordship. It related, in fact, to a matter of very serious importance, and one which admitted of no delay. In short, it appeared that if some means were not found before the end of the week of improving the relations between Turkey and Greece, the Porte would dismiss the Greek Minister from Constantinople, close its harbours against Greek ships, and force all Hellenic subjects to quit the Ottoman dominions.

M. Bourée telegraphed that he had obtained the delay till the end of the week with the greatest difficulty, and was convinced that it would be impossible to induce the Porte to prolong it, unless Greece complied with the ultimatum laid down. M. de Moustier thought that M. Bourée was right in this opinion. I must, he observed, be well acquainted with the character of the Grand Vizier, Aali Pasha, and be aware that, though a very quiet, cautious man, he had a very large share of Ottoman pride, and was quite capable of coming to a resolution rather to perish with honour than submit to constant humiliation. I must know, too, that his language was always well weighed, and that he said less rather than more than he meant. On first hearing the rumour that the Porte intended to break off relations with Greece, M. de Moustier had telegraphed to M. Bourée that the French Government could not but regard it as a personal slight, if the Porte should take so serious a step without consulting it. The telegram which he had shown me contained Aali Pasha's answer. I had, he said, seen that his Highness had declared that he could not listen any more to counsels which had now for more than two years been followed with disastrous results. M. de Moustier was in fact convinced that the Porte was fully resolved to execute what it had threatened, unless it received satisfaction before the end of the week.

He had, he said, spoken in this sense to M. Rangabis, the Greek Minister at Paris, who had just left him. He had even read to M. Rangabis a passage in a letter from Baron Baude, the French Minister at Athens, which stated that after all that had occurred, the Turks could not but resort to the measures they had announced. He had assured M. Rangabis that Baron Baude was a cool well-judging man, kindly disposed towards Greece, who would not have written this if the case against the Greek Government had not been very strong. M. de Moustier said, in conclusion, that he had used very calm and moderate language in speaking to M. Rangabis, and had begged him to see in this calmness and moderation a proof of the very serious importance which he attached to the dangerous crisis at which the relations between Turkey and Greece had arrived.

M. de Moustier did not in speaking to me propose any definite course of action, but said that he was extremely desirous that our two Governments should act together. He appeared to be very anxious that instructions should be sent immediately to Her Majesty's Minister at Athens to act energetically and unreservedly in concert with Baron Baude.

The case was, he said, extremely urgent; in fact, if anything was to be done by us to avert a rupture between Turkey and Greece it must be done before Saturday next, the 12th instant. He trusted that, even under present circumstances, Her Majesty's Government might be able to give immediate attention to it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 14.

Mr. Erskine to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 10.)

(Telegraphic.) *Athens, December 10, 1868.*

IN a note addressed to the Representatives of the three Powers, dated yesterday, the Greek Government refuse to interfere with the band of Petropoulaki, but promise that neither officers nor soldiers of the army shall join him. They further undertake that no armed merchant-ship shall leave their ports, and that they will continue to protect refugees desirous to leave.

The Turkish Minister has received a note which amounts to the refusal of his demands. To-morrow he will send in his ultimatum.

No. 15.

Mr. Elliot to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 454.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, November 29, 1868.*

I RECEIVED, this afternoon, from Mr. Erskine, a copy of his despatch to your Lordship, No. 174 of the 25th instant, reporting the aggressive attitude adopted by the Greek Government towards Turkey, and I subsequently called upon the Grand Vizier and inquired what account had been received by the Porte from their Minister at Athens.

Aali Pasha regretted to have to say that Photiades Bey's despatches left little prospect of it being possible for the Sultan's Government to avoid breaking off relations with Greece. He then read me a portion of these reports, which exactly coincided with Mr. Erskine's account of the open encouragement which is being given by the Greek Government to the enrolment of volunteers for Crete, of the enlistment of soldiers for the service, and of their having received arms from the Government stores.

Photiades Bey adds, that he had reason to believe that the whole garrison of Nauplia were being encouraged to take part in it.

In the face of such unwarrantable proceedings, it was not possible, Aali Pasha said, for a Government with any feelings of self-respect to remain passive.

The Turkish Government had carried patience and forbearance to their utmost; but there were limits beyond which they could not go without degenerating into weakness, which public opinion would not tolerate.

The Sultan could not allow his Representative to remain at Athens, to be witness of what was now going on there, and a rupture of the relations of the two countries seemed, therefore, unavoidable.

The Greeks would probably care little for the recall of the Turkish Legation from Athens, or of the Greek Legation from Constantinople; but if the Porte found it necessary to take the step which was almost forced upon them, they would accompany it with the expulsion from the Turkish Empire of all Greek subjects, and with the exclusion of Greek vessels from Turkish waters.

I said that before such a serious step was decided on, I hoped he would carefully weigh all the consequences it might involve.

I was ready freely to admit, what I imagined few Governments or individuals would be prepared to contest, that the proceedings described in the last despatches from Greece would sufficiently justify the Porte in openly resenting them, and that they could not be accused of precipitancy nor of violence if they acted as his Highness proposed.

Nevertheless, the measure hinted at was not one lightly to be adopted, the more especially as it would almost appear as though a rupture were what the Greek Government were now aiming at.

The progress that had latterly been made in the suppression of the Cretan insurrection rendered it evident that no great length of time could elapse before its entire extinction might be calculated upon, unless it were artificially excited and kept alive by renewed

interference from abroad: and it was not impossible that the Greek Government are now provoking a rupture with Turkey, in the hopes that it might lead to complications which may ultimately cause a European intervention, now that they hope to see in England a Government more favourable to Greek pretensions.

Aali Pasha inquired what injurious effect upon Turkey such an intervention could now have?

Was it to be supposed after Turkey had shown herself able to reduce the island to submission, not only without assistance, but in spite of moral and material support afforded to the insurgents by foreign Governments, that the Powers should step in and hand the island over to Greece.

I said, I agreed with him in looking upon such a proceeding as impossible; but a rupture of relations, and the expulsion of the Greek subjects from Turkey, might easily lead to further questions, which the Governments hostile to Turkey might not be unwilling to take advantage of.

Incursions into Thessaly and Epirus might be looked to as the first consequence, and the numerous Greek sailors who now find their livelihood in Turkish waters might be expected to give trouble.

With regard to the frontier, Aali Pasha said, he had not a shade of anxiety; for the Porte were fully able to answer for the tranquillity of the border provinces; and he did not attach much importance to anything the Greek sailors might do now; that nearly the whole of Candia is in the hands of the Imperial troops.

Nevertheless, he did not conceal from himself the gravity of the step he had spoken of, and deeply regretted that it seems to be forced upon the Government.

I said, I had thought it right to urge him to act with all deliberation in so momentous a matter, without calling in question his perfect right to proceed as he proposes; but it was with difficulty I refrained from adding, that in the position in which things have now arrived, I fully agreed with him in considering that the Porte could not avoid the adoption of vigorous measures without a sacrifice of self-respect, greater than any Government can be expected to submit to.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 16.

Mr. Elliot to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 455. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, November 29, 1868.*

THE Grand Vizier mentioned to me to-day, with as near an approach to irritation as he ever exhibits, that General Ignatieff had thought proper to warn him not to calculate too much on the progress of the pacification of Crete, and to remind him that Her Majesty's present Government were likely to be in a minority in the new Parliament, and would probably be replaced by Mr. Gladstone, who, as a known Philhellene, would show his sympathy for the insurgents.

His Highness said he had replied to the Russian Ambassador by remarking that, though he should regret it if a Minister of Her Majesty should express sympathy with the revolted subjects of the Sultan, he felt no apprehension of the insurgents receiving support from Her Majesty's ships, and, unless such support were given, the Porte felt perfectly confident of the early pacification of the island.

I should scarcely have thought this worth reporting to your Lordship, if it had not been that General Ignatieff's remark may, perhaps, furnish the clue to the suddenly increased encouragement given to the insurrection by the Greek Government.

It is probably considered at Athens that, if the insurrection can be kept alive for a few weeks longer, a new Government in England might be found less firm in adhering to the strict neutrality that has been followed by your Lordship, and to which the Turkish Government owe so much.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 17.

Mr. Elliot to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 457.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December 1, 1868.*

THE Grand Vizier yesterday informed the Sultan that, in his opinion, the Greek Government had carried their aggressive policy to a point which left his Majesty no alternative but to break off the relations between the two countries.

His Majesty has given his cordial assent to a measure which seems imperatively called for by the neglect or violation by the Greek Government of all the duties due to a neighbouring State, and a Council of Ministers is called for to-morrow, when the decision of the Sultan and of the Grand Vizier will be submitted to them, and immediately put into execution.

The resolution is, no doubt, one of very serious import, even if it should not lead to anything further. The Hellenic subjects are so numerous throughout the Empire, and have so large a share in the commercial and industrial affairs, while their navigation so far exceeds that of any other nation in the Turkish waters, that their expulsion will inflict upon very many individuals a loss that can hardly be calculated, and must produce a disturbance that will be extensively felt in commercial affairs.

The Turkish Government do not shut their eyes to the gravity of the step they are about to take, but they consider that they have no choice left; that the authority of the Sultan would sink too low in the minds of his people, were he longer, without resenting it, to tolerate proceedings which have pushed his forbearance to a point beyond which its continuance would only be attributed to inability to take the measures that would long ago have been adopted by any other independent Sovereign under similar provocation.

Turkey is no doubt weak, weaker, perhaps, than at any previous period; but the deference she has conceived herself obliged to show to the recommendation of the European Powers has tended to give an appearance of weakness, which is rapidly producing the reality.

On the other hand, Greece has become convinced that there was no amount of provocation that Turkey would dare or be permitted to resent.

If Turkey is to continue to exist, she must show that she has the elements of vitality, and that she has still at least sufficient strength to enforce respect from a fourth-rate State.

She cannot be accused of aggression, but, while asking for no assistance from any quarter, she has a right to expect that, if driven to strong measures by the long continued and increasing hostility of a neighbour, there may be extended to her by the European Powers that principle of non-intervention which is now so generally invoked in international questions.

That the insurrection in Crete has been prolonged, and is now kept alive in great part by the belief that nothing could move the Turkish Government to action, is a truth which few who are acquainted with the facts, would venture to dispute.

Of the numerous Greeks enjoying the protection of the Turkish law, and carrying on, for the most part, lucrative business in the Turkish Empire, there is hardly one who has not subscribed for the support of the insurrection; some doing so from sympathy in the cause, but many more because they could not venture to refuse their countrymen.

The Greeks are, however, shrewd calculators, and can reckon their profits pretty closely, and it may safely be affirmed that if they had suspected that their encouragement of the insurrection would lead to their own expulsion, their sympathy for the insurgents would have remained within moderate bounds.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 18.

Mr. Elliot to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 459. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December 1, 1868.*

BY his despatch No. 931 Lord Lyons informed your Lordship of the dissatisfaction of the French Government with what they regard as the inertness and incapacity exhibited by the Porte, especially as shown by the refusal to establish a monopoly of tobacco, by the delay there has been in getting French vessels for the conveyance of the refugees back

to Crete, and by the impunity with which the blockade-runners have been able to carry on their operations.

I learn from Aali Pasha that reproaches have been addressed to him from Paris in these matters in a tone of which he was disposed to complain.

With regard to the tobacco monopoly his Highness said, as I have informed your Lordship in another despatch, that the Ottoman Government saw sufficient reasons for not consenting to it, and had never held out an expectation of their doing so.

The delay in getting the French ships was caused, Aali Pasha said, by the Companies which traded with the East, including the Messageries Impériales, having declared that they had no vessels available.

With respect to the blockade-runners he had not so much to say, for he admitted that the Ottoman navy had made a deplorable appearance.

Some excuse for it was, however, to be found in the stringency of the orders which had been given to the officers to avoid doing any injury except to the actual persons engaged, and this no doubt had tied their hands.

If ships had been stationed at the points where they would be most likely to intercept the Greek vessels, they would have been exposed to be fired upon from the villages, which fire must have been returned, and all Europe would have been made to ring with the account of the bombardment and massacre of non-combatants, and perhaps of women and children.

He must, however, protest against the tone which the French Government thought themselves entitled to adopt in reference to these matters; they seemed to look upon the advice they gave too much in the light of orders to be obeyed, the neglect of which they had a right to resent.

The Ottoman Government, on the other hand, especially in questions of internal economy, such as the tobacco monopoly, believed themselves to be better acquainted than M. de Moustier with the peculiarities and requirements of the country, and did not admit his right to impose his views upon them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 19.

Mr. Erskine to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 179.)

My Lord, *Athens, December 2, 1868.*

THE Hellenic Government continue to throw every obstacle in their power in the way of the embarkation of the Cretan refugees; and the Turkish Minister has had some difficulty in getting about 200 on board the French merchant-steamer chartered by the Turkish Government, which will, I believe, sail from the Piræus to-night or to-morrow morning for Crete.

M. Bulgaris having held out some hope to Photiades Bey, a few days ago, that the Government would take effectual measures for the protection of the refugees desirous of returning to Crete, who are now in the island of Ægina; a small sailing-vessel was sent over with about twenty Cretans to endeavour to remove the families of those who wished to return home; but the men dispatched on this errand were, as usual, met by the opposite party, who beat and ill-used them to such an extent, that they were too happy to re-embark and sail for the Piræus.

This morning M. Bulgaris has sent to apologize to M. Photiades for what occurred on that occasion, and to promise that more effectual measures shall be adopted another time; but M. Photiades has received so many such promises that he no longer believes that the Hellenic Government are acting in this matter with good faith, or that anything effectual will be done until some energetic step on the part of his Government shall have been adopted.

Mr. Consul Merlin has reported to me, that on the 28th ultimo, two Cretans were shamefully ill-treated and beaten by their countrymen at the Piræus, to prevent them from embarking or persuading others to embark; and he adds, that several police constables who were on the spot, refrained from interfering until the obnoxious Cretans had been soundly beaten. They are now on board the French steamer at the Piræus, with their heads broken. Similar scenes are taking place both here and at the Piræus almost daily; and on more than one occasion very serious disturbances have been prevented only by the interference of a mounted patrol.

M. Delyanni does not deny that soldiers were enlisted by Petropoulaki for his expedition to Crete; but he affirms that the Nomarch of Nauplia succeeded in detaching them

from the land; and that Petropoulaki was ultimately expelled from Nauplia without obtaining any assistance or reinforcements there—a statement which I am disposed to receive with some incredulity.

As far as I know, Petropoulaki has not yet left Gytheon for Crete; and the prospects of the insurrection appear to be so unpromising, that it is just possible the expedition may, after all, be given up, and a rupture with Turkey thus avoided.

Photiades Bey continues to receive instructions by telegraph to address "energetic remonstrances" to the Greek Government against their apparent connivance with the enemies of the Porte; but, as your Lordship will readily understand, things have gone too far for such remonstrances to produce any real effect; and neither the Greek Government nor the Greek people can be induced to believe that the Porte will be permitted to carry out its threat of a diplomatic rupture, or to expel all Hellenic subjects from Turkey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

No. 20.

Mr. Bonar to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 199. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Vienna, December 8, 1868.*

PRINCE YPSILANTI, the Greek Minister at this Court, called upon me yesterday and asked me whether I had yet received any information from your Lordship relative to the events passing in Greece, and to the ultimatum reported to have been addressed by the Porte to the Greek Government.

I answered, that I had no information beyond that gathered from the telegrams contained in the public papers. Whereupon the Prince read to me a despatch he had received on the 6th instant, though dated two or three days previously, from his Government, in which it was stated that that ultimatum was supposed to be imminent, and in which was also quoted the substance of a telegram from Mr. Elliot, which had been received at Athens by Mr. Erskine, saying—"He trusted the ultimatum of the Ottoman Government would not be productive of war, nor cause complications beyond the limits of Greece;" and Prince Ypsilanti asked me if I could explain that message.

I told the Prince that of course I could only give my private opinion on the subject, but what was well known and very clear to me was this: Her Majesty's Government had upon various occasions declined to press hardly upon the Greek Government on the very equitable and considerate grounds that they were not entitled to do so, as long as the Greek Government did what lay in their power to maintain their international obligations, to arrest and put down a movement in the country on the part of the National party which was directed against a neighbouring Power with which Greece was living in amity. The Greek Government professed to be acting in that sense to the best of their power, and Her Majesty's Government put full confidence in that declaration; but, unhappily, that power of the Greek Government had been very inadequate. The movement in Greece for the constant relief and supply of Crete, and to prevent the re-embarkation of Cretan refugees, continued as active and strong as ever; and the sense of Mr. Elliot's despatch, I imagined, was, that the proposed measure of the Ottoman Government would even strengthen the hands of the Greek Government by at least depriving the revolutionary party of the hope of continuing their schemes unchallenged and with perfect impunity.

Prince Ypsilanti then went at great length into the question of the aspirations, so natural and just as he declared them to be, of the Greek people; but the pith and purport of his language was simply, that if the Greek Government were to weigh untimely what they would lose by the chances of war, and what they would also lose by going against the so general and national feeling, there was, in his opinion, no good reason why they should not at once give the preference to the first alternative. Indeed, the whole tone and spirit of Prince Ypsilanti's language was such that it may be sincerely hoped that such are not the opinions and advice offered the Greek Government by the rest of its Diplomatic Agents, or the Greek Government would be likely to be led into serious embarrassments by them.

On going over, an hour ago, to Count Beust, to learn the opinion of the Imperial Government upon the events passing in Greece, I was informed by his Excellency that he had absolutely the most meagre knowledge of them. Baron Prokesch, he believed, was unwell, and, by a strange coincidence, just at this moment he was almost without information from Constantinople. He had even telegraphed, two days ago, to the Ambassador, simply to ascertain whether it was true that the Ottoman Government contemplated, as

reported, the banishment from Turkey of the Greek subjects (a measure which his Excellency seemed to think most impolitic, though he had not as yet proffered one word of counsel upon the subject), but even to that telegram he had as yet received no answer.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. G. G. BONAR.

No. 21.

Safvet Pasha to M. E. Musurus.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by M. E. Musurus, December 12.)

(Télégraphique.) *Constantinople, 9 Décembre, 1868.*

PAR le courrier d'aujourd'hui vous recevrez copie de la note que Photiades Bey a reçu hier l'ordre télégraphique d'adresser au Gouvernement Hellénique pour lui notifier les conditions auxquelles est subordonnée la rupture de nos relations avec la Grèce. Un délai de cinq jours à partir de la notification est fixé pour le rejet ou l'acceptation de ces conditions, que voici:—

1. Disperser immédiatement les bandes de volontaires dernièrement organisées dans différentes parties de la Grèce, et empêcher la formation de nouvelles bandes.

2. Désarmer les corsaires "Enosis," "Crète," et "Panhellenion," ou en tout cas leur fermer l'accès des ports Helléniques.

3. Accorder aux emigrés Crétois non-seulement l'autorisation de retourner dans leur pays, mais encore une aide et une protection efficace.

4. Punir, conformément aux lois, ceux qui se sont rendus coupables d'agression contre les militaires et les sujets Ottomans, et accorder aux familles des victimes de ces attentats une juste indemnité.

5. Suivre désormais une ligne de conduite conforme aux Traités existants et au droit des gens.

Nous sommes persuadés que les Puissances amies de la Sublime Porte apprécieront la gravité et la légitimité des griefs qui l'ont mise dans la nécessité de recourir à cette extrémité, ainsi que la modération des conditions précitées.

No. 22.

The Earl of Clarendon to M. E. Musurus.

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 12, 1868.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of a copy of the telegram which you received from your Government, dated December 9, containing the substance of the ultimatum to be presented by Photiades Bey to the Greek Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 23.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Erskine.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 12, 1868.*

REPEAT to the Greek Government, as by orders of Her Majesty's present Advisers, the warning you were instructed by Lord Stanley's telegram of the 7th instant, to give them as to the danger of the course which they were pursuing towards Turkey.

No. 24.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Erskine.

(No. 2 A.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 12, 1868.

I HAVE to instruct you to repeat to the Government of His Hellenic Majesty, as by orders of Her Majesty's present Advisers, the warning which you were instructed by Lord Stanley's despatch No. 87 of the 7th instant, to give to them in regard to the serious danger in which they were involving Greece, by the course they were pursuing towards Turkey.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 25.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 4.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 12, 1868.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that I approve the language which you held to Aali Pasha, as reported in your despatch No. 454 of the 29th ultimo, on the subject of the threatened rupture of the relations between Turkey and Greece.

I am, &c.
(Signed) STANLEY.

No. 26.

Mr. Erskine to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 181.)
My Lord, *Athens, December* 5, 1868.

SINCE my despatch No. 178, of the 28th ultimo, was written, I have ascertained from a thoroughly trustworthy source that the band of Petropoulaki spent two whole days at Nauplia; that it was about 250 strong on its arrival there; and that it was reinforced by a considerable number of military prisoners, who were liberated on condition of their joining the expedition.

Two mountain guns were supplied to it from the Government Arsenal, in addition to arms and military stores of all kinds; and a sufficient body of artillery-men accompanied the expedition to serve the guns, but I cannot say for certain whether they were taken from this garrison or that of Nauplia.

Petropoulaki eventually left by land for Tripolitza, and other places in the Peloponnesus, to raise recruits; and it was understood that he would rejoin the expedition at Gythion, to which place the "Panhellenion" proceeded with the main body of the volunteers.

I mention these circumstances because M. Delyanni assured Photindes Bey that the authorities had succeeded in "detaching" all the soldiers who had joined the expedition before it left Nauplia, and that Petropoulaki had been expelled from the town—a statement which implied that the Government had done its utmost to discountenance the equipment of a force intended for the invasion of a State with which Greece is ostensibly at peace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

P.S. (Confidential).—The above information was furnished to the French Minister by his Vice-Consul at Nauplia, M. Antonopoulos, a Greek, the brother-in-law of M. Kehaya, a late Minister of Finance, who openly acknowledged, not long since, in the Chamber of Deputies, that the steamer "Crete" (a well-known blockade-runner) had been purchased by the Government in England and ceded to the Steam Navigation Company at Syra. The information I previously gave your Lordship on the subject was derived from a Report of the Austrian Vice-Consul at Nauplia, a Venetian; but I have not mentioned either of these gentlemen in the body of my despatch because it is very desirable that their position at Nauplia should not be jeopardized (as it undoubtedly would be) by its being publicly known that they have acquainted their respective Legations with the aid given by the authorities to the corps of Petropoulaki.

E. M. E.

No. 27.

Mr. Erskine to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 182.)
My Lord, *Athens, December* 5, 1868.

AS it may interest your Lordship to learn the impression produced in this country by your recent speech to the electors of King's Lynn, I inclose two articles upon the subject from the "Grèce" and the "Indépendance Hellénique," Opposition papers published here in the French language. The article from the "Grèce" is written, I feel confident, by M. Tricoupi, Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Government of M. Commoundouros, who affects to think that the views entertained by your Lordship are, at no distant date, destined to emancipate the Christians of the East from the yoke of Turkey, and to realize the ambitious designs of the Greek race, commonly known as "la grande idée." The writer contrasts the elevation of your Lordship's language with the illiberal and short-sighted views of most of the Diplomatic Agents of Great Britain abroad, whom he describes as wedded to the errors of a bygone period, and as animated by an ill-concealed disdain for the liberties of their own country, whilst their minds are so dwarfed by their endeavours to carry out literally the instructions of their Government that they are incapable of originating any truly generous idea; and finally your Lordship is promised a most cordial and enthusiastic reception in the event of your visiting Greece, where you could scarcely fail to become a convert to the doctrines of "la grande idée" as the only practical policy for this kingdom.

I likewise inclose an article from a paper called the "Esprit National," giving an abridged report of a speech said to have been delivered by Mr. Tuckerman, the United States Minister at this Court in which he speaks of the aggrandizement of Greece as the only practicable remedy for the evils from which she is now suffering.

I transmit, also, a copy of a petition addressed to King George by 400 students of the University of Athens, and in which His Majesty is sharply taken to task for supporting so unpatriotic a Ministry as that of M. Bulgaris. This petition, it appears, was delivered by a deputation of students to the aide-de-camp on duty at the palace, and although I have reason to believe that His Majesty was much irritated by the unseemliness of its tone, I have not heard that any step has been taken either to repudiate the document or to punish its authors.

And lastly I inclose a copy of a letter addressed to the newspapers by the King's Private Secretary, declaring that in his opinion, "neither royalty, the Government, nor private persons, should cease labouring in favour of the annexation of Crete," and insinuating at the close of the letter that the writer is expressing the real sentiments of His Majesty.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 27.

Extract from "La Grèce" of December 3, 1868.

Inclosures 2 and 3 in No. 27.

Extracts from "Indépendance Hellénique" of December 3, 1868.

No. 28.

Lord A. Loftus to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 452.)
My Lord, *Berlin, December* 11, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith an article from the "Presse de l'Allemagne du Sud," which has been reproduced in the columns of the "Correspondance de Berlin," commenting on the present state of affairs in Eastern Europe, and deducing from the arguments used the improbability that Russia can meditate the outbreak of a war in the East for the acquisition of Constantinople.

I am induced to forward this article to your Lordship as it tallies with the opinions of competent persons here. I am told that Russia is not favourable to the idea of the Greeks becoming inheritors of the Turkish Empire and possessors of Constantinople.

She would prefer to leave the possession of this important point in the hands of a weak Power rather than that it should form the capital of a strong and independent kingdom.

On these and other grounds therefore it may be presumed that Russia will not favour the ambitious projects of Greece, and will unite with the Western Powers in maintaining the *status quo* in the East.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 28.

Extract from the "Correspondance de Berlin."

L'ARTICLE suivant de la "Presse de l'Allemagne du Sud" mérite, eu égard aux dernières nouvelles d'Orient, d'être lu avec un intérêt particulier:—

"On reproche à la Russie d'intriguer en Orient, pour exploiter à son profit la crise qu'elle y aurait fait éclater. On prétend qu'elle vise à la possession de Constantinople. Outre que ce dernier point n'est aucunement prouvé, et qu'en Russie même de sages et puissants hommes d'Etat repoussent énergiquement une idée pareille, parce que l'Empire Russe devrait déplacer alors son centre de gravité et que ce déplacement entraînerait à sa suite les complications intérieures les plus graves,—quelles chances s'offrent aujourd'hui à la Russie de terminer avec succès une nouvelle guerre Orientale?

"La situation intérieure de la Russie est meilleure, nous l'accordons, qu'au temps de la guerre de Crimée. Les chemins de fer du Sud sont terminés, ou à peu près; le transport facile des troupes est assuré dans cette partie de l'Empire. L'armée est mieux armée, mieux organisée. De meilleures finances lui permettraient, nous voulons le croire, de couvrir les frais d'une guerre si coûteuse. Enfin, le peuple Russe se lèverait comme un seul homme à l'appel du Gouvernement et sacrifierait volontiers ses biens et sa vie pour une telle entreprise, car une guerre contre le Croissant sera toujours populaire en Russie. Voilà pour les chances heureuses.

"Mais sur quels alliés la Russie peut-elle compter dans le cas d'une guerre en Orient? Sur la Prusse, voudra-t-on dire? Celle-ci n'aura garde d'assurer à la Russie un appui direct. Elle ne peut lui venir en aide qu'indirectement en concentrant une armée sur le Rhin, une autre en Silésie, et en jouant de la sorte un rôle à peu près pareil à celui que jouerait la Russie elle-même dans l'éventualité d'une guerre Franco-Prussienne.

Ce parti-là est même douteux; la Prusse aimerait mieux peut-être observer la même neutralité que pendant la guerre de Crimée, ce qui équivaudrait à jeter sur les bras de la Russie, outre les Turcs, les Français et les Anglais, trois ou quatre cent mille Autrichiens, car on ne mettra guère en doute que l'Autriche ne prenne une part active dans une nouvelle guerre d'Orient.

"Si la presqu'île des Balkans sert de théâtre à la guerre, les sympathies des races Chrétiennes n'auront pour la Russie aucune valeur sérieuse; en de pareilles circonstances la révolution perd tout portée, et on l'étouffe sans ménagement. La Roumanie et la Serbie pourraient se ranger du côté du Czar, mais quel secours lui apporteraient ces pays, eussent-ils trouvé l'occasion de mettre leurs armées sur le pied de guerre?

"Dans l'hypothèse la plus favorable, la Russie pourrait compter sur le concours des Etats Unis d'Amérique, mais alors les flottes réunies des Puissances Occidentales suffiraient pour neutraliser l'aide Américaine. La France, comme alliée de l'Autriche, n'aurait nul besoin, cette fois, de transporter son armée en Orient par la voie de mer; elle utiliserait les chemins de fer Italiens et Autrichiens, et pourrait ainsi jeter sur le théâtre de la guerre deux fois plus de troupes que du temps de la guerre de Crimée.

"En de telles circonstances, y aurait-il la moindre sagesse, de la part de la Russie, à provoquer une guerre dont l'issue, comme on voit, serait si douteuse, qui lui coûterait, même dans la plus heureuse hypothèse, des sacrifices incalculables, et l'exposerait aux plus graves dangers intérieurs? Si la Russie voulait tirer de l'acquisition de Constantinople un avantage pratique, et, une fois sur le Bosphore, couper court à de nouvelles guerres, elle devrait y transporter le centre de son Empire. C'est presque une impossibilité. Si néanmoins tel était son plan, les préparatifs seraient déjà faits de longue date, et ne sauraient rester enveloppés d'un voile. Un Empire gigantesque comme la Russie

ne peut tenter subitement une pareille métamorphose, sans s'exposer aux plus redoutables ébranlements.

"L'unique solution favorable de la question d'Orient consiste, pour la Russie, dans la formation successive d'Etats Chrétiens indépendants, qui prendraient peu à peu la place de l'Empire Turc."

No. 29.

Mr. Erskine to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 14.)

(Telegraphic.) *Athens, December* 14, 1868.

I HAVE communicated your Lordship's telegram of the 7th instant to the Greek Government. The French, Austrian, Prussian, and Italian Ministers have offered similar advice, but I believe the Government are determined to allow the Turkish Minister to leave on Thursday next, in the persuasion that the Powers will not permit a rupture of relations to degenerate into actual hostilities.

No. 30.

Mr. Elliot to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 14.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December* 14, 1868, 5·40 P.M.

PRINCE GORTCHAKOFF telegraphs to the Russian Ambassador that M. de Moustier considers the most dangerous moment of the Turco-Greek quarrel has passed, and that the Powers should concert upon the action to be taken at the Porte.

The French Ambassador has received nothing similar.

I do not believe the Porte would now be stopped in the measures resolved upon by anything short of an engagement by the Powers that Greece should fulfil her international duties.

No. 31.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 3.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 15, 1868.

COUNT BERNSTORFF has read to me a despatch from Count Bismarck, stating that a report had reached the Prussian Minister at Constantinople of the intention of the Greek Government to place Greek subjects under the protection of Prussia in the event of a rupture between Greece and the Porte.

Count Bismarck did not say that the application, if made, would be declined, but intimated that it would be more properly addressed to one of the three Protecting Powers.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 32.

Mr. Erskine to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 15.)

(Telegraphic.) *Athens, December* 15, 1868.

AS the "Enosis" was returning from Candia yesterday morning, after landing the expedition of Petropoulaki, she fell in with two Turkish cruizers under Admiral Hobart near Syra, at six miles from land. A blank shot having been fired by one of the cruizers, the Greek answered with a shot which struck the flag-ship, whereupon the cruizers fired more than once at the Greek—who, however, got safe into Syra, where the Admiral now is. He requires that the "Enosis" shall be arrested as an armed pirate, but intimates his willingness to abide by the result of an investigation by the Consular Body. The decision of the Greek Government will be announced by a special steamer this evening.

No. 33.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Erskine.

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 15, 1868.

I HAVE spoken seriously to M. Bräilas-Armeni with respect to the policy and proceedings of his Government, and prefaced my remarks by alluding to a report that had reached me of the great expectations entertained in Greece of support from Mr. Gladstone, whose Philhellenism was well known, and who was now at the head of Her Majesty's Government. I said that no one could desire more ardently than Mr. Gladstone the welfare and prosperity of Greece, and it was because he did so that he regretted and condemned the course which had been lately pursued by the Government; a course which was ruinous to her finances, which checked all progress, which could not be successful, and, even if it were eventually to succeed, it would not be profitable to Greece.

The determination of the Greek people still to take part in the Cretan insurrection, with the tacit, if not avowed, assent of the Government, was a violation of international law which the Porte could no longer endure; and the Turkish Government was now about to adopt measures of repression that were much to be regretted, but the right of resort to them could not be impugned.

These measures, provoked by necessity, and for the protection of the Sultan's interests and dignity, might, I said, menace the peace of Europe; and as all the Great Powers of Europe were unanimous in their desire to avert the calamity of war, Greece would be looked upon as incurring a very heavy responsibility if she persisted in a course of policy that might endanger the maintenance of peace.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 34.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

(No. 13.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 15, 1868.

THE French Ambassador called at this office yesterday, and read to me three despatches; the first was from M. de Talleyrand, reporting a conversation between Prince Gortchakoff and the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires (narrated to him by the latter), in which the Chancellor seems to have spoken in strong terms of disapprobation with respect to the proceedings of the Greek Government, and in friendly terms as to the right of the Porte to resent the injuries of which the Sultan's Government justly complained; but he earnestly recommended that the extreme measures threatened by the Porte, such as the expulsion of all Greek subjects from the Turkish territory, should not at once be resorted to, and that the Porte for the present should be satisfied with the rupture of diplomatic relations, and thus give time for the friendly intervention of other Powers.

Assuming that Prince Gortchakoff was sincere, the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires had reason for the satisfaction he expressed at this language.

The next despatch was from M. de Moustier to M. Bourée, in which the advice usually offered to the Porte was given at great length. Moderation was inculcated, and a policy of patience and expectancy was recommended in preference to the active measures that the Porte now was prepared to adopt.

I remarked to the Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne that although I concurred as to the soundness of much of the advice contained in this despatch, it did not seem to me to recognize with sufficient clearness the right of the Sultan to act as an independent Power in resenting the wrongs he sustained at the hands of the Greeks.

The third despatch was from M. de Moustier to the French Minister at Athens, which set forth in severe, but by no means unfriendly terms, the various acts committed by Greek subjects, with the apparent connivance of the Greek Government, in violation of the duties of good neighbourhood and the obligations of international law, and in the interests of Greece, recommending an immediate change of policy.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 35.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl Clarendon.—(Received December 16.)

(Telegraphic.) *Athens, December* 16, 1868.

I HAVE communicated your Lordship's message of the 12th to the Greek Government. Their answer to the Turkish ultimatum is in all respects so unsatisfactory, that the Legation will leave to-morrow.

Yesterday evening a message was delivered to the Representatives of the three Powers, to the effect that two vessels of war were about to be sent to Syra, with orders to insist that Admiral Hobart shall quit that port in one hour. In the event of his refusal, he will be attacked.

The French Minister, without being aware of this intention, had dispatched a ship of war to try to persuade Hobart Pasha to keep the peace. I have not imitated the example, as I believe the Greek Government would only be emboldened by our interference, to persist in the dangerous course they are pursuing.

No. 36.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Erskine.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 16, 1868.

THE Greek Government must not expect that Her Majesty's Government will place any constraint on the Porte in regard to any measures that it may take to obtain satisfaction from Greece.

Her Majesty's Government earnestly recommend the Greek Government to take such measures, presuming them, of course, to be in compliance with the just demands of international law and obligation, as will prevent the rupture of diplomatic relations from degenerating into the hostilities which appear to be imminent.

No. 37.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Erskine.

(No. 5.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 16, 1868.

AS it appears to be the intention of the Greek Government to allow the Turkish Minister to leave Athens in the persuasion that the Protecting Powers will not allow the rupture of the relations with Turkey to degenerate into actual hostilities, I have to state to you that, in as far as Her Majesty's Government are concerned, the Government of His Hellenic Majesty must not expect that any constraint will be placed on the Porte in regard to any measures which she may think proper to take in order to obtain satisfaction from Greece.

You will state to the Greek Government that Her Majesty's Government earnestly recommend them to lose no time in taking such measures,—presuming them, of course, to be in compliance with the just demands of international law and obligation,—as may prevent the rupture of diplomatic relations with Turkey, from degenerating into the hostilities which at the present moment appear to be imminent.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 38.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Erskine.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 17, 1868.

WAS the Turkish ultimatum altogether rejected, or did the Greek Government express its readiness to accept any portion of its conditions?

Answer immediately.

No. 39.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December 17.*)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December* 16, 1867, 11 P.M.

THE Greek Government having refused the ultimatum, Porte has sent the Greek Minister his passports.

No. 40.

Mr. Elliot to Lord Stanley.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 466.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 5, 1868.

THE Russian Ambassador came to me this morning with the object apparently of inducing me to consent to unite with himself and M. Bourré in taking some joint action to prevent the Ottoman Government from carrying into execution the rupture of the relations with Greece and the expulsion of the Hellenic subjects from Turkey which were known to have been decided upon by the Council of Ministers.

General Ignatieff considered the step to be one of such serious import that, as Representatives of the Protecting Powers of Greece, we were called upon to try to avert a measure which might lead to results that it is impossible now to foresee, and to call upon the Turkish Government to pause before they took a step which he designated as hasty and precipitate.

I had the evening before had a long conversation on the subject with the French Ambassador, and had ascertained that he concurred with me in considering that the provocation which is being systematically given by Greece is so ample and so notorious, that all interference to prevent the Sultan's Government from taking the steps which they think necessary would be uncalled for and unadvisable.

I therefore told General Ignatieff that I must decline taking any step such as he had hinted at, and that, in my opinion, the only safe policy which we could pursue in Turkey, as in other countries, was one of the strictest non-intervention.

The Greek Government has, I said, lately acted in a manner which certainly justified, if it did not imperatively call for, the steps which the Porte seemed resolved to adopt, and if we stepped in in any way to shield it from the consequences of those acts, the Sultan's Government would be entitled to call upon us to undertake that Greece should henceforward fulfil those international duties which she has so long neglected.

I was not prepared to assume, on account of Her Majesty's Government, the moral responsibility which I considered inseparable from any step partaking of the nature of a pressure exerted to prevent the Sultan's Government from acting in the manner which they believed called for by their own interests.

I added, however, that being fully alive to the serious nature of such a step as the expulsion of the Greek subjects, I was on the point of going to the Porte with the view of recommending them to make it known at Athens that if, within the fortnight's delay that it was proposed to afford them, the Greek Government entered into satisfactory engagements with respect to the volunteers and to the protection of the refugees desirous of returning to Crete, the Sultan's Government would then abstain from putting the order into execution.

It seemed a matter for consideration, and which I proposed to discuss with the Grand Vizier whether it would be more desirable to adopt the above suggestion, or, instead of it, to begin by sending to Athens an ultimatum, the rejection of which would be followed by the rupture of relations.

Upon being received by Aali Pasha, I found that he had just been having a conversation with the French Ambassador, who had also come to him to speak in favour of delay in carrying out the resolution of the Council.

His Highness, in deference to the suggestion of M. Bourrée who read him a despatch he had just received from the Marquis de Moustier, had consented, in the first instance, to address himself to the Representatives of the three Protecting Powers of Greece, requesting them to inform their Governments that if by this day week, Saturday the 12th, the Greek Government shall not have undertaken to put a stop to the assemblage of the volunteer bands, to protect the Cretans anxious to return home, to hinder armed vessels from leaving their ports as blockade-runners, and generally to fulfil their international duties, the Sultan's Government was irrevocably resolved to break off relations with Greece and to expel the Greeks.

The Grand Vizier had yielded so far, he said, out of deference to the friendly powers; but he hoped he might expect that if the delay were not attended with the wished-for result no further attempt would be made to interfere with the course which the Porte proposed to follow.

Although I regretted that the Grand Vizier had not adopted what appeared to me the far preferable course of sending an ultimatum directly to Athens, rather than this appeal to the three Powers, I at once expressed my readiness to telegraph to your Lordship immediately on my return home, the communication which had been agreed upon with the French Ambassador.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 41.

Mr. Elliot to Lord Stanley.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 467.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 5, 1868.

KNOWING that it had been insinuated that I had advised the Porte to adopt energetic measures towards Greece, and that there was an attempt to throw upon me the responsibility of the resolution that has been come to, I took the opportunity of my conversation with General Ignatieff this morning to remark that it was entirely incorrect.

For the last fortnight or three weeks the accounts from Greece had shown that the Government there were daily adopting a line of more open aggression, and were trying to outdo their predecessors by the unconcealed assistance they were giving to the Cretan insurrection.

It was evident, as your Lordship must have gathered from Mr. Erskine's correspondence, that the Greek Government had been persuaded by ill-judging sympathisers that they might safely carry out this policy without risk of its being resented by the Porte.

I had ascertained the temper of the Sultan's Government, and I knew their patience to be nearly exhausted, and when I saw the course that was entered upon at Athens, I expressed to my colleagues, to the Greek Minister, as well as to the Russian Ambassador, the conviction that if persisted in it must inevitably end in a rupture.

It was not to be expected that the Porte, which conceives the pacification of Crete to be within sight, should, without resenting it, allow that result to be endangered by the action of a neighbouring Government, but, in the decision that was come to, the Sultan's Government neither consulted me nor any of my colleagues.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 42.

Mr. Elliot to Lord Stanley.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 469.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 6, 1868.

THE fear of provoking a collision which has hitherto restrained the Turkish Government from taking effective measures for putting a stop to the running of the Cretan blockade, has at length given way before the accounts which have been received of the preparations for the conveyance of a large corps of Hellenic volunteers to Crete in steamers "Enossis," "Panhellenion," and "Crete," the last-named being the vessel which the Minister of Finance of the Administration of M. Coumoundouros lately boasted of in the Chambers as having been purchased by the Government.

Admiral Hobart has consequently been dispatched to Crete with a sufficient force, as is believed, to render the future operations of these vessels highly hazardous to them.

Learning that he was about to start, I last night made a point of seeing him for the purpose of impressing upon him how much depended upon the prudence of his conduct in avoiding every act not strictly justified by international law; and I believe he is duly impressed with the responsibility that will rest upon him in this respect.

In dealing with simple unarmed blockade-runners Admiral Hobart conceives himself only authorized to capture them when endeavouring to elude the cruizers; but armed vessels, not provided with papers, he believes to be liable to be treated as pirates according to the recognized law of nations.

He is an energetic officer, and appears determined that the blockade-running shall not continue with its former impunity so long as he is entrusted with the naval command.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 43.

Mr. Elliot to Lord Stanley.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 471.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 7, 1868.

AT a Council of Ministers, held yesterday in the presence of the Sultan, it was resolved to send by telegraph to Athens an ultimatum, of which I have the honour to inclose a transcript.

It demands—

1. The dispersion of the bands of volunteers, and the prohibition to form new ones.

2. The disarming of the blockade runners "Enosis," "Panhellenion," and "Crete," or at least the closing of Greek ports against them.

3. That the Cretan emigrants desirous of returning to their island should receive efficient aid and protection.

4. That those persons who were guilty of aggression against Turkish subjects should be punished according to law, and that indemnity to the families of the victims should be granted.

5. That Greece should engage to adopt a line of conduct more consonant with Treaties and the law of nations.

The delay granted for the acceptance of these demands is five days: if within that term the ultimatum is not accepted, the Ottoman Minister is to leave Athens with the whole of his Legation, and all Turkish Consuls in Greece are to be recalled.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

Inclosure in No. 43.

Safvet Pasha to Photiades Bey.

(Télégraphique.)

1. DE disperser immédiatement les bandes de volontaires dernièrement organisées dans différentes parties du royaume, et d'empêcher la formation de nouvelles bandes.

2. De désarmer les corsaires "Enosis," "Créte," et "Panhellenion," ou en tous cas de leur fermer l'accès des ports Helléniques.

3. D'accorder aux émigrés Crétois non seulement l'autorisation de retourner dans leurs foyers, mais encore un aide et une protection efficaces.

4. De punir conformément aux lois ceux qui se sont rendus coupables d'aggression contre les militaires et les sujets Ottomans, et d'accorder aux familles des victimes de ces attentats une juste indemnité.

5. De suivre désormais une ligne de conduite conforme aux Traités existants et aux droits des gens.

No. 44.

Mr. Elliot to Lord Stanley.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 472.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 7, 1868.

M. DELYANNI, the Greek Minister, called upon me this afternoon, and spoke of the position into which the relations of his Government and that of Turkey had fallen, exhibiting the utmost surprise at the resolution come to by the Porte, which he said he found it impossible to account for otherwise than by the supposition that for some reason or other they had made up their mind to force on a rupture.

He could not conceive as really serious the pretext which was now alleged with respect to the enrolment of Petropoulaki's band, for the same thing had been done with much much more ostentation without provoking a rupture two years ago, when the volunteers were escorted by music and every kind of public manifestation.

I remarked that this was a singular line of defence, and was certainly a poor encouragement for the forbearance then exhibited by the Turkish Government; but it was precisely the accumulation of aggressive acts on the part of the Greeks which had at length led to the present crisis.

I told him that it now lay entirely with his Government to avoid the rupture, for the Turkish Government had put forward demands which could not be characterized as excessive, the rejection of which by Greece would be followed by that regrettable result.

M. Delyanni said, that if the Porte had taken the matter up differently, the question might easily have been arranged, for his Government would not have refused to protect the Cretan refugees, and would probably have made no difficulty in declaring that foolish demonstrations in the streets of Athens, such as had been made by Petropoulaki's followers, would not be permitted to occur again.

I remarked, that if the Greek Government had answered in this sense the repeated protestations and representations of the Turkish Minister, the necessity for having recourse to more stringent measures would never have arisen.

They had, however, on the contrary, persistently refused him either satisfaction for the outrages that had occurred or assurances against the repetition of them for the future, and, remonstrances having failed of effect, the Greek Government could not fairly complain of a different course of proceeding having at last been adopted.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 45.

Mr. Elliot to Lord Stanley.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 473.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 8, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to inclose the copy of a Report from Mr. Pisani, communicating, at the request of the Grand Vizier, the substance of a remark attributed to me by the Russian Ambassador.

The words put into my mouth are so purely imaginary, that I do not attempt to account for them by any possible misunderstanding on the part of General Ignatieff.

A Turkish invasion of Greece is, I believe, an event of which there is not the slightest probability; and I never had occasion to pronounce any opinion whatever respecting the feeling which it might excite in England.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

Inclosure in No. 45.

Mr. Pisani to Mr. Elliot.

Sir, *Pera, December* 8, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to report, that the Grand Vizier told me, confidentially, that the Russian Ambassador sent him to-day a message through General Bogoslowski, to the effect that he had a lengthened interview with your Excellency last night, on the affairs of Greece, and that you entirely shared his opinion; and that you had said that if the Porte dared to violate the Hellenic territory, England would rise as one man to protect it.

His Highness desired the Russian interpreter to say to his Chief, in reply, that he thought that the British Ambassador wanted no Foreign Representative to express his opinions and appreciations, and that he could communicate them to the Porte very freely, either himself or through his chief interpreter; but if General Ignatieff wanted to intimidate the Porte, which he considered very weak, he may be assured that they had still courage enough left not to yield to threats, especially when right was on their side.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. PISANI.

No. 46.

Mr. Elliot to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 474.)
Constantinople, December 8, 1868.

My Lord,

IT having been asserted that the Porte had taken measures for reinforcing their troops in their frontier provinces, I made inquiry this evening into the truth of it, and am assured that the report is altogether untrue.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 47.

Mr. Elliot to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 475.)
Constantinople, December 8, 1868.

My Lord,

IN the telegraphic instruction sent to Photiades Bey, the recall of the Consuls was to be simultaneous with that of the Ministers; but as it seemed desirable that in order to leave time for an accommodation, the rupture should be carried out as gradually as possible, I have strongly recommended that the same delay should be allowed to the Consuls as to the Greek subjects who will be directed to leave the country.

There will, I believe, be no difficulty in the part of the Turkish Government in agreeing to this.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 48.

Mr. Elliot to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 476.)
Constantinople, December 8, 1868.

My Lord,

WHEN the Grand Vizier spoke to me of the demands to be made upon the Greek Government, I begged him not to lose sight of the fact that, under a free Government like that of Greece, many things could be done of which the Porte might have a right to complain, but which the constitution of the country made it impossible for the Hellenic Government to prevent.

For instance, if it were proposed to require that the blockade-runners shall be entirely stopped, the Greeks could not assent to it. While the Greek Government allowed armed private vessels to leave their ports without papers, carrying volunteers with arms, ammunition, and provisions, for Crete, with the avowed intention of resisting the Turkish blockading squadron, they put themselves so far in the wrong that they might fairly be called upon no longer to permit such an abuse of their ports; but this was a very different thing from requiring their interference with respect to unarmed blockade-runners.

Your Lordship will perceive that the demands made with respect to these vessels is limited to such as are armed.

With regard, also to the enlistment of volunteers, it appeared essential to recognize the difference between the open embodiment of corps, as was done by Petropoulaki, and the departure of individuals to take part in a struggle in which the whole nation feels an interest.

In this matter, also, the Porte have limited their demands to the case of the enrolment of bands.

An efficient protection for the Sultan's subjects desirous of returning to Crete, and the punishment of those who have been guilty of the outrages upon them appeared to be demands which the Porte was so clearly entitled to make upon a neighbouring Government, that I did not feel called upon to make any observations with regard to them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 49.

Mr. Erskine to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 184.)
Athens, December 9, 1868.

My Lord,

ON the receipt of Mr. Elliot's telegram of the 5th instant, stating that the Porte would break off diplomatic relations with Greece, and expel all Hellenic subjects from Turkey, unless, before the 12th instant, the Hellenic Government pledged themselves to prevent the departure of Petropoulaki, to prohibit the employment of armed blockade-runners, and to take effectual measures for the protection of the Cretan refugees who desired to return to their country, I called on the French Minister and the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, and ascertained that they, also, had received communications of a similar purport from their respective Embassies at Constantinople.

Baron Baude agreed with me that we should wait upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs and communicate to him unofficially the substance of the intelligence which had reached us; and Prince Gagarine, although he did not acquaint me with the exact tenor of the despatch he had received from General Ignatieff, appeared to be disposed to follow the same course; and he informs Baron Baude that he should advise the Greek Government to reply in a conciliatory tone to any communication which might be made to them by the Porte.

On the 7th instant I accordingly called upon M. Delyanni and said that although I had just heard from your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government had resigned office, and consequently that for some days to come I could not expect to receive any instructions, the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government had been so generally and cordially sanctioned by public opinion, that I could not doubt that any future Cabinet which might be formed would pursue a course very similar to that which had been followed by your Lordship. I trusted, therefore, that in any decision which might be come to on this important question, the Greek Government would not be influenced by the expectation that a change of Government in England would be followed by any material change in the views of Her Majesty's Government as to the aggressive attitude of this country towards Turkey.

I then communicated to M. Delyanni the substance of Mr. Elliot's telegram and did my utmost to persuade him to give the assurances required by the Porte; but, I regret to say that none of my arguments appeared to produce the least impression upon his mind.

He entered into a long retrospective statement to show that there had been no such change in the recent policy of the Greek Government towards Turkey as would justify the Porte in proceeding to extremities. He denied that the Government had in any way countenanced the expedition of Petropoulaki, and upon my enumerating the different acts which, in my opinion, established connivance on the part of the Greek Government at the departure and equipment of this expedition, he emphatically denied that such was the case, and challenged the Porte to prove the assertions which had been made by Photiades Bey in the notes which he had recently addressed to the Hellenic Government. With respect to the protection to be accorded to the refugees, he stated that the Hellenic Government had all along performed their duty on this head, but he could not admit that they were bound to go out of their way to assist the Porte in persuading its revolted subjects to return to Crete.

In short, I gathered from M. Delyanni's language that the Government had made up their minds to reject the demands of the Porte in the shape in which they were submitted to the Representatives of the three Protecting Powers at Constantinople, but that they would defer making any formal statement upon the subject until they were in the receipt of the ultimatum which he assumed would be addressed to them by the Porte, and until the three Guaranteeing Powers should have made known the course they intend to pursue in this emergency.

I have endeavoured likewise to persuade M. Bulgaris to put a stop to the departure of Petropoulaki's band, and otherwise to acquiesce in the reasonable demands of the Turkish Government, but I left him with the full conviction that the Hellenic Government are quite determined to let things take their course.

I must add that the public appear to be unanimous in wishing for a rupture; nothing is now heard but declarations of hatred towards the Turks, and of eagerness to be led against the common enemy of Hellenism.

I inclose copies of an article upon this subject from the semi-official paper, the "Courrier d'Athènes," of the 6th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

Inclosure in No. 49.

Extract from the "Courrier d'Athènes" of December 6, 1868.

Athènes, le 5 Décembre, 1868.

LA persistance de la Porte à vouloir rapatrier, par tous les moyens possibles, les Crétois réfugiés en Grèce est de tout point injustifiable.

La Porte prétend que les Crétois sont retenus en Grèce par la violence, et le fait est que ceux qui ont voulu s'en aller ont été protégés par le Gouvernement Hellène jusqu'à leur embarquement à bord des vaisseaux destinés à cet effet.

Il est vrai que d'autres réfugiés, qui voyaient en ceux qui quittaient la Grèce des déserteurs de la cause nationale, ont voulu employer la force même pour les retenir, mais c'est à peine si, sur 40 convois de 40 à 50 personnes, en moyenne, qui ont quitté la Grèce, il y a eu à déplorer deux ou trois rixes entre Crétois, rixes que l'autorité militaire a aussitôt réprimées.

Ce n'a été que pour se conformer aux lois fondamentales du pays, qui ne mettent aucune entrave à la liberté individuelle, que le Gouvernement Hellène avait résolu de ne pas mettre obstacle au départ des réfugiés. La Porte voulait non seulement que le Gouvernement Hellène facilitât aux Crétois qui désiraient s'en aller leur départ, mais qu'il y aidât en quelque sort et qu'il agît de concert avec elle pour accréditer en Europe la fausse nouvelle donné par certains journaux que l'Ile de Candie est pacifiée.

C'était donc à Athènes et non en Crète que la Porte se proposait de frapper la révolution. Mais à Athènes il n'y a que des Grecs, au Gouvernement comme ailleurs, et il est difficile de nous engager à frapper sur des frères qui ont mêlé leur sang aux nôtres dans toutes nos luttes nationales. Le Gouvernement Turc voulait en quelque façon rendre le Gouvernement Hellène complice de la diplomatie Européenne dans la question de Candie. Mais outre que la conscience publique se serait soulevée d'indignation à cette idée, les Ministres du Roi portent trop haut le sentiment national pour se prêter à toute manœuvre tendant à remettre sous le joug étranger l'un des membres de la famille Hellénique.

En second lieu, comme cela se fait depuis trois ans, il y a des enrôlements de volontaires pour la cause Crétoise. Il paraît que la Porte voulait cette fois faire intervenir le Gouvernement du Roi pour empêcher ces enrôlements, et pour donner à ces prétentions une certaine couleur diplomatique, elle a fait répandre le bruit que c'était au su du Gouvernement Hellène que ces enrôlements se faisaient, et que le corps de Pétropoulaki avait reçu des secours d'armes, des officiers et des sous-officiers de l'armée, pour compléter ses armements et ses cadres.

On a paru croire à ce bruit, mais c'est le contraire qui est vrai. Le Ministre de la Guerre en apprenant qu'il y a eu quelques désertions dans l'armée, a fait poursuivre et arrêter les déserteurs et a envoyé une circulaire très sévère à tous les commandants militaires, pour empêcher les désertions. Cependant les institutions du pays ne permettent pas au Gouvernement d'empêcher les enrôlements et le départ de volontaires, et ils ont eu lieu sous tous les Ministères depuis le commencement de la révolution en Crète.

Il paraît que tout cela a aigri le Gouvernement Ottoman, qui n'est pas en mesure de comprendre quelles sont les limites d'un pouvoir constitutionnel dans un pays libre, et qui est froissé de ce que le Gouvernement du Roi ne lui donne la main pour étouffer la révolution de Candie.

Cette singulière prétention de la Porte a donné lieu à tous ces bruits qui circulent avec une certaine persistance à Athènes et à Constantinople sur une rupture des relations officielles entre les deux Etats voisins—rupture que la Porte, si ces bruits venaient à se réaliser, provoquerait d'une manière injuste, comme on vient de le voir.

Inutile de faire observer que le Cabinet désirant par lui-même d'abord, et aussi pour se conformer aux conseils des Puissances amies, maintenir avec la Turquie des relations de paix et de bon voisinage, a observé la neutralité ainsi qu'il l'a déclaré depuis le commencement de la révolution, mais qu'il ne peut ni violer les institutions du pays ni aller à l'encontre de l'opinion publique pour être agréable à ceux qui ont des intérêts opposés aux nôtres.

No. 50.

Mr. Erskine to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 185.)

My Lord, *Athens, December 10, 1868.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship, herewith, a copy of an official note which has been addressed to me by M. Delyanni, upon the subject of the threatened rupture of diplomatic relations between Greece and Turkey. I likewise inclose a copy of an identic note, in reply to this communication, which I have addressed to M. Delyanni in common with my French and Russian colleagues.

With reference to M. Delyanni's statement that neither the "Arkadi" nor the "Enosis" were allowed to leave a Greek port armed ("armés en guerre"), I may remind your Lordship that the former of these vessels was notoriously armed with several small guns, and I presume that she was so armed at the time of her capture by the Turkish cruizers. Whilst Mr. Consul Lloyd, in writing to me on the 6th instant, states, "The 'Enosis' is being fitted for the two Armstrong guns brought here by the 'Aphroessa;'" which, as I have already mentioned to your Lordship, is a small gun-boat belonging to the Greek Government.

Photiades Bey has already received by telegraph the draft of an ultimatum which he is to address to the Greek Government before breaking off relations; and I believe that this paper will be sent in to-morrow, the 11th instant, and that five days after its delivery he will quit Athens with the whole of his Legation, removing also, at the same time, all the Consular Agents of Turkey throughout Greece.

A very offensive note has already been addressed to Photiades Bey by M. Delyanni, in reply to the several notes in which he had recapitulated the demands of the Turkish Government; and I presume that the ultimatum, which is to be sent in to-morrow, will be answered in the same tone.

I herewith inclose a translation of the speech delivered yesterday by M. Delyanni in the Chamber of Deputies, upon the subject of the impending rupture.

One of the steamers chartered by the Porte at Marseilles will leave the Piræus for Canea this evening, with about 240 refugees on board. This, I imagine, will be the last batch of refugees which will be dispatched by the Ottoman Legation. The whole number who have so returned is about 5,000.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 50.

M. Delyanni to Mr. Erskine.

Athènes, le $\frac{23 \text{ Novembre}}{5 \text{ Décembre}}$, 1868.

LE Soussigné, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté le Roi des Hellènes, a l'honneur d'informer MM. les Représentants de la Grande Bretagne, de France, et de Russie, qui l'ont entretenu Lundi dernier, par délégation de leurs Excellences les Ambassadeurs des mêmes Puissances à Constantinople, du conflit qui est sur le point d'éclater entre la Grèce et la Turquie; qu'il a porté à la connaissance de Sa Majesté et à celle de ses collègues au Cabinet, les quatre points mis en avant par la Sublime Porte, et sur lesquels on désire que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté donné une réponse satisfaisante.

Ces quatre points sont—

1. Dissolution par le Gouvernement Hellénique du corps de Petropoulaki.
2. Défense aux bâtiments Grecs armés de faire des voyages en Crète.
3. Protection des familles qui veulent rentrer en Crète.
4. Respect des droits de la Porte et des Traités.

Le Soussigné n'a aucune difficulté de répondre au désir de leurs Excellences les Ambassadeurs, en donnant les informations suivantes aussi brièvement que possible:

Le Gouvernement du Roi ne saurait dissoudre le corps de Petropoulaki ou tout autre corps de citoyens allant en volontaires à leurs risques et périls guerroyer à l'étranger, où bon leur semble, la Constitution de l'Etat ne lui permettant pas de gêner à cet égard la liberté des citoyens Hellènes, et le droit des gens ne l'y forçant point; seulement le Gouvernement Royal n'a point permis que des officiers, sous-officiers, et soldats en activité de service se réunissent à ces bandes. En dernier lieu, vis-à-vis de ce même Chef de Volontaires, Petropoulaki, le Gouvernement a pris des mesures sévères en faisant poursuivre et ramener de force à leurs rangs des soldats de la ligne qui avaient déserté pour le suivre. Le Soussigné fait observer, au reste, que depuis trois ans environ que dure

l'insurrection de Candie, plusieurs centaines de volontaires sont allés en Candie, et s'en sont retournés pour la plupart, sans que ce fait ait été considéré comme une preuve de mauvais vouloir de la part du Gouvernement Royal et comme une violation du droit des gens ou des Traités existants. Le Gouvernement Royal continuera à remplir à cet égard ce que la neutralité qu'il a observé lui impose, en ne permettant pas à des officiers et à des soldats qui sont à son service de faire partie des bandes des dits volontaires.

Le Gouvernement du Roi n'a jamais permis et ne permettra non plus à l'avenir, aussi longtemps que les bons rapports continueront entre lui et celui de la Sublime Porte, à des bâtiments Grecs armés dans ses ports d'aller ravitailler l'insurrection de Crète; mais les institutions du pays ne lui permettent pas, et le droit des gens ne l'oblige point, d'empêcher des navires appartenant à des particuliers ou à des Sociétés de Commerce de faire ce service à leurs risques et perils, et le Soussigné fait remarquer que les informations qui prétendent que, soit "l'Arcadi," soit "l'Enosis," ont été armés en guerre dans les ports du Royaume sont erronées et inexactes.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, suivant en cela les principes libéraux des institutions nationales qui assurent à tout habitant de l'Etat une pleine et entière liberté de locomotion ou autre, a accordé déjà et ne cessera d'accorder sa protection à tout émigré Crétois qui voudrait rentrer en Crète. Le Gouvernement Hellénique n'a aucun intérêt à garder de force ces émigrants sur son sol, où ils ont été transportés par humanité, par les marines des Puissances étrangères. On ne saurait donner une meilleure preuve des bonnes dispositions du Gouvernement Royal à cet égard que sa conduite depuis qu'un certain nombre de ces émigrants, non certes spontanément, mais travaillés de toute manière, ont manifesté le désir de retourner en Candie. Plus de quarante convois sont déjà partis, et le Gouvernement du Roi n'a jamais hésité, malgré la surexcitation du sentiment national en Grèce par suite de cette longue et interminable affaire de Candie, à employer tous les moyens de police que la loi permet pour repousser la violence exercée dans deux ou trois circonstances par d'autres Crétois, en vue d'empêcher le départ de leurs compatriotes.

Le Gouvernement est fermement décidé à continuer d'accorder la même protection aux émigrés Crétois qui de leur propre gré et volonté manifesteraient l'intention de quitter le territoire du Royaume.

Quant au quatrième point relatif au respect des droits de la Porte et des Traités, bien que le Soussigné n'en saisisse pas exactement le sens et la portée, il n'hésite pas à déclarer que le respect des droits de chaque Etat et des Traités existants entre deux ou plusieurs Etats est une obligation à laquelle le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Hellénique n'a jamais manqué; et pour ce qui est de ses relations avec la Porte, il s'est trouvé lui-même, soit à propos du brigandage qui désole les provinces frontières, soit à propos d'autres nombreux intérêts des sujets Hellènes en Turquie, dans le cas d'invoquer ce respect des droits et des Traités; mais ces différends, comme les autres sujets impliqués dans les trois autres points ci-dessus, n'ont jamais été considérés ni ne sauraient l'être, en toute justice, comme des motifs suffisants d'une rupture des relations entre les deux Etats voisins, rupture injustifiable et dont la responsabilité et les graves conséquences doivent retomber sur celui qui la provoqué.

(Signé) P. DELYANNI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 50.

Mr. Erskine to M. Delyanni.

Athens, December 10, 1868.

THE Undersigned, Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of Greece, has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of a note addressed to him on the 9th instant by M. Delyanni, Minister of Foreign Affairs of His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, upon the subject of the unofficial and confidential communication which he made to him on Monday last.

The Undersigned has not failed to forward a copy of that document to Her Majesty's Government, and he avails, &c.

(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 50.

M. Delyanni's Speech in Chamber of Deputies, December 9, 1868.

Messieurs, vous savez que le Gouvernement s'expose à la critique, si pendant que des négociations se poursuivent sur de graves sujets, il ne porte pas à la connaissance de ce corps ou ne lui donne pas communication des faits. Souvent ces communications deviennent dangereuses aux intérêts généraux. Cependant devant l'inquiétude générale qui paraît exister, depuis qu'à dater de quelques jours le bruit s'est répandu que la rupture des relations diplomatiques entre le Gouvernement Hellénique et le Gouvernement Ottoman était imminente, le Ministère cédant devant cette inquiétude, a décidé d'en dire quelque choses, dès à présent, à la Chambre.

MM. les Députés, pendant la longue durée de la lutte Crétoise, les secours et les divers encouragements qui étaient donnés d'autre part à cette île héroïque ont cessé graduellement, et maintenant l'assistance nécessaire n'est fournie que du côté du seul territoire Grec. Ceci, Messieurs, a refroidi les relations du Gouvernement Hellénique et du Gouvernement Ottoman, et au fur et à mesure que la lutte se prolongeait, la froideur des relations s'en augmentait proportionnellement. Finalement, ces relations se sont refroidies maintenant à tel point qu'il semble que la Sublime Porte a décidé de procéder à une rupture absolue des relations existantes qui jusqu'ici avaient ce caractère de froideur.

J'aurais dit, Messieurs, que le moment était arrivé pour le Ministère de mettre à jour tous les faits et de déposer toutes les pièces relatives à cette grave question, n'était la circonstance que voici: les Ministres des grandes Puissances à Constantinople, aussitôt qu'ils eurent connaissance des décisions que le Gouvernement Ottoman venait de prendre à ce sujet, intervinrent en s'efforçant de prévenir cet événement si grave par ses conséquences éventuelles. Par suite de cette intervention survint une négociation qui est encore pendante.

Pour cette raison je ne puis dire davantage aujourd'hui. Je pense néanmoins que dans le courant de la semaine prochaine le Ministère sera à même d'informer la Chambre ou que cette intervention a eu pour résultat de prévenir cette mesure si grave et si importante, ou que la rupture a eu lieu, et conséquemment alors, sans la moindre hésitation, de placer sous vos yeux tous les faits et de déposer ici toutes les pièces.

Plusieurs (des deux côtés).—Très bien!

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.—Je puis ajouter ceci, que le Ministère dans cette sérieuse conjoncture et dans cette négociation de la plus haute gravité n'a point consenti et ne consentira pas que la moindre atteinte soit portée ni à la dignité de la Couronne, ni à nos libertés constitutionnelles, ni à notre grandeur nationale. (Applaudissements de tous côtés.)

No. 51.

Mr. Bonar to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 1.)

My Lord. *Vienna, December* 15, 1868.

HAVING sought an interview with Count Beust this morning, to inquire of his Excellency what fresh information he had received on the subject of the difference between the Turkish and Greek Governments, and the course of events at Athens, his Excellency told me that he was placed in the extraordinary position of being absolutely ignorant, from official sources, of how affairs stood.

Baron Testa, at Athens, had been silent for several days, and all that he (his Excellency) knew was, what he was informed, was the substance of a despatch received here yesterday by the Greek Envoy, Prince Ypsilanti, saying that the Greek Government had given way on some of the points contained in the Turkish ultimatum, but in a haughty tone had refused acquiescence in the rest. Yet, his Excellency hoped and believed, that the conflict between the two Governments would be amicably settled without creating further complications.

The action of the Austrian Government had been confined to recommending moderation on both sides. His Excellency's instructions to Baron Prokesch at Constantinople, were to the effect that it was not for Austria to counsel the Porte to abstain from such measures as she might consider necessary to the maintenance of her dignity, as well as of the integrity of her Dominions, especially as Austria could offer her later no compensation for the possible consequences of such abstention, but that the Austrian Ambassador was to

associate himself generally with the English and French Representatives in all counsels of moderation which they might recommend.

His instructions to Baron Testa at Athens had been in the same sense, namely, that the prominent part among the foreign Representatives in this question belonged to the three Protecting Powers, but that he was not to fail to recommend moderation on the part of the Greek Government, and regard for all just demands of the Porte.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. G. G. BONAR.

No. 52.

M. E. Musurus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 18.)

Ambassade Impériale Ottomane, Londres, le 17 Décembre, 1868.

My Lord,

J'AI l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence qu'il résulte d'une dépêche télégraphique que je reçois à l'instant du Ministère Impérial des Affaires Etrangères que le Gouvernement Hellénique, ayant répondu par un refus aux cinq propositions de la Sublime Porte, les relations diplomatiques et commerciales viennent d'être rompues entre la Turquie et la Grèce. Photiades Bey a quitté hier Athènes avec toute la Légation Impériale. Le Ministre Hellénique à Constantinople a reçu aussi hier ses passeports.

J'ai, &c.

(Signé) ET. MUSURUS.

No. 53.

The Earl of Clarendon to M. E. Musurus.

Foreign Office, December 18, 1868.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 17th instant, announcing the withdrawal of the Turkish Minister from Athens and that the Greek Minister at Constantinople had received his passports.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 54.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 18.)

Athens, December 18, 1868.

(Telegraphic.)

THE Greek Government decline to say whether they have or have not rejected the ultimatum; but the Turkish Minister thinks they have, and left yesterday. They absolutely reject the two first points, assert that they have not infringed the third, and that there is no ground for the two last.

No. 55.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir A. Buchanan.

Foreign Office, December 18, 1868.

(Telegraphic.)

THE following are the terms of the Turkish ultimatum received from Mr. Elliot:—

1. Dispersion of the bands of volunteers, and the prohibition of the formation of new ones.

2. The disarming of the "Enosis," "Crete," and "Panhellenion," or, at least, the closing of the Greek ports against them.

3. Efficient aid and protection to the Cretan emigrants desirous of returning.

4. The punishment, according to law, of those guilty of aggression against Ottoman subjects, and indemnity to the families of the victims.

5. The engagement to follow implicitly line of conduct in accordance with Treaties and the law of nations.

No. 56.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir A. Buchanan.

Foreign Office, December 18, 1868.

(Telegraphic.)

STATE to Prince Gortchakoff that the united action of the Three Protecting Powers is of urgent importance for putting an end to the present state of things in Greece; that the conduct of the Greek Government, being in violation of international law, is not defensible; that the terms of the Turkish ultimatum are such as the Porte is justified in demanding, and we hope that Russia will concur with us in recommending their acceptance, as basis of negotiation, by Greek Government allowing for such alteration in the form as may appear necessary to the Representatives of the three Powers at Athens under the circumstances of the moment.

No. 57.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir A. Buchanan.

Foreign Office, December 18, 1868.

(No. 6.)

Sir,

I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to state to Prince Gortchakoff that Her Majesty's Government consider that the united action of the Three Contracting Powers is of the most urgent importance in order to put an end to the present state of things in Greece; that the conduct of the Greek Government is in violation of international law, and cannot, therefore, be defended; that the terms of the Turkish ultimatum are, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, such as the Porte, under the circumstances, is quite justified in demanding, and that they, therefore, hope that the Russian Government will concur with that of Her Majesty's in recommending the Greek Government to accept the same as a basis of negotiation, with the understanding that such alteration may be made in the form thereof as may, under the circumstances of the moment, appear necessary to the Representatives of the Three Protecting Powers at Athens.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 58.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir A. Buchanan.

Foreign Office, December 18, 1868.

(No. 7.)

Sir,

BARON BRUNNOW called upon me this morning to speak of the Turco-Greek question, which he considered to be every day becoming more serious. I said that its importance and duration would depend on the policy of the Protecting Powers—that the Greeks had behaved ill—that the Porte, having a due regard to its own dignity and interest, was justified in demanding that the violation of international law and the duties of good neighbourhood committed by the Greeks should cease, and I had no doubt that the Hellenic Government would recognize their error and give reasonable satisfaction to the Porte, if advice to that effect was offered in a friendly spirit by the Protecting Powers.

Upon Baron Brunnow replying that I was much mistaken if I thought that Russia could join in any pressure upon Greece without its being applied with equal force on Turkey, I inquired whether his Excellency was speaking upon specific instructions or whether his language was only such as he assumed would be in harmony with the opinion of his Government.

His Excellency replied, that as yet he had no specific instructions, but he felt himself authorized to say that his Government considered that the Porte had acted with precipitation, and that on presenting the ultimatum a longer time ought to have been given to Greece for consideration.

I answered that Her Majesty's Government were most anxious to take no step in the matter, and I believed I could say the same with respect to the French Government.

except in conjunction with Russia, and there was no wish to bear harshly on Greece, or to leave out of consideration the strong national sympathies which had prompted their late proceedings, but there was a strong wish, I might almost say strong conviction, on the part of England and France, in which I was sure the Government of Russia would join, that this Turco-Greek quarrel should not disturb or even menace the peace of Europe, which it possibly might do if it was not speedily brought to a close.

Baron Brunnow said his Government would no doubt be desirous to act with those of England and France, but would not be induced to lay exclusive blame on the Greeks, and he added, "The Government of the Emperor has no more sympathy with the Turks than I have myself."

I replied that I had for many years been aware of that fact, but that want of sympathy did not imply disregard of justice, and that if the provocations offered to the Turks were fairly considered, I should still hope that Russia would join in giving such advice to Greece as it would manifestly be for the interest of that country to adopt.

Baron Brunnow's language and tone throughout the conversation were the reverse of conciliatory, and he left me saying that he should call again to-morrow, when he possibly might have received instructions from St. Petersburgh.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 59.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 18.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, December 18, 1868.*

I AM told that Chancellor of the Empire is dissatisfied with French language at Constantinople. He has declined to see French Ambassador, instructed to ask his opinion on crisis caused in Greek waters by Turkish Admiral, till to-morrow afternoon, and until he has taken Emperor's orders. I believe he also waits for an answer to a telegram to London.

No. 60.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 19.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, December 19, 1868.*

THE Prince suggested your ignorance of expulsion of Greeks from Turkey when you wrote your telegram of yesterday, which I said was improbable. He cannot, therefore, support acceptance of ultimatum by Greece; and having received orders from the Emperor, would despatch messages to London and Paris to-morrow, with reasons why the question should be treated by all the Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris. I urged that no demand in the ultimatum could be objected to on grounds of Greek Constitution, except that respecting blockade-runners, but he would not accept Representatives' text as official. If France and England will at once invite Greece and Turkey to suspend measures on both sides till European Powers can intervene, he will support them, but Russia will not begin a mediation by indirectly admitting that only one party has been wrong.

He will evidently do nothing till he receives answers from Paris and London to his proposal for a European intervention.

No. 61.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 8.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 19, 1868.*

THE Russian Ambassador called upon me this morning as he yesterday announced his intention of doing.

He said that a courier was on the road to him from St. Petersburgh, but that, in the meanwhile, he had been informed by the telegraph that the Emperor had declined to take Greek subjects under his protection during the rupture between Turkey and Greece.

I expressed the satisfaction with which I heard this intelligence, as I hoped it would

be a sign to the Hellenic Government that their proceedings did not meet the approval of His Imperial Majesty.

Baron Brunnow did not entirely dissent from this, but said that, with reference to public opinion in Russia, it would be impossible for the Emperor to take part against the Greeks.

I answered that it was far from being the wish of Her Majesty's Government, who had no such intention themselves, that the Emperor should take part against the Greeks; but His Imperial Majesty was known to be an eminently just man, and if he would fairly weigh the evidence respecting the acts committed by the Greeks, and the amount of satisfaction demanded by the Porte, I thought there would be no disagreement with Her Majesty's Government as to the advice that should be given both at Constantinople and at Athens.

Baron Brunnow then asked me whether I contemplated the settlement of the question by the Protecting Powers alone, or whether it would not be advisable to refer it to a Conference of all the Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris, and whose Representatives should meet either at London or Paris.

I said that to such an inquiry I could only answer in my individual capacity until the opinions of my colleagues had been ascertained; but that, speaking for myself, I had no hesitation in saying that if the three Powers acted honestly together, with a sincere desire to do justice between the contending parties, and a strong conviction that the general peace should not be disturbed, the dispute might at once and with ease be terminated; but that if a Conference were to assemble, the whole of the so-called Eastern question would be opened, a revision of the Treaty of Paris would be attempted, and the probable result of the Conference would be dissension among the Powers rather than the restoration of peace between the belligerents.

Baron Brunnow made no answer to these observations.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 62.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 19.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, December 19, 1868, 3·30 P.M.*

COUNT BISMARCK disapproves reported intention of Turkey to expel Greek subjects from Turkish dominions; it will give rise to insurrection and bloodshed at all corners of the Empire. Object desired will be equally secured by closing Turkish ports to Greek trade.

No. 63.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 13.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December 19, 1868.*

COUNT BERNSTORFF has this day read to me a telegram from Count Bismarck, stating that the Representatives of the three Protecting Powers at Constantinople had been asked to take Greek subjects under their protection during the rupture between Turkey and Greece, and that the application had been declined by the French Ambassador.

Count Bernstorff further informed me that his Government had heard, with great regret, of the intention of the Porte to expel all Greek subjects from the Turkish territory on very short notice, and that orders to that effect had been received at Belgrade and Bucharest, where their execution was highly improbable; and that therefore the Suzerain Power would find its authority defied.

I said, that Her Majesty's Government, while fully recognizing the right of the Sultan as an independent Sovereign to obtain redress for the wrongs he was suffering at the hands of the Greeks, yet would lament that measures of undue severity, and to all appearance, not yet called for by necessity, should be resorted to; and their opinion on the matter had been communicated to the Turkish Government.

Count Bernstorff has lately, and on more than one occasion, expressed to me the hope

of his Government that the quarrel between Turkey and Greece might be put an end to by the Protecting Powers.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

P.S.—Count Bernstorff has expressed to me the desire of his Government that the Turco-Greek question should be referred to a Conference of the Great Powers.

C.

No. 64.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 19.)

(Telegraphic.) *Athens, December* 18, 1868.

THE Turkish squadron having been reinforced and left the harbour of Syra, there is now less danger of a collision. At the Admiral's own suggestion French Minister has proposed that the "Enosis" shall come here under Greek escort, to be tried by the competent tribunal, and this proposal may possibly be accepted.

With reference to your telegram of the 16th, the Government disclaim any intention of precipitating hostilities.

No. 65.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 10.) *Foreign Office, December* 19, 1868.

Sir,

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to the Russian Ambassador upon the subject of the threatened rupture of relations between Turkey and Greece, and the course you pursued in the matter, as reported in your despatch No. 466 of the 5th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 66.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 11.) *Foreign Office, December* 19, 1868.

Sir,

THE Turkish Chargé d'Affaires called at this office to-day, and I expressed to him the regret felt by Her Majesty's Government at learning that the Porte persisted in its determination to expel all Greek subjects from the Turkish territory on a given day and at very short notice. Such a measure, I said, would be productive of great hardship, particularly in the depth of winter; that in many places it was sure to be resisted, and that blood would be shed and cruelties committed, for which the Porte would be held responsible in the eyes of Europe. At this moment I added the tendency of opinion seemed to be favourable to the Porte, which had borne great provocation with patience, and had not resorted to measures of coercion until they were called for and justified by the dignity and the interests of Turkey; but the tide would soon turn, and the Porte would lose the advantage of having opinion in its favour if it pursued a course of conduct that would be characterized as unnecessary and cruel, and not in accordance with the spirit of the times or the usages of civilized nations. M. Musurus, in a tone of great propriety, defended the measure as the only one calculated to bring the Greeks to reason, and to preserve the Porte from the machinations of the Greek subjects to stir up revolt throughout the Turkish provinces, if they were permitted to reside there during the contest that had already commenced between the two countries.

I remarked that, at all events, the necessity for such a measure had not been proved, and that it was consequently premature; and that as nothing would be gained by undue haste, and much might be lost by a departure from the moderation hitherto exhibited by the Sultan's Government, I earnestly hoped that the measure in question would be suspended, and time thereby given for such efforts as could be made by friendly Powers

for the re-establishment of relations between Turkey and Greece. M. Musurus assured me that he had duly transmitted to his Government the remarks of a similar character that I had addressed to him a few days ago, and that he should not fail immediately to communicate the opinions I had then expressed.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 67.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 12.) *Foreign Office, December* 19, 1868.

Sir,

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to M. Delyanni, as reported in your despatch No. 472 of the 7th instant, upon the subject of the relations between Turkey and Greece.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 68.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 13.) *Foreign Office, December* 19, 1868.

Sir,

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the advice which you gave the Porte, as reported in your despatch No. 475 of the 8th instant, in regard to extending the time for the withdrawal of the Greek Consuls from the Turkish Dominions.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 69.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 14.) *Foreign Office, December* 19, 1868.

Sir,

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to the Grand Vizier, as reported in your despatch No. 476 of the 8th instant, in regard to the demands to be made upon the Greek Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 70.

Mr. Erskine to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 187.) *Athens, December* 11, 1868.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship, herewith, a copy of a letter from Hobart Pasha, commanding the Ottoman squadron in Crete, inclosing a notification to all persons attempting to break the blockade of that island, stating that summary measures will be adopted against any vessel which shall fire at a blockading cruizer.

A copy of this document has been forwarded to Her Majesty's Consul at Syra for the information of any British subjects whom it may concern.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 70.

Vice-Admiral Hobart Pasha to Mr. Erskine.

"*Hudavendikiar*," *Suda Bay, December* 9, 1868.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to request that your Excellency will be good enough to inform the Consuls and subjects of the nation you represent of the contents of circular herewith forwarded.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS HOBART.

Inclosure 2 in No. 70.

Notification.

"*Hudavendikiar*." *Bay of Suda, December* 9, 1868.

HAVING been appointed by His Majesty the Sultan and the Government of the Imperial Ottoman Empire to command the squadron employed in the Cretan waters for the prevention of intercourse between the insurgents in the Island of Candia and their sympathizers in foreign countries, I wish it to be publicly known to all persons who have been and who may still be projecting to pass the Turkish blockade without permission, that while by the law of nations a vessel breaking a proclaimed blockade is liable, if captured, to confiscation, I consider that any vessel who fires at a blockading cruizer while in the execution of her duty commits an act of piracy, and that I shall deal summarily and as severely as the law will admit with all persons found on board any vessel or vessels so acting.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS HOBART, *Vice-Admiral Commanding.*

No. 71.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 188.)

My Lord,

Athens, December 12, 1868.

AT about 4 P.M. yesterday Photiades Bey called upon M. Delyanni, and placed in his hands the ultimatum of the Turkish Government, a copy of which has already been forwarded to your Lordship by her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople. After reading this paper, M. Delyanni replied that he saw no great difficulty in coming to an understanding with the Porte as to the two last points, but that he feared it would be impossible to agree to the three first. He, however, added that he would consult his colleagues upon the subject, and ascertain the intentions of the King, and the result would be communicated to Photiades Bey some time between this and Wednesday next the 16th instant.

Should the Hellenic Government reject the demands contained in this ultimatum, M. Photiades will probably embark on board the steamer of the Messagéries Impériales on the 17th instant, with the whole of his Legation, and he will be followed by all the Ottoman Consular Agents in Greece.

M. Delyanni is understood to be in active telegraphic communication with Vienna, St. Petersburgh, Paris, and London, and he appears not to have lost all hope that a rupture may be prevented by the mediation of the Guaranteeing Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

No. 72.

Safvet Pasha to M. E. Musurus.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by M. E. Musurus, December 20.)

(Extrait.)

(Télégraphique.)

Constantinople, le 20 *Décembre*, 1868.

Si la Sublime Porte se trouvait dans une position identique à celle des autres Etats par rapport à la juridiction sur les sujets étrangers, elle n'aurait pas pris la mesure de l'expulsion des sujets Hellènes. Les étrangers se trouvent ici dans une position exceptionnelle, grâce aux Capitulations concédées; les Hellènes présentent dans les circonstances actuelles un élément de trouble chez nous. Je dois vous informer du reste que la Sublime Porte a décidé d'excepter les familles, les nourrices, les cuisinières, les servantes, et d'autres femmes Hellènes s'occupant d'un métier quelconque, ainsi que ceux des Hellènes qui acceptent la sujétion Ottomane. Nous avons pris aussi certaines mesures à l'égard des navires sous pavillon Hellénique qui n'auraient pas appris à temps l'interdiction de leur entrée en Turquie.

No. 73.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, December 20, 1868.

THE prohibition of entering Turkish ports will not be enforced against any Greek vessels that have been chartered for such a destination previous to rupture.

No. 74.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, December 20, 1867.

THE Prussian Chargé d'Affaires has formally proposed to the Marquis de Lavalette a Conference of the six Powers at Paris, on the Turco-Greek question. The Russian Ambassador proposes the mediation of the six Powers instead of the three only, but does not distinctly propose a Conference. M. de Lavalette, not having yet taken the Emperor's orders, has not given an official answer to either, but he is himself evidently much taken with the idea of a Conference. I have stated to him your objections to a Conference and to going beyond the three Powers, and he has promised to report them to the Emperor.

No. 75.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 208. Confidential.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburgh, December 16, 1868.

I CALLED upon Prince Gortchakoff this morning, and had some conversation with his Excellency upon the present critical state of the relations of Greece and Turkey. I said that your Lordship had not entered on your official duties when the last messenger left, but Lord Stanley, before quitting the Foreign Office, had instructed Mr. Erskine to warn the Greek Government against the danger of wantonly provoking a conflict with the Porte in which they could not hope for support from any other Power, and his Excellency answered that he hoped Her Majesty's Government had also used their influence at Constantinople to induce the Turkish Government to abstain from pressing inadmissible demands on the Government of Greece. He then read to me a letter which he addressed to General Ignatieff on the subject a few days ago, and some extracts from another, transmitting a copy of it to Baron Brunnow, which he said would reach London to-morrow, and in which he instructs them to impress upon your Lordship's attention the difficulties in which the King of Greece is placed by the Greek Constitution, and to induce you to urge upon the Porte the necessity of limiting its demands to such measures of redress as the King can grant without endangering his Throne, by violating the articles of the Constitution, which entitle Greeks to engage in the service of other countries, and vessels like the "Enosis" to sail from the ports of the kingdom.

As Baron Brunnow will doubtless have fully acquainted your Lordship, before the arrival of this despatch, with the opinions of Prince Gortchakoff, as set forth in the letters to which I have referred, it is unnecessary for me to report them to you, but I may mention that his Excellency not only appeals to the Constitution as an insurmountable obstacle to the entire concession by the Greek Government of the requirements of the Porte, but he invites Baron Brunnow to remind your Lordship that he pointed out, in 1865, the defects of that Constitution, and suggested the expediency of its being amended before the arrival of the King in Greece. He intimates also that if his suggestions had been acted upon, the

King would not now find himself placed between the painful alternatives of exposing the country to a war with Turkey or of violating his engagements towards his subjects.

His Excellency then said he felt assured that the late measures of the Turkish Government would not have been adopted had they not been approved of or suggested by Austria, and I answered that it appeared to me very unnecessary to attribute to an Austrian intrigue a state of things which could be naturally accounted for by such conduct on the part of the Greek Government, as I had seen reported in Mr. Erskine's despatches. He said Mr. Erskine had, however, accused the Greek Government of having allowed soldiers to join the corps of volunteers raised by Petropoulaki, and that they had proved the accusation to be unfounded. I replied that Mr. Erskine had merely mentioned that report as one which he had no proof, and his Excellency said he did not mean to defend the Government of Greece, for M. Bulgaris had undoubtedly permitted, for electioneering purposes, acts of which Turkey had a right to complain; but all he contended for was that a mode of arrangement should be sought for compatible with the position of the King. He repeated, however, his belief that Austria is responsible for what has occurred, observing that he could not understand Baron Beust's policy unless he wished to create mistrust and estrangements between all the Powers of Europe.

The same language with respect to Baron Beust had been held to me some days previously by one of his Excellency's subordinates, and an observation made in the letter which he read, as to encouragements from without being given to the Porte, evidently alludes to the Government of Austria.

Before concluding this despatch I may mention that, I am told, the Greek Minister has been holding everywhere exaggerated language as to the dangerous position of the King, and expressing a conviction that if the demands of the Porte are granted, it will be impossible to maintain the dynasty.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 76.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 21.)

(No. 2.)
Berlin, December 18, 1868.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship in original, with a précis in translation by Mr. O'Conor, an article from the "Provincial Correspondenz" (the official organ of the Government) on the question of the difference between Turkey and Greece.

This article states that the Prussian Government, although not occupying the position of one of the Protecting Powers, has spontaneously joined the other European Powers in their efforts to induce Greece to comply with the just demands of Turkey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 76.

Précis of Article in the "Provincial Correspondenz."

Berlin, December 16, 1868.

THE following half-official article appears in the "Provincial Correspondenz," respecting the Greco-Turkish difficulty:—

"Within the last few weeks the complications between Greece and Turkey have assumed a serious character, and now engage the active attention of the European Governments.

"For some years past the Cretans, of whom the greater number belong to the Greek Church, have been in a state of insurrection against the Ottoman Government. The Cretans had many grievances arising from the oppression exercised by the Turkish authorities, and they carried on an obstinate struggle in the hope of delivering themselves from Turkish supremacy, and attaching themselves to the kingdom of Greece. The successful issue of the struggle was for a long time doubtful, as the Cretans were often victorious, and were powerfully assisted by the transmission of arms, &c., from Greece, whose people took a lively interest in the fate of their fellow-believers. Embittered by the continuance of the revolutionary movement, the Turkish Government complained loudly of the support accorded to the Cretans, both by the enlisting of volunteers and the transmission of arms and money.

The diplomatic relations between the Porte and Greece were not disturbed however by the continuance of the Cretan insurrection, and it is therefore the more surprising that the Turkish Government, now that the insurrection is almost suppressed, should advance certain claims on the Greek Government, and threaten the interruption of pacific relations in case of non-compliance before a certain date (17th instant).

"The Turkish ultimatum demands the Greek Government to disband the volunteers; forbid the formation of fresh corps; offer no obstacle to the return of Cretan emigrants; stop the Cretan blockade-breaking ships; and, in fact, observe the existing Treaties and international usages.

"The European Powers, parties to the peace of 1856, have endeavoured to prevent a disturbance of the peace in the East. Prussia, who neither exercises a special right of control over Greece, like the Western Powers and Russia, nor lays claim to a special protection over the Ottoman Empire, has, nevertheless, joined in a very urgent manner, as has been acknowledged by the Protecting Powers, the other Powers in their efforts to preserve the peace, and has urged upon Greece the fulfilment of the claims advanced by the Porte, in so far as they may be consistent with international law.

"It is strongly expected that the warnings addressed to both Powers will be successful in maintaining peace."

No. 77.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 21.)

(No. 12.)
Berlin, December 18, 1868.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that, in consequence of a telegraphic instruction from his Government, Aristarchi Bey, the Turkish Minister at this Court, has formally announced to Count Bismarck the rupture of diplomatic and commercial relations between Turkey and Greece.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 78.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 21.)

(No. 14. Confidential.)
Berlin, December 19, 1868.

My Lord,

IN a conversation I had last evening with Count Bismarck, his Excellency informed me that he had learnt from Constantinople that it was the intention of the Turkish Government to expel, after a certain date, all Greeks from the Turkish dominions, including even Egypt and the outlying provinces.

His Excellency then said that he had declined to accept the protection of the Greek subjects resident in Turkey after the rupture with Greece, and had replied to the offer made by advising that this request should be addressed to one of the Protecting Powers. He had telegraphed in the same sense to London, Paris, and St. Petersburgh. His Excellency remarked that Russia declined it for herself, but seemed to regret that Prussia should not have accepted it.

Count Bismarck then expressed his disapproval of the proposed expulsion of the Greeks from Turkey. He said that it would be in the first place impracticable on account of their number; and further, that it would be a dangerous measure as regarded Turkey. It would give rise to conflict and bloodshed at every corner of the Empire, and would involve Turkey in endless difficulties. His Excellency was of opinion that the simple act of closing the Turkish ports to Greek vessels would prove a more efficient means of compulsion, as the Greek commerce in the East was very considerable, and the cessation of it would inflict serious losses on the Greek population.

His Excellency expressed a hope that the Protecting Powers would use their influence both in Greece and at Constantinople to pacify the litigants, and that these efforts would avail to prevent any serious collision.

I inquired of his Excellency whether the Prussian Government would also support at Athens the just demands of Turkey.

He replied that at that moment he could not quite recall the exact nature of the five points contained in the Turkish ultimatum. There was, however, one point which appeared to him to be opposed to the Constitution to which the King of Greece was bound, namely, the freedom for Greek subjects to fit out vessels for purposes of commerce and trade. He could not urge the King to violate a pledge given. His Excellency, however, made this reserve somewhat vaguely, and without apparently having given the subject in question a serious consideration.

His Excellency expressed to me his conviction that the Russian Government were sincere in their desire to bring about a settlement of the difference between Turkey and Greece.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 79.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 1,062. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, December 20, 1868.*

I SAW the Marquis de Lavalette this afternoon for the first time since his appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs. After expressing in strong terms his desire to act in the most perfect concert with Her Majesty's Government, he proceeded to speak of the critical state of the relations between Turkey and Greece.

He told me that the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires, Count Solms-Sonnenwalde, had come to him by order of Count Bismarck, to propose to him, on the part of the Prussian Government, that a Conference of the six Powers who had signed the Treaty of Paris should be held at this place, to devise measures for settling the differences between Turkey and Greece, and averting the danger of their leading to a serious disturbance of the tranquillity of Europe.

M. de Lavalette had, he said, told Count Solms, that he must take the orders of the Emperor before giving an answer to this proposal. Speaking, however, for himself, he had no hesitation in declaring to Count Solms that in principle he was entirely in favour of referring all international disputes to the decision of the general voice of Europe. This was the system laid down by the Congress of Paris, and he was anxious that it should be acted upon as much as possible. There were, however, in the present case practical matters which required to be attended to at once. Some time must elapse before a Conference could be assembled, and meanwhile the Porte would justly require some guarantee that the aid given by Greece to the Cretan insurrection should be put a stop to. All, therefore, that he could say for the moment to Count Solms was, that he was disposed to look with favour upon the principle on which the Prussian proposal was founded.

M. de Lavalette proceeded to tell me that soon after Count Solms had left him, he had received a visit from the Russian Ambassador, Count de Stackelberg, who had urged that measures should be taken at once by the Powers of Europe to prevent matters coming to extremity, and in particular to avert the threatened expulsion of the Hellenes from the Ottoman Empire. M. de Stackelberg had suggested that the mediation of the six Powers should be offered to Turkey and Greece, and had seemed to think that it resulted from a recent communication from Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh that Her Majesty's Government were in favour of a measure of the kind.

I said that Her Majesty's Government certainly thought it very important that England, France, and Russia should act together, and that your Lordship had accordingly sent a telegram to that effect to St. Petersburgh, and had urged that Russia should unite with England and France in recommending the Turkish ultimatum as a basis of negotiation to Greece, without insisting upon an actual compliance with the exact terms of it. Your Lordship had not, however, contemplated a reference to any other Powers than the three by whom Greece was guaranteed, and who were therefore in some measure responsible for her conduct. It was plain that it was of the greatest consequence that Russia should not separate herself from France and England. If she did so, she might take a line of her own, which would lead to much inconvenience, and possibly to a serious misunderstanding between her and the other two Powers. Your Lordship was, however, of opinion that there were serious objections to a Conference of the six Powers. If England, France, and

Russia acted sincerely together, and made the Greeks feel that they would get no support in resisting the just demands of the Porte, the whole matter would speedily be brought to an end, to the great advantage of Greece as well as of Turkey. In fact, I said, it would be easy to settle the whole question in this way, before a Conference could well be assembled. There appeared to be very little hope of any practical good to be set against the manifest danger that a Conference might re-open the whole Eastern Question, and thus be more likely to lead to dissension between the great Powers than to concord between Turkey and Greece.

As the conversation went on it became evident that M. de Lavalette himself was very favourable to the idea of a Conference of the six Powers at Paris, and that he had not altogether concealed this either from the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires or from the Russian Ambassador.

The principal arguments he used in favour of a Conference were, that it would render a suspension of active measures compatible with the dignity of the Porte, which would yield only to the counsels of all the Great Powers; that it would render it easy to prevent, *vi et armis*, if necessary, all communications between Greece and Crete during the negotiations; that the dangers of its re-opening the whole Eastern question might be avoided by strictly limiting its action beforehand, and by a perfect understanding between England and France; that, in fact, not only the dignity of the Porte but the *amour-propre* of other Powers concerned would be best consulted by allowing the settlement to be made by the united voice of Europe.

I begged M. de Lavalette not to fail to bring distinctly to the notice of the Emperor your Lordship's objections to a Conference, and this he promised to do. He said, moreover, that he would make me acquainted as soon as possible with the Emperor's views.

M. de Lavalette was of opinion that it would be very objectionable that the Hellenes in Turkey should be taken under the protection of any of the three Powers, or that each individual should be allowed to select whichever of them he preferred—which would, he said, infallibly lead to their all resorting, sooner or later, to Russia.

He considered it to be of great importance that the Porte should, if possible, be prevented from actually expelling the Hellenes from the Empire.

He thought the order which had been sent to Servia and Roumania to expel the Hellenes extremely unwise. It was, in his opinion, doubtful whether the Porte had the right to give such an order, while it was almost certain that it would not be obeyed.

Finally, M. de Lavalette begged that, as he had not yet been able to take the orders of the Emperor on the subjects we had discussed, the conversation might be regarded as unofficial and confidential.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 80.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

(No. 36.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, December 21, 1868.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 1,062, Confidential, of the 20th instant, reporting your communications with the Marquis de Lavalette on the question of assembling a Conference for the purpose of adjusting the differences between Turkey and Greece; and I approve of the language which your Excellency has held on this subject as reported in your despatch.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 81.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 21.)

St. Petersburgh, December 21, 1868.

(Telegraphic.)

RUSSIAN Minister represents as barbarous, obligation of Greeks in Turkey to leave or become Turkish subjects, but many of her own subjects in Turkey during the Crimean war preferred a Turkish nationality to protection of a neutral Power.

No. 82.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 21, 5·50 P.M.)

Paris, December 21, 1868, 3·30 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

THE Marquis de Lavalette says that the Emperor is decidedly in favour of a Conference of the six Powers. I will send you a written report this evening.

No. 83.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

Foreign Office, December 21, 1868.

(Telegraphic.)

WE strongly recommend the Porte not to resort to the extreme measure of expelling Greeks who behave themselves peaceably from the Turkish territory. We think it impolitic and unnecessary at present, and that it may be attended by disastrous consequences to Turkey. The ports might be closed against Greek vessels.

No. 84.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 21.)

Florence, December 21, 1868.

(Telegraphic.)

ITALIAN Government has received from French Government a proposal originating from Prussia for a Conference at Paris on Eastern affairs which they have accepted; and they trust Her Majesty's Government will also accept as best means of arriving at solution of present differences.

No. 85.

Safvet Pasha to M. E. Musurus.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by M. E. Musurus, December 22.)

Constantinople, le 19 Décembre, 1868.

(Télégraphique.)

REMERCIEZ Lord Clarendon des sentiments de sympathie qu'il a témoignés à l'égard de la Sublime Porte. Quant à ses observations au sujet de l'expulsion des sujets Hellènes, vous direz à sa Seigneurie que nous n'aurions pas hésité à suivre son conseil si les sujets étrangers étaient soumis chez nous, comme chez les autres Puissances, aux lois du pays, et si les Hellènes ne commettaient pas chaque jour les abus les plus flagrants en s'abritant sous le manteau des Capitulations.

No. 86.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 22.)

(No. 1,069. Confidential.)

Paris, December 21, 1868.

My Lord,

THE Marquis de Lavalette told me this afternoon that the Emperor was decidedly in favour of acceding to the Prussian proposal that a Conference of the six Powers should

be held at Paris in order to effect a reconciliation between Turkey and Greece. He had, he said, made known to the Emperor the objections which I had stated, and His Majesty had given them careful consideration, but had nevertheless come to the conclusion that they were outweighed by the advantages which a Conference might be expected to produce.

M. de Lavalette went on to say that he had spoken on the subject to Prince Metternich, the Austrian Ambassador, who, though without instructions, declared himself to be favourable to the idea of a Conference. The Chevalier Nigra, the Italian Minister, had expressed himself to the same effect. Djemil Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador, had been very careful not to commit himself, but had made no objection. In fact, it was England only which seemed to hesitate.

M. de Lavalette then told me that he had sent telegrams to Constantinople and to Athens, urging delay, in order that he might have time to make himself acquainted with the question, and bring to an issue communications ("pourparlers") in which he was engaged with the Great Powers of Europe. To Constantinople he had said that, while admitting the provocation the Porte had received, he doubted whether the measures contemplated by it, were prudent or opportune, that he found this doubt to be shared more or less by most of the Representatives of foreign Powers here; that he appealed to Aali Pasha's confidence in the friendship of France, and even to his Highness' personal friendship for him, and conjured him to allow the expulsion of the Hellenes and the closing of the ports to remain for the present simply as threats ("dans l'état comminatoire"). To Athens he had said that while he found that many of the Representatives of foreign Powers here thought Greece entirely in the wrong, he did not find one who thought her to be entirely in the right, that he urged her to do nothing whatever to aggravate the evils of the actual state of affairs. He had added that he approved of the steps taken by Baron Baude, the French Minister at Athens, with respect to the proceedings of Hobart Pasha concerning the blockade-runner "Enosis."

M. de Lavalette proceeded to state at length, and with considerable eloquence, the arguments in favour of assembling a Conference.

It had, he said, been conjectured that the Prussian proposal had been suggested by Russia. This seemed probable, although the Russian Ambassador had not made a precisely similar proposal nor held exactly the same language. At all events, both the Prussian and the Russian Governments urged that the matter should be referred to the six Great Powers. It was plain that the object of both must be to avert a disturbance of the tranquillity of Europe. Would it be wise to discourage them?

It might, indeed, be suggested that it would be more natural that the three Protecting Powers of Greece should alone take part in the settlement of such a question. In resorting to such a proceeding, those Powers would place themselves naturally enough in the position of protectors of Greece; but in what position would they stand towards Turkey? and if they declared Greece to be in the wrong, and forced her to give redress, how would they be playing the part of protectors?

M. de Lavalette perceived that this argument did not make much impression upon me, and he went on to say that it was not one to which he himself gave very great weight. He did, however, think that very great weight, in considering this question, should be allowed to the remarkable changes which had taken place since the independence of Greece had been established forty years ago. Turkey had become, politically, socially, and financially a member of the Great European Society of Nations. Her integrity was guaranteed by the six principal Powers. If the arrangements respecting Greece were now to be made, no doubt Austria, Italy, and Prussia would be parties to them. Was there any good reason for excluding them from a Conference to be held now on the affairs of Turkey and Greece? Austria was directly interested in Turkey, as a neighbour, and the Porte could have no doubt that the rights of the Sultan would receive due consideration from her. There might be people who apprehended that Prussia would lend herself to Russian prejudices against Turkey, but she was sufficiently disinterested in the matter to be impartial. At all events, whether the fact was liked or disliked, it could not be denied that Prussia held now a position in Europe very different from that which she had occupied forty years ago, and her claim to take part in the settlement of any European question could not be gainsaid; Italy might be expected to agree in the main with France and England on this question; she might, indeed, be suspected of certain ultra-liberal, or, so to speak, "Garibaldian," tendencies, but these would be more likely to be restrained if she were invited to join in the Councils of the other Powers than if she were left out. Besides, France, who had done so much towards establishing her unity and independence, and England, who had always so warmly sympathised with her, must desire that she should acquire the political experience and serious qualities which were derived from

taking a part in grave international affairs. Her geographical position and her active commercial intercourse, both with Greece and Turkey, gave her, moreover, a very direct concern in the present quarrel between those two countries.

I said that as to the general proposition that Austria, Italy, and Prussia were entitled to a voice in the settlement of great European questions, I conceived there were not two opinions. Certainly England had, less than any country, ever manifested a disposition to exclude any one of them; this was not, however, the present question. Her Majesty's Government had not thought it necessary or desirable that a solemn assize of all Europe should be held on this difference between Turkey and Greece. It was not to be denied that a general Conference was fraught with much risk and with many inconveniences. The case had appeared to Her Majesty's Government to be so simple that it might be settled in a few days. It could not be doubted that in the main the Greeks were in the wrong, and Her Majesty's Government conceived that if the three Powers, on whose protection Greece relied, simply told her that she must not expect any support from them in transgressing her international duties, she would at once yield, and the question would be at an end.

M. de Lavalette replied that this might be so, if the three Powers were unanimous. But could Russia be brought to unite with France and England in making such an announcement to Greece? He must say that the Russian Ambassador here, who no doubt very correctly represented his Government, appeared to be simply the advocate of Greece. He confessed that he thought the only way out of the difficulty was to assemble a Conference of the Great Powers. The first effect of this would be to put an immediate stop to the present lamentable state of things. He felt confident that Turkey would in such a case readily suspend the execution of the two measures she had threatened—the expulsion of the Hellenic subjects, and the closing of her ports to Greek ships. M. de Lavalette dwelt for some time upon the disastrous consequences to Turkey herself, and upon the injury to Great European interests which the execution of those threats would entail. He then went on to say that Greece, on her part, would abstain from all interference in Crete, and that if there were any doubts of her acting fairly in this respect, he should be prepared to propose that foreign ships of war should enforce a cessation of her communication with the Cretan insurgents. The questions opened to discussion in the Conference might be strictly defined beforehand; and there could be no fear, if England and France were in perfect accord, that the limits laid down would be transgressed. For instance, he should lay down as essential that no proposal to cede Crete to Greece should be brought forward.

I observed that the exclusion of such a proposal would still leave the door open to discussions upon Crete, to which the Porte would very strongly object; that, in fact, it at once conveyed the idea that the real business of the Conference would be to settle the future political condition of Crete.

M. de Lavalette said that he was not sufficiently well acquainted with what had passed already to be able to enter into details. He had, of course, not had time to read up the papers, and his predecessor, the Marquis de Moustier, was too ill to be spoken to. There were, however, considerations of a higher order than any he had yet mentioned, which had great influence with him. He was convinced that the mere assembling of a Conference of the six Powers, to consult in common on any measure for securing tranquillity, would have the best possible effect. Nothing would, in his opinion, contribute so much to the maintenance of peace; nothing, he was certain, would do so much towards re-establishing in France the confidence which had been so much shaken. There were, perhaps, very few questions upon which there would be a sufficient accord among the Powers to render such a Conference possible. It would, he thought, be a most grave error to lose the present opportunity; a Conference *ad hoc*, strictly limited to the matter in hand, seemed perfectly safe. It was as a man, responsible to God and his country, who deprecated above all things a war which would lead to frightful slaughter, and be injurious alike to France and to the Imperial dynasty, that he so earnestly sought to obtain the assent of Her Majesty's Government to a measure which he conscientiously believed to be more than other calculated to secure to Europe the blessings of peace and tranquillity.

In conclusion, M. de Lavalette asked me whether he might say to the Emperor, to whose presence he was going immediately, that I would without delay communicate to your Lordship the views of the French Government on this subject.

I answered that I would make to your Lordship as faithful and full a report as I could, of what he had said to me, and would, if possible, send it off this evening.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LYONS.

No. 87.

Consul-General Longworth to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 22.)

Belgrade, December 21, 1868.

(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE just been informed by the Regency, that the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Constantinople has addressed himself to the Servian Agent to induce the Servian Government to insist, under existing circumstances, on the withdrawal of the Greek Consul. Such a measure they think would be unpopular, and there being only a rupture of relations between Porte and the Greek Government, would be unnecessary. On a declaration of war, however, the case might be different.

No. 88.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 22.)

Constantinople, December 22, 1868, noon.

(Telegraphic.)

A PROLONGATION of the time for the departure of the Greeks has been decided on.

Three weeks will probably be added to the original term.

No. 89.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 16.)

Foreign Office, December 22, 1868.

My Lord,

COUNT BERNSTORFF yesterday read to me a telegram from Count Bismarck, stating that Prussia had declined to take Greek subjects under her protection during the rupture between Turkey and Greece; and that his Excellency was still of opinion that that duty would more properly devolve on one of the Protecting Powers; but he understood that the English and French Ambassadors at Constantinople had refused the application that had been made to them.

I said, I could well understand the motives of the Prussian Government for declining this charge, as the Power which undertook to protect the Greek subjects might, to a certain extent, become responsible for their conduct.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 90.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Erskine.

(No. 7.)

Foreign Office, December 22, 1868.

Sir,

I HAVE to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve the course you pursued, as reported in your despatch No. 184 of the 9th instant, in order to prevent the threatened rupture of relations between Turkey and Greece.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 91.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 3.)

Foreign Office, December 22, 1868.

My Lord,

THE Austrian Ambassador called at this office yesterday, and read to me a despatch from Baron Beust, dated December 13, by which he disclaims the intention of again pressing the programme of 1867 respecting Eastern Affairs, or any modification of the terms of the Treaty of Paris, but he thinks it due to himself to point out the disastrous consequences of the English policy of non-intervention. He would have preferred to

have kept the Porte in a state of tutelage, and while compelling her to make reforms, and to improve the condition of the Rayahs, would have protected the Turkish Empire effectively against all hostile acts on the part either of her neighbours or her vassals.

The bad reception with which the suggestions of the Austrian Government on Eastern Affairs had met in England, had compelled them to be very reserved upon the subject. Baron Beust trusts that this reason may be appreciated by the British Government, and hopes that it may be understood that Austria is still as ready as ever to join in common action respecting the East, and more especially in any that may be concerted between the British and French Governments.

Count Apponyi also read to me some inclosures in the above-mentioned note, the tenor of which was as follows:—

A telegram of December 10 to the Austrian Minister at Athens, instructed him to join the Representatives of the Protecting Powers in recommending the Greek Government to satisfy the demands of the Porte.

A telegram of the same date to Baron Prokesch, informed him of the above telegram, and instructed him to join the Representatives of England and France in conciliatory measures, and also to watch Austrian commercial interests.

A despatch of December 13 to the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, recapitulated the above telegrams, and stated that Baron Beust was not surprised at the complications which had arisen in the East, which he attributed to the neglect of his advice, and especially to Lord Stanley's doctrine of non-intervention. Baron Beust alluded to his programme of 1867, which, although it would have subjected the Porte to a gentle pressure, and thus in a certain sense compromised her independence, would have given additional security to the Ottoman Empire; and he added that Austria in fulfilment of that policy, would not have shrunk from vigorous acts, such, for instance, as that suggested by her of sending a naval force into Greek waters to protect the Cretan refugees who were desirous of returning to their homes.

Baron Beust trusted that the efforts of the Protecting Powers would prevent war, and he hoped much from the influence of Russia in Greece, which should be exercised in the interests of peace.

In conclusion, he pointed out that the present unlooked-for complications should teach the Governments of Europe to keep a more active watch on Eastern Affairs.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 92.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 17.) *Foreign Office, December 22, 1868.*

Sir,

THE Turkish Chargé d'Affaires called at this Office yesterday and gave me the inclosed copy of a telegram which he had received from Constantinople,* stating the reasons why the Porte declined to abandon its intention to expel Greek subjects from Turkish territory.

I expressed to M. Musurus my regret that the advice of Her Majesty's Government had been offered in vain, and after repeating the arguments that I had used on previous occasions, I added that there seemed to be but one opinion at the different Courts of Europe as to the impolicy of this rigorous measure, and the injury that in various ways Turkey would thereby inflict upon herself.

I pointed out also that it was irregular and contrary to usage to expel Greek subjects merely on the rupture of Diplomatic relations, and before war had been formally declared by Turkey against Greece.

M. Musurus engaged to bring this latter observation to the knowledge of his Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

P.S. *December* 23, 1868.—M. Musurus having called on me again to day I adverted to my conversation with him yesterday, and, in order to prevent any mis-apprehension, I requested him to take notice that when I said that the expulsion of Greek subjects was irregular before war was declared, I did not mean to imply that such an extreme measure if rigour would be rendered expedient or justifiable by a declaration of war.

* No. 85.

No. 93.

Photiades Bey to M. Delyanni.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by M. E. Musurus, December 23.)

Athènes, le 11 *Décembre*, 1868.

LE Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan ne croit pas devoir chercher à prouver combien est sincère et sérieux son désir d'entretenir des relations d'amitié et de bon voisinage avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Hellénique. Le monde entier a vu la longanimité dont la Sublime Porte a fait preuve en face de l'attitude prise à son égard par le Gouvernement Hellénique depuis bientôt trois ans. On connaît l'histoire de la dernière insurrection Crétoise. Il est superflu d'énumérer ici les machinations ourdies publiquement et sous les yeux du Gouvernement Hellénique par les Comités siégeant dans la capitale même du Royaume pour fomenter et entretenir la rebellion en Crète malgré la volonté de l'immense majorité de ses habitants.

L'histoire des nations civilisées ne fournit aucun exemple du mépris avec lequel le droit des gens a été traité par les dits Comités. Ils n'ont épargné ni menace ni mensonge aux pauvres insulaires afin de les obliger à prendre les armes contre leur Souverain légitime. Les bandits pris à leur solde, et envoyés en Crète sous le titre de volontaires, s'y sont livrés à des actes de plus horrible brigandage contre ceux des habitants qui osaient leur résister. C'est donc en menaçant et faisant suivre leurs menaces par une exécution implacable ou par des promesses trompeuses qu'on est parvenu à décider une partie de ces malheureux habitants à émigrer en Grèce, où ils n'ont trouvé que misère et souffrance. Detrompés, pressés par la misère, et voyant la parfaite sécurité qui règne dans leur patrie, ces malheureux émigrés ont demandé et demandent à hauts cris leur rapatriement. C'est en vain qu'ils supplient qu'on les laisse jouir de leur libre arbitre; c'est en vain que la Sublime Porte fait, depuis plus de trois ans, des démarches pressantes auprès du Gouvernement Hellénique dans le but d'obtenir leur liberté. La majeure partie en reste encore exposé à toutes sortes de vexations et de misères, et le petit nombre qui a pu retourner n'a pu effectuer son départ qu'au prix de son sang.

Le rétablissement de la tranquillité en Crète et l'agonie dans laquelle se débattent les quelques volontaires qui restent encore sur les sommets des montagnes de l'île, ont déterminé les meneurs Hellènes à empêcher à tout prix le retour des émigrés dans leurs foyers et à former de nouvelles bandes de volontaires pour donner le change à l'opinion publique sur l'apaisement entier de l'insurrection.

Ce succinct et fidèle exposé de la situation nous paraît suffisant pour convaincre tout juge impartial qu'il ne s'agit nullement de délivrer un peuple opprimé, mais qu'il s'agit d'opprimer, de torturer toute une population dans l'intérêt de l'ambition d'un État voisin. Les documents échangés depuis plus de deux ans témoignent hautement de l'esprit de conciliation dont nous nous sommes montrés animés vis-à-vis du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi Georges et du compte très grand que nous avons tenu de ses difficultés intérieures. Les sacrifices en toute genre que la Sublime Porte s'est imposés afin de ne pas démentir ses sentiments de modération sont connus de tout le monde. Toutes nos démarches auprès du Gouvernement Royal n'ont eu invariablement pour réponse ou qu'une fin de non-recevoir ou que des aveux d'impuissance de comprimer l'élan d'un parti qui veut soumettre tout aux exigences de sa passion. Cet état de choses va s'empirant en Grèce. Les derniers événements ont couronné l'édifice et ont enlevé au Gouvernement Impérial tout espoir d'un prompt retour de la part de la Grèce à des sentiments de justice et au respect du droit des gens.

En effet, quelle espérance aurions-nous pu conserver (1) devant la déclaration du haut de la Tribune d'un des anciens Ministres qu'une partie du dernier emprunt avait été affectée à l'achat du bateau la "Crète," qui sert aujourd'hui au transport des volontaires et des munitions en Crète au mépris de tous les droits internationaux—déclaration qui contredit d'une manière si solennelle les assurances que le Gouvernement du Roi nous avait données; (2) devant un discours Ministériel qui dénote clairement la résolution de poursuivre l'idée de l'annexion de l'île de Crète à la Grèce; (3) devant la violence inqualifiable avec laquelle on cherche à empêcher le rapatriement spontané et volontaire des émigrés Crétois; (4) devant la persistance que le Gouvernement Royal met à ne pas réprimer ces violences: (5) devant la formation d'une nouvelle bande de volontaires qui s'organise non seulement sans la moindre opposition de la part des autorités, mais par leur concours presque avoué; (6) devant l'impuissance de nos représentations tant de fois réitérées; (7) devant la tendance ambitieuse de plus en plus accentuée et non déguisée des partis en Grèce; (8) devant l'impunité que rencontrent auprès des autorités Helléniques les agresseurs des officiers, soldats, ou sujets Ottomans, assassinés ou maltraités sur le territoire du Royaume.

Le Gouvernement Impérial manquerait à ses devoirs les plus sacrés s'il continuait à se bercer d'une illusion qui a valu déjà tant de sacrifices.

En conséquence, dans le cas où, dans le délai de cinq jours à dater d'aujourd'hui, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi ne prendrait pas l'engagement formel :—

1. De disperser immédiatement les bandes de volontaires dernièrement organisées dans différentes parties du Royaume et d'empêcher la formation de nouvelles bandes ;

2. De désarmer les corsaires "Enosis," "Crète," et "Panhellenion," ou en tout cas de leur fermer l'accès des ports Helléniques ;

3. D'accorder aux émigrés Crétois non-seulement l'autorisation de retourner dans leurs foyers, mais encore une aide et une protection efficace ;

4. De punir conformément aux lois ceux qui se sont rendus coupables d'agression contre les militaires et les sujets Ottomans et d'accorder aux familles des victimes de ces attentats une juste indemnité ;

5. De suivre désormais une ligne de conduite conforme aux Traités existants et au droit des gens ;—

Le Soussigné, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de la Sublime Porte, d'ordre de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan son auguste Souverain, a le regret de faire savoir à son Excellence M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté Hellénique que la Légation Ottomane à Athènes et les Consuls résidents en Grèce quitteront immédiatement le territoire Hellénique. Comme déduction naturelle de cette détermination, les relations diplomatiques et commerciales entre la Turquie et la Grèce se trouvant interrompues, le Ministre, le personnel de la Légation et de la Chancellerie Hellénique à Constantinople, les Consuls Grecs dans l'Empire Ottoman, recevront leurs passeports. Les sujets respectifs des deux Etats devront quitter le pays qu'ils habitent dans le délai de quinze jours à partir du jour de la signification de la rupture des relations, et l'entrée des ports Ottomans se trouvera aussi interdite au pavillon Hellénique à partir de cette même date.

Le Soussigné, &c.

No. 94.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 286.)
My Lord, *Florence, December* 18, 1868.

I REPORTED in my telegram of the 7th instant that the Italian Government had sent instructions to their Minister at Athens to advise the Greek Government to accede to the demands of the Turkish Government, and to avoid for the future giving any just ground of complaint to the Turkish Government.

While holding this language at Athens, the Italian Minister at Constantinople, I am informed by Count Menabrea, is likewise directed to give counsels of moderation to the Government of the Sultan.

In short, the object of the Italian Government is that the present differences between Greece and Turkey should not assume larger proportions, and they will use their best influence with both Governments to bring about an accommodation and to avert misunderstandings for the future.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. PAGET.

No. 95.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 18.)
My Lord, *Berlin, December* 21, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith a précis in translation by Mr. Harriss-Gastrell of two articles from the "Kreuz Zeitung" and the "Nord Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," on the subject of the differences between Turkey and Greece. These articles, which, if not officially inspired, represent correctly the opinions of the Prussian Government, state that the order for expulsion of the Greek subjects from the Ottoman territory, before war has been formally declared, is not in accordance with the law of nations; and they further maintain that as regards the Principalities of Servia and Roumania, the order of expulsion is illegal and inexcusable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 95.

Précis of Articles from the "Kreuz Zeitung" and the "Nord Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" of the 20th of December, 1868.

THE order of the Turkish Government to the Servian and Roumanian Governments to eject from their territories Greek subjects, must be viewed in a very serious aspect. Such a measure is a measure of war between Greece and the Porte. But war had not broken out; and in modern times such a measure of war has not been resorted to—for instance in the war of 1854 between the Western Powers and Russia. The measure in question is still more complicated, for the Servian and Roumanian Governments are under the protection of the Great Powers. Can they, without the consent of the Protecting Powers, carry out a measure of war against Greece? In the late war between the Porte and Russia, Servia and Roumania were neutral. The Peace of Paris has not weakened but strengthened their autonomy. This is a very serious aspect of the reported order, for it not only is against international law but it attempts to place the protected States in an attitude of war without the consent of the Protecting Powers. This can only place them in a position of jeopardy, and even endanger the legal basis of their existence. We therefore find the demand of the Porte to be not only hazardous but also premature, and somewhat impossible of execution.

No. 96.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 17. Private and Confidential.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 23, 1868.

COUNT BERNSTORFF called at this office to-day and read to me a despatch from Count Bismarck, of which the following is the substance.

Count Bismarck instructed his Excellency to explain to Her Majesty's Government the dangerous character of the present policy of Austria. It was most improbable, he observed, that the Porte should have taken the violent course which he had lately adopted without foreign influence, and the Internuncio seemed bent on paralyzing the effects of other Powers to keep the peace. The French Ambassador at Constantinople seemed to be much under the influence of his Austrian colleague, and it was therefore the more necessary that England should endeavour to ward off the ill-effects of Austrian policy. The effects of her policy were, he added, equally pernicious in Germany.

Count Bismarck believed that I had confidence in the pacific sentiments of the Emperor Louis Napoleon, but those sentiments were not trusted in Germany, because Austria was constantly asserting that she could at any moment form an alliance with France, and that it was she alone who kept her back from the prosecution of ambitious designs. The uneasiness thus produced was, in his opinion, most dangerous to the peace of Europe.

Her Majesty's Government could, Count Bismarck believed, render greater services than any other for the preservation of peace, and Count Bernstorff was accordingly instructed to ask me if I did not think that I could contribute, by friendly but grave representations, to moderate the present policy of Austria, and to give it a character less restless and less compromising to the peace of Europe.

I told Count Bernstorff that I would gladly use my best efforts towards bringing about a better understanding than appeared now to exist between the Prussian and Austrian Governments, but I must be permitted to observe that the accusations against Count Beust were extremely vague, and capable, therefore, of being met by a formal denial; and I asked if the Prussian Government possessed any proofs of the misdeeds with which the Austrian Minister was charged.

Count Bernstorff said that the present excited state of Germany was owing to Count Beust, who was constantly declaring, through his organs of the press, that Austria alone restrained France from going to war with Prussia, and that she would do so the moment that Austria gave the signal. The consequence was that no one in Germany had confidence in the pacific intentions of the Emperor of the French, and the fear and expectations of war were kept alive. Count Bernstorff also declared that large sums of money were given by Count Beust to newspapers that calumniated the policy of Prussia and excited distrust of her among foreign Governments.

Count Bernstorff's principal complaint, however, was that the Internuncio was

instructed to stir up strife at Constantinople and urge the Porte to a warlike policy, and to act against the conciliatory advice given to the Sultan's Government by the Representatives of other Powers.

I told Count Bernstorff that I was in justice bound to inform him that only two days ago Count Apponyi had read to me a despatch from Count Beust upon the present troubles in the East, which was not less remarkable for its tone of moderation than for the determination not to interfere actively either at Constantinople or at Athens. In that despatch there were copies of telegrams to the Austrian Representatives at both those places forbidding them to take the initiative in advice, and enjoining them to support the moderate counsels that would doubtless be offered by their colleagues.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 97.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 1,073.)
My Lord, *Paris, December 22, 1868.*

THE Marquis de Lavalette told me this morning that he had received a telegram from Cairo, stating that the Porte had called upon the Viceroy to furnish a contingent of 20,000 men, and to expel from Egypt the Hellenic Consuls and all other Hellenic subjects.

M. de Lavalette observed that this fact furnished an additional proof of the danger attending the present state of things, and added to his desire that the European Powers should take measures at once to guard against the serious consequences which were to be apprehended.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 98.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 1,074.)
My Lord, *Paris, December 22, 1868.*

THE Marquis de Lavalette communicated to me this morning a telegram which he had received from the French Ambassador at Constantinople. I have the h nour to inclose a copy of it.

It states that after the expiration of the term of fifteen days, Greek vessels which left foreign ports before intelligence of the rupture could have reached them, will be admitted into Ottoman ports; that the term will also be extended for Greek subjects; and that the Porte does not require that Greek subjects shall be expelled from Roumania and Servia.

M. de Lavalette and I were equally at a loss to understand the precise meaning of the clause stating that the term would also be extended for Greek subjects.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 98.

M. Bourée to M. de Lavalette.

(Télégraphique.) *Pera, le 21 Décembre, 1868.*

LE Gouvernement Ottoman vient de se décider à admettre dans les ports de l'Empire, et à autoriser à franchir les Détroits, les bâtiments sous pavillon Grec, même après le délai de quinze jours, pourvu qu'ils aient quitté les ports étrangers avant que la nouvelle de la rupture ait pu y être connu: le terme fixé serait reculé également pour les sujets Grecs. La prétention de la Porte ne va pas jusqu'à l'expulsion des Hellènes des Principautés Danubiennes et de Serbie: elle s'est bornée à leur faire connaître les dispositions arrêtées par suite des événements.

No. 99.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

(No. 50.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, December 23, 1868.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 1,069 of the 21st of December, respecting the wish of the Emperor of the French and of his Government that a Conference of the Powers, parties to the Treaty of Paris, should be convoked for the purpose of taking into consideration, and if possible providing a remedy for, the present critical state of relations between Turkey and Greece.

I have laid your despatch before the Queen; and having considered it in conjunction with Her Majesty's confidential advisers, I have now to instruct your Excellency to state to M. de Lavalette that His Imperial Majesty and his Government may be assured that any proposal or suggestion which they may bring before Her Majesty's Government will always be received and considered with the utmost attention by the Government of Her Majesty, and with the most sincere desire to agree with it.

Her Majesty's Government do not, any more than the Government of the Emperor, disguise from themselves the importance of the present crisis in Eastern affairs; but while making allowance for the internal difficulties with which the Greek Government may have had to contend, they cannot admit that those difficulties should be pleaded against the plain requisitions of international law. They have viewed with anxiety the continuous provocations given by Greece to Turkey, and they have felt that if those provocations were allowed to continue unrepressed, the forbearance of the Porte might be exhausted, and that it might have recourse to measures of retaliation, which would very easily degenerate into open warfare. Such a contingency Her Majesty's Government, having regard for the interests of the Porte as an ally, and of Greece as a State owing its very existence to the interposition of England, France, and Russia, cannot too earnestly deprecate, and therefore His Imperial Majesty may be assured that Her Majesty's Government is not inclined to withhold its co-operation towards the restoration of a good understanding between Turkey and Greece.

The process by which such a result may be produced is two-fold: the one the interposition of the three Powers who have hitherto been the sole protectors, under Treaty, of the Greek State; the other, the conjoint action of all the Powers parties to the Treaty of Paris.

The first course is undoubtedly the one that most naturally suggests itself for adoption, inasmuch as the three Powers are not only guarantors for Greece against any unprovoked attack on the part of the Porte, but are therefore also, by implication, guarantors for Turkey against any unprovoked attack on the part of Greece.

Her Majesty's Government will not conceal from the Government of His Imperial Majesty their preference for such a tripartite interposition, nor their conviction that if the three Powers held the same language to both the Parties, and required both to suspend active operations, whether falling short of actual war or bearing the character of it, until the three Powers by the joint exercise of their good offices for securing the Porte from further vexation on the part of Greece, and Greece from further molestation of its subjects residing in Turkey as a measure of retaliation, shall have replaced the two countries on a friendly footing, the efforts of the three Powers will not prove to have been made in vain.

Nevertheless, as His Imperial Majesty desires that the question should be treated as one, though not immediately affecting the general interests of Europe, yet very likely to do so if suffered to remain unadjusted, and therefore as one which should be brought before a Conference to which all the Powers parties to the Treaty of Paris should be invited, Her Majesty's Government will not willingly stand aloof from such an Assembly, though, before formally agreeing to take part in it, they would wish to submit to the Government of His Imperial Majesty some considerations which they are of opinion ought to be fully weighed.

The first of these is, that in convoking the Powers parties to the Treaty of Paris it would be impossible to exclude the Porte from taking part in the Conference. The Porte was a party to that Treaty, by which incident it was brought within the pale of European politics; but yet it might be difficult to admit the Porte and to exclude Greece: nevertheless, Greece would, under the Treaty of Paris, have no *locus standi* in a Conference composed of Powers who were parties to it.

This may be said to be a difficulty of form, but a difficulty of substance remains behind, which cannot be overlooked; and on this point Her Majesty's Government would be glad to be made acquainted with the views of the Government of His Imperial Majesty.

I mean the previous definition of the attributes of her Conference. Her Majesty's Government do not suppose that the Government of His Imperial Majesty contemplates that the deliberation of the Conference would be directed towards any other point than that for the settlement of which it was convened. This is essential to be provided for. But then, in order that the Conference may not waste its time in vague discussions, it would seem desirable that all the parties who come together should be agreed beforehand on a common basis on which the reconciliation of the litigant States should be effected; and that basis, if proposed by the Powers parties to the Treaty of Paris, must needs embrace the principle that the integrity of the Ottoman Empire shall not be touched upon; and specifically, as mentioned to your Excellency by M. de Lavalette, that no proposal to cede Crete to Greece should be brought forward.

Her Majesty's Government would be glad to be made acquainted with the views of M. de Lavalette in this matter. They feel convinced that a Conference convened without some definite scheme or outline of policy can lead to no practical result, and that so far from contributing to maintain the peace of Europe, such a Conference would be more likely to endanger it, by giving an opportunity for raising questions of the most delicate nature, and on which it might even be found that the Powers assembled in Conference, or at least some of them, entertained divergent views.

These doubts, you may assure M. de Lavalette, are not thrown out in any captious spirit, but the expression of them is dictated by a sincere desire on the part of Her Majesty's Government, that if a Conference is held, it may not end in disappointment or ill-feeling.

Your Excellency will read and give a copy of this despatch confidentially to M. de Lavalette.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 100.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 14.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 23, 1868.*

BARON BRUNNOW has this day read to me a telegram, of which the substance is as follows:—

The Emperor considers that the co-operation of the European Powers is urgently required to check the progress of the Turco-Greek quarrel, but that this co-operation should not be limited to the three Protecting Powers, but should be shared by the other Powers, all being equally interested in the maintenance of general tranquillity. Russia is prepared to join, if France and England are inclined to instruct their Representatives at Constantinople and Athens to recommend the Porte to accept an European arbitration, and to suspend the extreme measures it has adopted, and to urge the Greek Government to abstain from further action.

I told Baron Brunnow that although Her Majesty's Government would have preferred the more simple way of settling, by the intervention of the three Protecting Powers, the quarrel between Turkey and Greece; yet that, as they are always anxious to act in concert with other Powers, and consider an agreement between them on this question to be of urgent importance, they will not be unwilling to consent to the proposed Conference; but they desire, first, to ascertain on what basis it will be convoked, and in what manner its discussions are to be limited.

Baron Brunnow expressed his satisfaction, and said he entirely agreed with me as to the necessity of a well defined basis, and of the discussion being confined to the re-establishment of friendly relations between Turkey and Greece.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 101.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 23.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 23, 1868, 9 P.M.*

I HAVE communicated your telegram of the 21st to the Grand Vizier. He says, that suspension of relations, if unaccompanied by other measures, would produce no effect upon the Greeks; but the term allowed to them has been prolonged, and their expulsion will not be executed with undue severity. Women and children will be excluded from its operation. He held out no expectation that the measure would be abandoned or relaxed.

No. 102.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 4.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, December 23, 1868.*

COUNT APPONYI has this day read to me a despatch from Count Beust respecting the proposed Conference at Paris, which was assumed to be of Prussian origin, and which would have for its immediate object the suspension, on the part of the Turks, of the order to expel Greek subjects from the Ottoman territory, and, on the part of Greece, the cessation of all acts of aggression.

Count Apponyi said that his Government would not object to take part in such a Conference, but that instead of "all acts of aggression," it would prefer the words "suspension of all assistance to the Cretan insurrection."

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 103.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 301.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December 19, 1868.*

I CALLED at an early hour this morning at the Foreign Office to fulfil the instructions conveyed to me by your Lordship's telegram of yesterday; but as Prince Gortchakoff had gone to the Emperor, I had to defer seeing him till this afternoon. When I had communicated to him the opinions and wishes of your Lordship, he said that he was most anxious to act in concert with Her Majesty's Government in recommending the Greek Government to give every reasonable satisfaction to the Porte, but that your telegram had doubtless been despatched before you were aware of the measures adopted at Constantinople for the expulsion of Greek subjects from all parts of the Turkish Empire; measures which, in his opinion, were without precedent in a civilised country, and had greatly changed the state of the question. As I answered that your telegram had left London at 6 yesterday evening, when your Lordship must have been acquainted with the latest occurrences in Turkey and Greece, he said he would not discuss dates with me, but new circumstances had arisen, and the question had assumed proportions which required that it should be dealt with by all the Powers who had signed the Treaty of Paris. He had, therefore, taken the Emperor's orders on the subject, and His Majesty had approved of despatches which would be forwarded to-morrow to London and Paris, proposing that the Governments of Austria, Italy, and Prussia, should be invited to take measures in concert with the three Protecting Powers for bringing about an amicable arrangement between Greece and the Porte, and for preventing their dissensions proving dangerous to the general peace. He said he could not join your Lordship in condemning the conduct of the Greek Government only, and that it would be necessary to examine whether there were not faults on both sides, and to ascertain how far it had been possible for the King of the Hellenes to concede the demands which had been addressed to him. He said such a "chemical analysis" was an indispensable preliminary to any decision as to what the Greek Government should be recommended to concede, and he repeated that the Constitution gives to all Greeks full liberty to leave their own country, and to take part in such a contest as that which has been carried on in Crete. I therefore read to him the copy of the ultimatum which has been forwarded to Her Majesty's Government by Mr. Elliot, observing that there is no question in it of any volunteers, except of bands organised on Greek territory, and that if it claims the punishment, according to law, of persons who have committed acts of aggression against Ottoman subjects, it must of course be intended that they should be punished according to the laws of Greece. I urged, therefore, that the only demand in the ultimatum, to the concession of which he could object, as exposing the King to a charge of having violated the Constitution, was that respecting the "Enosis" and the "Panhellenion," which might perhaps be susceptible of some modification on the

spot. As he continued, however, to reiterate his objections to the ultimatum, I asked whether he had a copy which contained other demands. He gave me no direct answer, but said Mr. Elliot's copy could not be considered official, and that we did not know the precise terms of the document as it had been addressed to the Greek Government, nor of the answers which had been given to it. It was certain, however, that the King could not have accepted the demands respecting the "Enosis" and the "Panhellenion," and Russia could not now adopt a proposal by which Greece alone was to be held responsible for the present complications, and the King was to be called upon by the Protecting Powers to act in violation of his constitutional engagements. He said that your Lordship, by recommending the acceptance of the ultimatum merely as a basis for negotiation, acknowledged indirectly that its demands required modification; and if so, he trusted you would admit that his proposal was the best that could be adopted under the circumstances, and the most certain to prevent the question having consequences dangerous to the general peace. He could only, therefore, request me to assure your Lordship of his anxiety to co-operate with Her Majesty's Government in bringing about a satisfactory arrangement; and in the hope that you will accept his proposal that the question should be treated by all the Powers who signed the Treaty of 1856, he suggested the expediency of England and France inviting the Porte and Greece, with the least possible delay, to suspend all hostile measures until the six Powers shall have had time to examine the whole question of their differences, and to adopt in concert means for their arrangement. He promised also that if such a step were taken by England and France, he would support it at Constantinople and Athens.

In answer to an inquiry from me he said he had not heard from Baron Brunnow since the arrival of the letters referred to in my despatch No. of the 16th instant, from which I presume that your Lordship may not yesterday have been fully acquainted with the feelings of the Russian Government on the question; but whatever concessions Prince Gortchakoff may eventually be induced to recommend to the Greek Government in concert with England and France, if they should be of opinion that the present difficulty should be arranged by the three Protecting Powers alone, it is evident that he will not be influenced by any arguments as to what these concessions should be, until he learns how his proposal to submit the question to all the Powers who signed the Treaty of 1856 has been received in London and Paris.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 104.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 1,078.)
My Lord, *Paris, December 23, 1868.*

THE Marquis de Lavalette has given me to-day an extract from a telegram which he has received from the French Ambassador at Constantinople in answer to the telegram in which he urged that the execution of the measures against Greece threatened by the Porte should be suspended.

The extract runs as follows:—

"*Pera, le 2 Décembre,* 1868.

"Au lieu des huit jours que vous avez demandés, deux semaines seront ajoutées aux quinze jours fixées primitivement dans l'ultimatum de la Porte."

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 105.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 1,079.)
My Lord, *Paris, December 23, 1868.*

THE Marquis de Lavalette told me this afternoon that he had been informed by Prince Metternich that, if the French Government thought it advisable that a Conference of the Great Powers should be held on the Turco-Greek question, Austria would consent to take part in one. In giving this consent, the Baron de Beust had, it appeared, made it

conditional on a satisfactory understanding being come to as to the basis and the programme of the Conference.

M. de Lavalette told me that he looked upon this condition as perfectly proper and reasonable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 106.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 24, 1868, 4·55 P.M.*

YOU may act on No. 50.

No. 107.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 24.)

(Telegraphic.) *Athens, December 22, 1868.*

THE Greek man-of-war "Hellas" returned from Syra this morning alone. It is understood that the Turkish Admiral persists in requiring the immediate surrender or trial of the "Enosis," and that the man-of-war has come for orders. This Government will probably acquiesce in the Admiral's demands.

No. 108.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 24.)

(Telegraphic.) *Athens, December 24, 1868.*

THE Greek Government having declined the Turkish Admiral's offer to let the "Enosis" come here under French and Austrian escort, the French man-of-war at Syra will be withdrawn, and the Admiral left to take whatever steps he thinks fit.

Parliament was closed yesterday. National Bank have been required to advance 4,000,000 drachmas for warlike preparations,—more than half the specie on the faith of which 20,000,000 of paper are in circulation. If this measure is not prevented it will be little short of ruin.

No. 109.

Mr. Elliot to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 25.)

(No. 479. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December 12, 1868.*

I SHOULD have been glad to inform your Lordship accurately of the course which has been followed here by the Russian Ambassador since the adoption by the Porte of the resolution to take strong measures towards the Greek Government, but I find myself unable to speak with any confidence on the matter.

To my French colleague and to myself, General Ignatieff recognizes the justice of the complaints against the Hellenic Government, and, although blaming the Porte for what he terms their precipitancy, says he has written to Athens strongly urging a compliance with the Turkish demands.

To others he has stated that he had recommended the acceptation of only two of the points contained in the ultimatum, and his language to the Porte has been far from conciliatory.

In other respects his proceedings have been such as to show how much he is disposed to favour the efforts of the Greek Government in encouraging the Cretan insurrection, his sympathy with the cause occasionally leading him to lengths to which few Diplomatic Agents, even of a rank far inferior to that which he occupies, would be inclined to go, as

was strikingly exemplified when Admiral Hobart was ordered to take the naval command in the Cretan waters.

It seems that, before coming here, Admiral Hobart had embarked in some industrial speculation in Russia which had turned out disastrously, and had involved in loss all who were engaged in or connected with it, and he thus incurred a debt to a Russian firm which he was unable to pay.

When the Porte resolved to send Admiral Hobart to put a stop to the blockade-running, General Ignatieff, aware that the energy of that officer would probably enable him to accomplish the task intrusted to him, and inflict a fatal blow on the insurrection, used every effort, not to say artifice, to stop him.

Remembering the liability incurred at St. Petersburgh, the Russian Ambassador sent for an English lawyer, and personally directed him to make a formal application to Her Majesty's Consular Judge for the arrest of Admiral Hobart for the debt due to a Russian firm.

The application, being altogether irregular and unsupported by the necessary documents or affidavits, was at once rejected by Mr. Francis; but that such an attempt should have been made upon the personal and eager initiative of the Russian Ambassador, instead of being left, as such cases usually are, to be conducted by the representatives of the creditors, sufficiently indicates the animus which inspires General Ignatieff in all matters connected with the Cretan question, and which is believed to lead him much further than his Government desire, or perhaps are aware of.

In confirmation of this opinion, I may state that three days ago his Excellency received a telegram from Prince Gortchakoff, which is said to have conveyed a reproof for the encouragement he had been giving to the Greeks.

There can, at all events, be no doubt that the communication was of a nature greatly to disconcert him; and his language to the Porte has been much modified and altered in tone since its reception.

The Greeks established at Constantinople are already beginning to be loud in their complaints that they have been led into their present difficulties by being encouraged to rely upon Russia, from whom they now see that they can look for no support.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 110.

Mr. Elliot to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 25.)

(No. 482. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 14, 1868.

THE Russian Ambassador informed me this afternoon that he had received from Prince Gortchakoff a telegram, saying that Count Stackelberg reported from Paris that the Marquis de Moustier considered the most dangerous moment of the crisis in the Turco-Grecian quarrel as being already passed, and that it was now essential for the Powers to concert upon the action to be exercised at the Porte to prevent further complications.

General Ignatieff added, that he had asked the French Ambassador whether he was authorized to act with him; but M. Bourée had replied that he had received no instructions of a similar nature, and that he must, therefore, abstain from taking any step.

I told General Ignatieff that I was, in this respect, in the same position as M. Bourée, and that I was, moreover, satisfied that no representation to the Porte would have the slightest effect in inducing them to abandon the measures they had resolved to adopt, unless it should be accompanied by a declaration of the Powers having undertaken that Greece should henceforward fulfil her international duties to this country.

General Ignatieff, upon this, as upon previous occasions, endeavoured to create in my mind a distrust of the line which is being followed by the French Government, and more than insinuated his belief that the Porte had been urged to their present energetic action by the French Ambassador, for the purpose of getting up an agitation in the East.

I said that I was perfectly convinced that there was not the slightest ground for his suspicion, and that M. Bourée had had no more to do in the matter than any one of our colleagues.

This is, indeed, so apparent that I can scarcely give General Ignatieff the credit of himself believing the suspicion he expressed; but the perfect good understanding which exists between my French colleague and myself, and the absence of all feelings of jealousy or rivalry, is a source of vexation to the Russian Ambassador, who is apt to avail himself

of every opportunity that occurs of throwing out an insinuation that may make one of us doubt the straightforwardness of the other.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 111.

Mr. Elliot to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 25.)

(No. 483.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 14, 1868.

THE Greek Minister here has received from his Government a despatch, of which I have the honour to inclose a copy, informing him of the measures which had been taken to prevent desertions from the Greek army of soldiers desiring of joining the band of Petropoulaki.

I am not aware of the effect which this communication may have produced upon the Porte, but it may be questioned whether much value will be attached to the declaration of the Greek Government, that they will continue to follow "the same system of neutrality" as that which had hitherto guided them.

The official admission of the large number of soldiers which had joined the band will no doubt be duly received, while the statement of the measures adopted to prevent it, will probably be received with some incredulity by the Turkish Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

Inclosure 1 in No. 111.

M. P. Delyanni to M. T. Delyanni.

(Traduction.)
M. l'Envoyé, *Athènes, le 23 Novembre*, 1868, v.s.

A LA suite de notre télégramme chiffré du 19 courant, nous avons l'honneur de vous transmettre, ci-joint, copie d'un Rapport du Ministre de la Guerre dont vous relèverez quelles mesures sévères ont été décrétées pour la poursuite et l'arrestation des déserteurs de l'armée régulière qui avaient déserté leurs rangs dernièrement pour se rendre en Crète.

L'adoption de ces mesures de poursuite démontre irréfragablement la ferme décision du Gouvernement Hellénique de suivre, en ce qui concerne la lutte Crétoise, le même système de neutralité qu'il a suivi jusqu'à présent, et de remplir invariablement les devoirs que lui imposent ses engagements internationaux envers l'empire limitrophe, et ses relations de voisinage.

Vous voudrez bien donner, au besoin, ces explications au Gouvernement auprès duquel vous êtes accrédité, et aux Représentants des Puissances.

(Signé) P. DELYANNI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 111.

General Milio to M. P. Delyanni.

(Traduction.) *Athènes, le 21 Novembre*, 1868.

EN suite de l'entretien que nous venons d'avoir ensemble sur les désertions qui viennent d'avoir lieu dans les rangs de l'armée, à cause des enrôlements pour Candie, faits par le Colonel Pétropoulaki, j'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance les mesures que je viens de prendre pour arrêter les déserteurs, et prévenir le retour de pareilles désertions.

Le Commandant de Place d'Athènes, ayant conçu des soupçons sur la désertion de quelques soldats appartenants à la garnison, a pris les mesures convenables pour empêcher de pareils actes, et arrêter ceux qui auraient quitté leurs rangs. Par conséquent, le 7 courant, le Commandant de Place de Pirée en a arrêté quinze, et hier quatre. Quelques uns ont pu échapper, s'étant travestis. Nous avons infligé aux déserteurs arrêtés les peines réglementaires, vû qu'ils ont été arrêtés avant l'expiration du délai accordé par la

loi militaire, pour le cas de répentir. Quant aux autres, on a ordonné une instruction, afin qu'ils soient poursuivis comme accusés de connivence de désertion à l'étranger.

Le 13 courant, ayant été informé par le Rapport du Commandant de Place de Nauplie, et le 15 par le rapport du Commandant de Place de Trepoli, que vingt-quatre soldats ont déserté de la garnison de la première de ces villes, et dix-sept de la seconde, j'ai ordonné par le télégraphe aux autorités militaires de Laconie, de rechercher les déserteurs, qui, d'après le rapport des dites autorités, s'étaient dirigés sur Githium (Mania), les arrêter et les envoyer aux corps respectifs. En même temps j'en ai informé le quatrième bataillon d'infanterie pour qu'il prit aussi les mesures nécessaires; ce qui a mené l'arrestation de quatorze déserteurs appartenants à la garnison de Tripoli, qui furent préventivement emprisonnés, pour que leur instruction soit faite.

Indépendamment de ces mesures, j'ai aussi adressé une circulaire à toutes les autorités militaires, afin d'éclairer les soldats sur les conséquences de la désertion, et en prévenir le retour.

Ayant été informé par le courrier d'aujourd'hui que des soldats faisant partie du sixième bataillon d'infanterie, stationné à Githium, sont soupçonnés de vouloir déserter, j'ai ordonné télégraphiquement qu'on y envoie un officier, avec la mission spéciale de prévenir cette désertion, et fixer aux soldats en question la peine qu'il jugerait convenable.

En terminant cette dépêche, je vous fais connaître, mon collègue, que, pour ce qui est des désertions, je persisterai dans les dispositions de ma circulaire, et je me montrerai très sévère; et c'est dans cet esprit que je me suis empressé d'expédier la circulaire en question, et réclamer la prompte et efficace poursuite des déserteurs.

Le Ministre,
(Signé) S. MILIO.

No. 112.

Mr. Elliot to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 25.)

(No. 484.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 15, 1868.

AT the invitation of the Greek Minister at Florence, General Menabrea instructed M. Bertinatti, the Italian Minister here, to convey to the Porte counsels of moderation in their present differences with Greece.

Aali Pasha's reply to M. Bertinatti, upon receiving this communication, was that, although he was always glad to listen to a friendly Government, as he regarded that of Italy, such advice would be more properly directed to Athens, where it was greatly required; whereas the Government of the Sultan had already given such proofs of moderation as must be recognized by all Europe.

My Italian colleague says, he was entirely of the same opinion as the Grand Vizier, and was therefore glad to learn that his Government had been urging moderation upon the Government at Athens.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 113.

Mr. Elliot to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 25.)

(No. 489.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 16, 1868.

AS it has been sometimes asserted that, in requiring the dissolution of Petropoulaki's band, the Turkish Government were requiring more than could be granted without violating the Greek law.

I have the honour to inclose a copy of the 127th Article of the Greek Penal Code, which would make Petropoulaki and his companions liable to the punishment of death, unless, indeed, they can plead that they were acting by order or permission of the Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

Inclosure in No. 113.

Article 127 of the Penal Code of Greece.

Peine de Mort.—1. Contre ceux qui sans ordre ou permission du Gouvernement rassemblent ou enrôlent, seuls ou au moyen d'autres, des corps de troupes ou des soldats, ou s'emploient à cela, de même que ceux qui en connaissance de cause et volontairement se rassemblent de cette façon pour une campagne.

2. Contre les Chefs de Corps qui gardent rassemblées leurs troupes après que le Gouvernement leur a donné l'ordre de les licencier ou de les renvoyer dans leurs foyers.

La même peine est encourue par celui qui volontairement et en connaissance de cause continue de rester dans une telle armée.

3. Contre ceux qui sans droit ou raison légale acceptent un commandement quelconque sur terre ou sur mer, en désobéissant aux ordres du Gouvernement n'abandonnant pas ce commandement.

Voir les Articles (page 47, 113, 131, 126, 227, 447, 450).

No. 114.

Mr. Elliot to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 25.)

(No. 490.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 16, 1868.

I HAVE made inquiry respecting the enrolment of a corps of Albanians for service in Crete, which is reported by Her Majesty's Consul at Janina.

Aali Pasha states, that the 700 Albanians that it is proposed to raise, are not irregulars, but are intended as zaptiehs or police for the garrison of certain blockhouses.

They consist of Christians as well as Mussulmans, and are enrolled as gendarmes, and receive regular pay and rations.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 115.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 25.)

(No. 2.)
My Lord, *Athens, December* 16, 1868.

LORD STANLEY'S telegram of the 7th instant, desiring me to warn the Greek Government of the serious danger they would incur by wantonly provoking a contest with Turkey, did not reach me until late at night on the 12th. I at once asked to see M. Delyanni; and on the following morning he called upon me at 11 o'clock.

On my acquainting him with the substance of Lord Stanley's communication, he said, with some warmth, that he well knew that, in the event of a contest with Turkey, wantonly provoked by Greece, the Guaranteeing Powers would be justified in throwing upon Greece the responsibility of her acts; but that the Greek Government were persuaded that when Her Majesty's Government were apprized of all that has occurred, they could not fail to acknowledge that Turkey was alone to blame for having provoked the impending conflict.

I replied, that I had no reason to believe that any representation which he could make would alter the opinion of Her Majesty's Government; that I presumed the Greek Government had not kept back any circumstances which they thought would tend to establish the rectitude and moderation of their conduct; and yet, that the impression produced upon my mind, as well as upon those of nearly all my colleagues, was precisely the same as that which appeared to have been made upon Lord Stanley. My present object, however, was not to raise a useless argument, but to induce the Greek Government to return such an answer to the Turkish ultimatum as would prevent the immediate departure of M. Photiades, and give time for negotiation; and I offered, in concert with my French colleague, to do everything in my power to smooth the path to reconciliation with Turkey.

Without troubling your Lordship with all that passed between M. Delyanni and myself on this occasion, I may state that he gradually became more reasonable in his observations, and appeared to be so disposed to discuss with me the terms upon which an accommodation might be effected; that upon his pressing me to let him have a copy of

Lord Stanley's instruction, I took upon myself to give him the substance of it in writing, in order that his hands might be strengthened in persuading his colleagues also to acquiesce in the course recommended by Her Majesty's Government.

But I regret to say that M. Delyanni was either trifling with me, or he was unable to induce the King and his colleagues to acquiesce in his views, as the Prussian Minister, who had occasion to see M. Bulgaris on the following morning to advise moderate counsels in the name of his Government, was at once informed most peremptorily by the Prime Minister that the Hellenic Government were determined not to give way in the matter. The Italian Minister likewise recommended conciliation in the most pressing terms, and the same advice was tendered by the Austrian Envoy, by order of their respective Governments. Even the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, as he informs me, advised M. Delyanni to avoid a rupture. He was not, however, acting under instructions from his Government, but merely at the suggestion of General Ignatieff.

The instructions of the French Minister were not as explicit as would have been desirable, but he was able to gather the intentions of his Government from an expression in a telegram from the Marquis de Moustier, alluding to the instructions given by Count Bismarck to the Prussian Minister in Greece, and Baron Baude accordingly agreed to speak to M. Delyanni precisely in the same sense as that of Lord Stanley's telegram.

All, however, was of no avail, and at about 4 o'clock yesterday afternoon M. Delyanni called on Photiades Bey, and placed in his hands a lengthy note in reply to the Turkish ultimatum, which is obviously meant as an unqualified rejection of its demands.

M. Photiades has accordingly taken down the arms over the house occupied by the Turkish Legation, and he will embark to-morrow with all the members of his Mission.

Your Lordship's telegram of the 12th instant adopting the instructions of Her Majesty's late Government, did not reach me until yesterday evening, after the reply had been given to M. Photiades: but I have not failed to acquaint M. Delyanni with its purport.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

No. 116.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 25.)

(No. 3.)
My Lord, *Athens, December 16, 1868.*

I HAVE already acquainted your Lordship by telegraph with the substance of the intelligence contained in the accompanying copies of a letter from Her Majesty's Consul at Syra, and of its inclosures, reporting that a Turkish naval force under Hobart Pasha had fallen in with the notorious blockade-runner "Enosis," at about six miles from shore, and that after an exchange of shots between the cruizers and the "Enosis," the latter had been chased into the port of Syra, where the Turkish admiral had cast anchor, insisting on the immediate surrender or punishment of the alleged "pirate."

Admiral Hobart, as your Lordship will observe, requires the "signal punishment of an act of piracy," but he states that he is willing that a proper investigation of the affair shall take place before the Consuls of the different nations, by whose decision he will abide. The Admiral's demand was doubtless framed in what he considered a spirit of conciliation, after the gross provocation he had received; but it is obvious that there was but little chance of its being complied with, as the Greek authorities are powerless to punish the "Enosis" as a pirate until she has been tried and condemned by a competent tribunal; whilst the Consular body can scarcely be expected to undertake a duty which is altogether foreign to their functions.

I presume, therefore, that Admiral Hobart was so exasperated by the outrage, that he has taken the unusual step of demanding the surrender by the Greek authorities of a vessel under their own flag.

I have requested Mr. Consul Lloyd to decline taking any part in the proposed investigation. I have, however, recommended him in case he would be consulted by Admiral Hobart, to lose no opportunity of advising him to avoid bringing on a collision until his Government shall have had an opportunity of considering the point at issue, and, if necessary, giving him instructions to proceed to extremities.

The French Minister, however, has gone a step further. After a consultation with Admiral Moulac, the French corvette "Forbin" has been despatched to Syra on a mission of peace. Her commander, Captain Meyer, has been desired to call upon Hobart Pasha, and to state to him that Admiral Moulac, without taking upon himself in any way to

dictate to the Pasha what course he should under the circumstances pursue, ventures, in the name of a friendly Government, to advise him most earnestly not to precipitate hostilities by insisting on conditions with which the Greek Government may be unable to comply, but to wait quietly until the Porte has had time to consult the great Powers, and to make known its decision. Captain Meyer is moreover directed to refrain from actual interference between the parties. Should a conflict unfortunately ensue, he is to move his ship out of the way, and remain a passive spectator of the action.

With every wish to prevent the outbreak of hostilities between Greece and Turkey, I do not consider that I should be justified in requesting the officer in command of the vessel of war on this station to follow the example of the "Forbin." Her Majesty's Government have repeatedly and solemnly warned the Greek Government that they would not be protected in the event of their provoking a rupture with Turkey. They have quite recently committed one act after another altogether incompatible with the position of a friendly Power. The very shot from the "Enosis" which struck the Admiral's vessel was probably fired from a gun furnished to the "Enosis" by a Government arsenal. It therefore appeared to me that it would be the height of inconsistency to tell the Greek Government one day that we intended in a certain contingency to leave them to their own resources, and when that very contingency arises, to send a British man-of-war to interpose between the contending parties. Such a course would only tend to perpetuate the impunity which the Greek Government have so long enjoyed, and to convince the nation that they may commit any act against Turkey, however monstrous, with the certainty that on the day of reckoning the Powers will come forward, and screen them from the consequences of their unlawful acts. In short, I can understand a European intervention ending in a military occupation of this Kingdom; but I can see no advantage in attempting to prevent a conflict in one place, which sooner or later would inevitably break out elsewhere.

At about a quarter to 7 yesterday evening, M. Tipaldo, a gentleman attached to the Greek Foreign Office, called upon me and stated that he was sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to inform me that the corvette "Hellas" and another vessel of war were about to start for Syra. That on their arrival there, the Nomarch would require Hobart Pasha to leave the port and Greek waters at once ("dans un bref délai"), and that in the event of his declining to attend to this injunction he would be attacked by the Greek vessels, which would do their utmost to capture or destroy the vessels under his command. M. Tipaldo added that the "Hellas" would quit the Piræus in about an hour, and that a similar message had been delivered by another gentleman to the Turkish and French Ministers, whilst he was about to seek the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires for the same purpose. On rising to leave, he inquired whether I wished him to take back any answer to his message. I replied that I was so astounded at the communication and so convinced of the hopelessness of doing anything at so short a notice that would be of the least use, that I could only express my deep regret at the extreme measure which was about to be adopted, but that I would acquaint my Government with what I had heard. He replied that the national honour imperatively required that Admiral Hobart should be driven from Syra, and that, at whatever cost, the attempt would be made.

I subsequently heard from Photiades Bey that he was informed by the gentleman who called at his house, that one hour would be the short delay accorded to Hobart Pasha to make up his mind.

The "Hellas" is a covered screw-corvette of about 1,500 tons, mounting 24 guns. She is an old, crank vessel built in England, and her deck is too crowded with guns for her to have much chance against a heavily-armed frigate like the Turkish flag-ship, if the latter is properly fought and handled. But I understand that the "Hellas" has taken on board a considerable number of picked artillerymen, with whose assistance her commander has been instructed to carry the Turk, if practicable, by boarding.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

P.S. *December 17th*, 1868.—In a letter dated the 15th, which I have received this morning, Mr. Consul Lloyd has forwarded to me the accompanying translation of the Report addressed to his employers by the Captain of the "Enosis," respecting his last trip to Crete with the expedition of Petropouláki—in which I notice an allusion to two guns he had on board. These, doubtless, are the guns supplied by the Government arsenal at Nauplia, to which I have alluded in a previous despatch respecting Petropouláki's proceedings whilst at Nauplia.

Mr. Lloyd informs me that four shots were fired by the "Enosis" at the Turkish cruizers, the second of which alone took effect, the gun having been displaced from its pivot

at the first shot. He adds, "in the present case the firing commenced near, if not in, Greek waters," a point which it may be difficult to establish: Admiral Hobart affirming that the first shot was fired at about six miles from the shore, whilst the Greek Captain estimates the distance at half-a-mile.

E. M. E.

Inclosure 1 in No. 116.

Consul Lloyd to Mr. Erskine.

Greek Steam Navigation Office, Syra, December 14, 1868, 10 A.M.

Sir,

AT 8 A.M. this day, the "Enosis" returning from Crete entered the harbour pursued by a two-funnelled vessel, supposed to be the "Izzedin" or "Fuad," and by a Turkish frigate supposed to have Admiral Hobart Pasha on board. The small English steam-tug "Maggie Smart" entered the harbour a minute or two before the "Enosis." Guns were fired by the two-funnelled vessel at the "Enosis" between the Island of Aspronisi and the Lighthouse Island. All four vessels are now anchored in the harbour, the frigate at the entrance. All the town in great excitement, the Consuls were invited by the Nomarch to come here, and the Nomarch says, that seeing in the papers that Hobart Pasha had orders to take the "Enosis" though she might be in the port of Syra, and as there were so many vessels in the harbour, and the Greeks would assuredly resist, he begged us to interpose in order to prevent bloodshed. It is decided we wait till the boat sent from the Health Office return, and we are waiting its return.

M. Axelos has just joined us. The "Enosis" left Gythion on Monday last, the 7th, and went to Sissi of Mirabello, where she landed some 600 men; thence she went to Kimolo of Milo Island, and on the 11th instant went to Mirton of Agios Vassilios and landed the rest, some 350, and the ammunition and provisions, and returning here, fell in with the Turks, who pursued her to Syra. A boat from the Turkish vessel has just come ashore, and M. Axelos is gone on board. A Greek steamer is getting ready for the Piræus, and I write these few lines in the greatest haste.

I have, &c

(Signed) ST. VINCENT LLOYD.

P.S.—M. Canaris, of the guard-cutter here, has been on board the frigate and given it pratique. The Admiral showed him the marks of a ball from the "Enosis" which grazed his decks; he said that he, the Admiral, said the latter had just fired a blank shot at the "Enosis" to stop her, and not stopping, he fired a shot, which the "Enosis" returned; that he intended to ask for satisfaction from the competent authority, and that if it was not given he will take it himself. These shots were exchanged half-a-mile beyond Aspronisi.

The Commandant of the Austrian gun-boat "Wall," in harbour here, has just come, stating he came from Admiral Hobart to demand of the Nomarch that he, the Nomarch, should declare in writing that the "Enosis" is, and remains under sequestration and arrest here, as accused of piracy, and that in case of refusal he will lay an embargo and prevent any Greek vessel in the harbour from leaving it.

M. Axelos is returned; he says the Admiral told him to tell us that he has entered the harbour in pursuit of a pirate, and will await orders—meantime will be happy to see the Consuls. M. Deubrutitz declined not to go; the others decided not to go in a body, each for himself if he chose to go.

2 P.M.—It being the intention of the Nomarch to send a strong protest to Admiral Hobart against his proceedings, the Consuls begged him to ask for Admiral Hobart's verbal communications by Captain of "Wall" and by M. Axelos, in writing; and I was requested to go on board for the purpose. I went directly, saw Admiral Hobart, delivered the message, and brought back his demand in writing, of which annexed is a copy. Admiral Hobart said he did not wish to do any harm to the town or its inhabitants, but insists that "Enosis" be prevented from leaving the port: he has sent for other vessels from Crete. The Nomarch is now replying that he cannot take upon himself to decide such a matter, and sends off an express steamer to Athens, and will give a reply as soon as it returns, and that meantime, as far as depends on him (the Nomarch) "Enosis" shall not leave the port. I believe I am to take the Nomarch's reply. M. Axelos decides to go to Athens by the express boat.

I learn that "Enosis" first landed near Bali 600 men on Tuesday night, thence went to Kimolo, where she took 320 more, and went east of Crete, and landed them at Mirto; thence for bad weather went behind Gaidouronisi, south of Crete, stayed there thirty hours, thence to Gulf of Mirabello, where landed the ammunition; thence to Santa Maria of Paros, where she arrived at 10 P.M. last night, and left this morning at half-past 5 A.M. for Syra.

4 P.M.—I have just returned from Admiral Hobart with the announced reply, and must close as the boat will be leaving. I asked if he wished to write, but he said he had no time, and you would know the news from me.

"Maggie Smart" is hired by Admiral Hobart.

ST. V. L.

Inclosure 2 in No. 116.

Vice-Admiral Hobart to M. Dracopoulos.

"*Hudavendikiai*," *Syra, December* 14, 1868.

Sir,

THIS morning, at 8 o'clock, being in my flag-ship, accompanied by the Turkish war-steamer "Izzedin," I observed the far-famed corsair "Enosis," who, I believe, was on her return voyage from Crete, where (after having openly armed with Armstrong guns at this port) she had, as I understand, landed a large number of Greek insurgents to assist in the revolution. We were at the time about six miles from the land. I ordered the "Izzedin" to follow her and to fire blank guns to bring her too; after the first gun had been fired, the "Enosis" replied with a shotted gun; the shot struck my ship and destroyed two boats; on which the "Izzedin" very properly also fired shot and followed her to within four miles of the port. I then steamed in and anchored here. Now, as the "Enosis" has, by so firing at a man-of-war, committed an act of piracy, I call on you to arrest her and allow me to make proper charges against this armed pirate. I trust that to avoid any unpleasant consequences your Excellency will see the necessity of at once acting—not to mention the patent fact that the "Enosis" has for two years been committing, with the perfect knowledge of yourself and all the Greek authorities, acts by which she has broken the law of nations. This act of piracy requires signal punishment—I need say no more; I leave it to the good feeling of yourself and the people here. I am willing that a proper investigation of this affair shall take place before the Consuls of the different nations here; and I will abide by their decision.

In the meantime I wait here your answer.

Yours, &c.

(Signed) AUGUST HOBART.

Inclosure 3 in No. 116.

M. Dracopoulos to Vice Admiral Hobart Pasha.

Syra, December $\frac{2}{14}$, 1868.

Sir,

IN reply to your despatch of this day's date, I have the honour to acquaint you that as I do not consider myself authorized to take upon myself the decision of a matter of such importance, I will send at once an express steamer to Athens to submit to the Royal Government your communication; and will, of course, hasten to acquaint you of its decision as soon as I receive it.

In the meantime, I beg to inform you that, as far as depends upon me, the "Enosis" shall not leave the port of Syra.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. P. DRACOPOULOS, *Nomarch of the Cyclades.*

Inclosure 4 in No. 116.

Vice-Admiral Hobart Pasha to M. Dracopoulos.

"*Hudavendikiai*," *December* 14, 1868.

Sir,

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your letter and to thank your Excellency for the prompt way in which you have acted. I wish your Excellency to make it public that

the only object of the Turkish vessels here is to prevent the escape of the piratical vessel "Enosis," a duty which I hope to perform to the satisfaction of all persons.

I have not the slightest idea of threatening in any way this place or its inhabitants, with whom I wish to be, if possible, on friendly terms.

I am, &c.
(Signed) AUGUST HOBART.

Inclosure 5 in No. 116.

Protest of the Captain of "Enosis."

(Translation.)

To the Directors of the Greek Steam Navigation Company.

THE Undersigned, Captain of the Greek steamer "Enosis," has to report that this day, Monday, the $\frac{2}{14}$ December, about 6 A.M., as he was coming into the port of Syra with his vessel, he encountered, in the waters of Syra, about half-a-mile distant from the island, two Turkish ships, a frigate and a steam yacht, which vessels, in perceiving his ship, bearing the Hellenic flag, fired several shots of large size and also from muskets; the pursuing vessels having approached his ship within musket-shot, the crew of the "Enosis" turned-up and manned the guns, shouting that they must defend themselves, lest the Turks should sink them; and they fired the guns and put the vessel at full speed to hasten her entrance into the port of Syra, which she effected under the fire of the Turkish ships, but, under God's blessing, without having suffered any damage. The Undersigned is in duty bound to make this statement, in order to preserve the rights of the Greek Steam Navigation Company—an insult having been committed, contrary to the law of nations, against the vessel and the flag—as well as with a view to the damage which ensued from the firing. He therefore protests on all these heads, and requests that a copy of the present may be delivered to him.

Syra, December $\frac{2}{14}$, 1868.

(Signed) N. SOURMELIS.

Inclosure 6 in No. 116.

Report of Captain N. Sourmelis.

(Translation.)

WE left Syra Saturday 23rd November (o. s.) at 9 P.M., and arrived at Gythion on Sunday morning. On Sunday evening we left Gythion, taking 900 volunteers, and arrived at Kimolo on Tuesday morning; thence we left at 1 P.M. with Leonidas Petropoulaki, and about 600 men, and arrived at Calakorufia or Sissais, near Bali, at 8 o'clock in the evening, where we landed the men who had brought with them provisions for five days. Thence we left after two hours, and returned to Kimolo at 7 o'clock A.M. on the Wednesday, having taken thence the old Petropoulaki with the rest of his men—300. Next day, Thursday, at half-past 8 P.M. we left thence, and having passed between Graboussa and Cerigotto we met two Turkish steamers which chased us for about two hours, but in vain they tried, because of the darkness, the bad weather, and the change of our direction they did not see us, we escaping their pursuit. On Friday approaching Gavdo at 11 A.M., at about twenty miles distant from it, we sighted a Turkish frigate cruizing and going from Gavdo to Sphakia, which it seems did not see us, and so we gained time and left her immediately behind. At 4 P.M. we sighted another Turkish chaser bound from Gavdo to Sphakia, but neither did she perceive us. At 10 P.M. we proceeded to Prassonissi, where we landed the men and all the cargo, except 120 boxes cartridges, 2 cannons, with appurtenances, which M. Petropoulaki did not wish to take with him, being short of mules. At 3 A.M. of Saturday, we left Prassonissi during very bad weather, and at 7 next morning we proceeded to Psariforathi, and landed the 120 boxes of cartridges, which were taken by the insurgents there, from whom we learned that a fight had taken place two days ago at Yerupetra, under the Chief Sphakianaki, where we (the insurgents) gained the victory, having killed many Turks. We left Prassonissi immediately, having taken on board a Turkish soldier who was a prisoner, and we arrived at Gaidoronissi at 9 P.M.; and from Gaidoronissi we started at 8 A.M. of Sunday, and arrived at Paros yesterday at midnight. From Paros we started at 6 o'clock this morning, and at 8 A.M., entering the harbour of Syra, we met outside Aspronissi three Turkish vessels which fired at us in sight of this

commercial town, and of the Consuls of the friendly Powers, and in sight of the European men-of-war stationed in the harbour of Syra.

Syra, December 2, 1868, o.s.

No. 117.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 25.)

(No. 4.)

My Lord, *Athens, December* 17, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of a note from M. Delyanni, protesting against the alleged pursuit by Hobart Pasha of the blockade-runner "Enosis" in Greek waters, repeating, as already stated in the previous number of my despatches, that the Pasha will be required to quit the port of Syra immediately; and, finally, throwing upon the Turkish Government the entire responsibility of the hostilities which may be the result of Hobart Pasha's acts.

I have informed M. Delyanni, in reply, that a copy of his note will be forwarded to Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

Inclosure in No. 117.

M. Delyanni to Mr. Erskine.

M. le Ministre, *Athènes, le* $\frac{1}{13}$ *Decembre*, 1868.

UNE flagrante violation de notre territoire et du droit des gens vient de se commettre à Syra, par l'Anglais Hobart, Vice-Amiral Ottoman.

Tandis que la paix n'avait pas encore cessé d'exister entre la Grèce et la Turquie, tandis que la rupture des relations diplomatiques n'était pas même consommée, la marine Turque a commencé les hostilités de la manière la plus inattendue et la plus audacieuse.

Vous savez déjà comment le bateau de la Compagnie Hellénique de Navigation à Vapeur "Enosis" fut attaqué à un demi-mille de distance de Syra le $\frac{2}{14}$ de ce mois dans son voyage de retour de Candie, par une escadre Turque sous le commandement immédiat du dit officier.

Les navires Turcs se mirent aussitôt, après l'avoir rencontré, à le canonner, dans l'intention évidente de le couler bas, et il ne dut son salut qu'à la rapidité de sa marche et à la proximité du port. Son équipage se vit obligé de tirer sur ces navires deux coups de canon pour se défendre et parvenir à gagner le port, en les faisant reculer pour un instant; c'est ce qui eut lieu en effet.

L'Amiral Ottoman ne s'est pas borné à cet acte de violence. Impuissant à capturer "l'Enosis" dans les eaux de Candie ou à la haute mer, et ayant échoué dans l'attaque insidieuse et illicite qu'il avait dirigée contre ce bateau, il continua à lui donner la chasse jusque dans le port de Syra, qu'il tint en quelque sorte bloqué.

Les remontrances de nos autorités et celles des Consuls étrangers n'avaient pas réussi, au départ du courrier, à faire comprendre à l'Amiral en question l'illégalité de ses procédés et à lui faire quitter la position menaçante qu'il avait prise.

Dans cette situation le Gouvernement du Roi n'avait qu'à consulter sa dignité et l'amour-propre national, gravement offensé. Il a expédié, ainsi que je vous l'ai fait savoir hier soir, des bâtiments de l'État avec l'ordre d'inviter Hobart Pacha à quitter les eaux de Syra, et d'employer la violence contre lui dans le cas où il n'y consentirait pas.

Si un conflit a eu lieu, si le sang a coulé, si le port d'une ville commerçante a été le théâtre de déplorables hostilités, et si la guerre s'en suit, la responsabilité tout entière en pèsera sur l'Amiral Turc et sur son Gouvernement.

La conscience du monde civilisé flétrira, à juste titre, la conduite de cet officier. Mais la position particulière de la Grèce vis-à-vis des trois Puissances qui ont garanti son indépendance me fait un devoir de protester de la manière la plus énergique contre ce qui vient de se passer à Syra, et de vous prier de vouloir bien porter cette protestation à la connaissance de votre Gouvernement.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) P. DELYANNI.

No. 118.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 25.)

(No. 5.)

My Lord, *Athens, December 17, 1868.*

THE Turkish Minister, Photiades Bey, left Athens at about 11 A.M. this day, and embarked for Constantinople on board the steamer of the Messageries Impériales. He was accompanied to the Piræus by a small escort of cavalry, and there was no demonstration or disturbance.

I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of a letter which has reached me this morning from Mr. Consul Lloyd, giving the latest intelligence from Syra. There had been no collision between the Turkish and Greek vessels up to yesterday at — P.M. when the steamer left, but Admiral Hobart was cruizing outside the harbour and it remains to be seen whether the "Hellas" will attempt to compel the Turkish squadron to quit Greek waters also.

I am informed by the French Minister that Captain Meyer, of the "Forbin," found Hobart Pasha most desirous to avoid provoking a contest, and he has addressed a letter to the Greek authorities which I am told is extremely moderate and well-written, offering to withdraw his squadron provided the Greek Government will consent that the "Enosis" shall be escorted by the "Hellas" to the Piræus, to be tried there by the competent Greek Tribunal.

Baron Baude has written a private letter to M. Delyanni recommending him very strongly to adopt either this proposal or one to the effect that the whole matter shall be referred to arbitration. His Excellency suggested that I also should advise M. Delyanni to acquiesce in this offer, and I have undertaken to do so as far as the first alternative is concerned; but it does not appear to me that it would be advisable to ask the Greek Government to allow the case of a Greek vessel accused of piracy to be decided by arbitration, as they would obviously reply that they have no power to interfere in a purely judicial matter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

Inclosure in No. 118.

Consul Lloyd to Mr. Erskine.

Dear Sir, *Syra, December 14, 1868, 4 P.M.*

MANY thanks for yours of yesterday, both received this morning. I never had an idea, nor do I believe the other Consuls had, either, of taking upon themselves the responsibility of deciding between the Nomarch and Admiral Hobart; it was, of course, a great mistake of the latter. I was glad of it, however, in order to be able to make some peaceful arrangement for the moment, and in which I succeeded; and if I can be of any further use in that way, you may be sure I will. The occasion may come yet.

Early this morning a four-funnelled Turk was seen in the harbour; at 9:30 A.M. the "Forbin" arrived; at 9:45 the "Austrian" from Piræus with M. Axelos, and the "Panhellenion," about the same time I believe, with news of the rupture at Athens.

At 11:45 A.M., Admiral Hobart steamed out of the harbour with the "Izzedin" and the four-funnelled steamer, and have been cruizing about ever since.

At 1 P.M. the "Hellas" came in and took a berth in the centre of entrance to harbour, and the "Izzedin" came once very close in to her, as though to challenge her.

At 2 P.M. there arrived, seemingly from Crete, another vessel, a steam corvette, which has joined Admiral Hobart outside. I see now a boat with Turkish flag at the stern of the "Forbin" and a boat from "Forbin" has just gone off to "Hellas." I have just written to Admiral Lord Clarence Paget, stating shortly how matters are here, and what vessels have come.

I expect Admiral Hobart will continue off Syra harbour until he has orders to move off, and that he will not lose sight of "Enosis" or "Crete," and will attack the former, if he has a chance, the moment she stirs out of the harbour.

Yours, &c.

(Signed) ST. VINCENT LLOYD.

No. 119.

Mr. Howard to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 25.)

(No. 7. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Munich, December 22, 1868.*

AT the moment when the alarms of war, which had so long agitated Europe, and proved so injurious to the development of commerce and trade, were subsiding, the rupture of relations between Turkey and Greece, with the concomitant danger of the opening out of the whole Eastern question, has again thrown disquietude into the public mind of this country, however remote from the immediate scene of action, as well as elsewhere.

I find the general impression entertained here to be that the Greek Government would not have ventured to adopt so hostile an attitude towards Turkey, unless they had been secretly encouraged by Russia to resist the just demands of the Porte.

I have, of course, no means of judging whether this impression be a correct one or not, but I think it right to record it.

At the same time, it is earnestly hoped that the Great Powers of Europe, and Great Britain and France in particular, as two of the Protecting Powers of Greece, will bring the whole weight of their influence to bear upon the Greek Government in order to induce them to give such satisfaction to Turkey as shall be called for by violated Treaty stipulations, and by the requirements of International Law and usage, and thus to extinguish the flame which threatens to be followed by so extensive a conflagration.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY F. HOWARD.

No. 120.

M. E. Musurus to Mr. Hammond.—(Received December 26.)

Bryanston Square, le 26 Décembre, 1868.

E. MUSURUS BEY présente ses compliments à M. Hammond, et a l'honneur de lui transmettre ci-joint copie d'une dépêche télégraphique qu'il vient de recevoir de son Excellence Safvet Pacha, et qu'il prie M. Hammond de vouloir bien communiquer à son Excellence le Comte de Clarendon.

Inclosure in No. 120.

Safvet Pasha to M. E. Musurus.

(Télégraphique.) *Constantinople, le 23 Décembre, 1868.*

JE vous ai déjà fait connaître les raisons de la mesure de l'expulsion des Hellènes. La Commission instituée pour l'exécution de cette mesure ne pouvant terminer sa tâche dans le délai fixé de quinze jours, nous avons dû le prolonger de trois semaines.

Pour ce qui concerne l'interdiction du pavillon Hellénique, cette mesure ne s'étend pas aux bâtiments qui, avant la notification faite par le Gouvernement Impérial, se sont trouvés en route chargés de marchandises en destination d'un port Ottoman.

Voilà tout ce que nous pouvons faire pour adoucir dans son application une mesure impérieusement commandée par les circonstances.

No. 121.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 26.)

(Télégraphic.) *Pera, December 26, 1868, 3·10 P.M.*

THE Porte believe the suggestion of a Conference to have originated with Russia, for the purpose of having the whole Cretan question discussed.

The Sultan's Government would not consent that the questions of annexation or autonomy should be touched by it.

They would probably not object if its object is confined to the matters at issue

between Turkey and Greece, but they regard it as a vital principle that their internal organization should not be meddled with by foreign Governments.

No. 122.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December 27.*)

(No. 9.)

Athens, December 19, 1868.

My Lord,

I SAW M. Delyanni yesterday, and communicated to him the substance of your Lordship's telegram of the 16th instant, directing me to recommend the Greek Government to do their utmost to avoid allowing the interruption of diplomatic relations with Turkey to degenerate into hostilities. I also availed myself of the opportunity to state that I had been assured by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople that although the Porte is determined to insist upon a compliance with its just demands, it has no present intention of resorting to hostilities, unless Greece should force it to do so.

M. Delyanni replied that the Greek Government were anxious, as far as might be possible, to adopt the advice given them by Her Majesty's Government, but that much would depend upon the course followed by the Porte. That if Turkey persisted in carrying out to its full extent the threatened expulsion of Greek subjects from Turkey, and the exclusion of Greek vessels from Turkish waters, the sufferers from those measures would necessarily be dispersed throughout Greece and could not fail to augment the public exasperation to such an extent that it would be impossible for the Government to prevent the outbreak of war. Already, he said, the Government had been compelled so far to give way to public opinion as to apply to the Chamber for authority to raise an extraordinary loan of 100,000,000 drachmas (3,571,428*l.*), and a portion of this money would be used for fortifications and other warlike measures; but he could assure me that they had no wish to push matters to extremities, and that nothing would be done wantonly to provoke hostilities.

In order to be able to reply to your Lordship's telegram of the 17th instant, I asked M. Delyanni whether he considered that his answer to the Turkish ultimatum amounted to an absolute rejection of its demands.

He said that he did not feel bound to express any opinion upon the subject; that it was for the Porte to determine whether the answer was satisfactory or not; but he admitted that I had correctly summarized its purport as follows:—

Absolute rejection of the two first points; refusal to make any concession in regard to the third; denial that there was any occasion to discuss the two last, inasmuch as the supposed murderer of an Ottoman subject at Syra had absconded to Crete; whilst the Greek Government cannot admit that they have infringed any Treaty or obligation of public law.

In case, however, M. Bulis should not yet have communicated to your Lordship the document in question, a copy of it is herewith inclosed.

As M. Delyanni has solemnly affirmed in his note to the Representatives of the three Guaranteeing Powers, of the 9th instant, that the Greek Government never have permitted, and never will permit, armed blockade-runners to leave their ports, I transmit, herewith, an extract from a letter which has been addressed to me by Mr. Consul Lloyd, dated the 6th instant, describing the means openly taken to arm the "Enosis" with two Armstrong guns furnished to that vessel by the Greek Government, and the public trial of those guns in the port of Syra. For some reason, which I have not been able to ascertain, this letter was not delivered to me until the 16th instant.

I herewith inclose copies of two letters addressed by Admiral Hobart to the Commander of the French corvette "Forbin" and to the Commander of the Greek corvette "Hellas," from which I infer that the Admiral would now be satisfied with the seizure and detention of the "Enosis" by the captain of the "Hellas," with a view to her trial on the charge of piracy preferred by Admiral Hobart.

M. Delyanni was not able to state to me what decision would be come to by the Greek Government in regard to this proposal; but I am not without hope that it will eventually be adopted. He appeared to be bent upon explaining to Admiral Hobart that the "Enosis" had committed no offence against Greek law, and that she would almost certainly be acquitted; but I urged him not to complicate matters by entering into discussion upon a point which, it must be assumed, had already been considered by Admiral Hobart. There were already six or seven Turkish vessels cruizing off Syra. It is not conceivable, therefore, that the "Hellas" would be so unwise as to provoke a conflict with a force so overpoweringly superior; and if the "Enosis" can be got away

from Syra, all danger of an immediate collision will be over; time will be gained for negotiation and, if necessary, for the interposition of the Guaranteeing Powers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 122.

M. Delyanni to Photiades Bey.

M. le Ministre, *Athènes, le* $\frac{3}{15}$ *Décembre*, 1868.

LE Gouvernement du Roi mon auguste Souverain a vu avec regret, mais sans surprise, la démarche que vous venez de faire d'ordre du Gouvernement de la Sublime Porte par votre note en date du $\frac{29\ \text{Novembre}}{11\ \text{Décembre}}$.

Le ton de vos précédentes communications et les informations que j'avais reçues me faisaient pressentir l'attitude que la Sublime Porte, pour des motifs tout autres sans doute que ceux qui lui y ont servi de prétexte, a résolu de prendre à notre égard. Je n'ai pas hésité à vous en exprimer ma conviction dans la note que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous adresser le $\frac{27\ \text{Novembre}}{9\ \text{Décembre}}$ et les faits sont venus démontrer que, quelques conciliantes que fussent les dispositions du Gouvernement Royal, son bon vouloir se serait brisé contre le parti pris par la Sublime Porte. C'est en vain que je me suis attaché à y faire ressortir que rien de nouveau n'était survenu de nature à altérer les relations d'amitié qui ont jusqu'à présent existé entre les deux Etats. C'est en vain que je vous ai donné des explications catégoriques et tranquillisantes. C'est en vain que je vous ai signalé la protection accordée par nos autorités à ceux des réfugiés Crétois qui voulaient effectivement retourner dans leurs foyers, les mesures de répression qui avaient été prises contre les instigateurs de violences, et les restrictions qui découlent de nos institutions en ce qui concerne l'action Gouvernementale sur les particuliers.

Mes explications, comme mes assurances, ont été de nul effet. Deux jours après avoir reçu ma note responsive vous me faisiez l'honneur de m'adresser la vôtre en date du $\frac{29\ \text{Novembre}}{11\ \text{Décembre}}$ sous forme d'ultimatum. Sans y faire aucune mention de ma dite note vous posez des conditions pour la plupart incompatibles avec la législation du pays et la dignité du Gouvernement Royal, en les faisant précéder de considérations en tous points erronées sur la révolution Crétoise, d'assertions inexactes sur la position des réfugiés Crétois en Grèce et sur les motifs qui les ont engagés à y venir demander l'hospitalité, de faits controuvés sur le traitement des sujets Ottomans en Grèce, et d'accusations gratuites contre la bonne foi du Gouvernement Hellénique.

Vous m'annoncez en terminant que, si ces conditions n'étaient pas acceptées dans un délai de cinq jours, la rupture des relations diplomatiques et commerciales entre les deux Etats aurait lieu sans retard, et serait suivie du renvoi des sujets Hellènes de l'Empire Ottoman et de l'exclusion de notre marine des ports de cet Empire.

Les développements contenus dans ma note susénoncée du $\frac{27\ \text{Novembre}}{9\ \text{Décembre}}$ m'auraient dispensé de discuter, à nouveau, les griefs mis en avant par la Sublime Porte; mais la persistance qu'elle montre, cédant à un entraînement inexplicable à mettre sur le compte d'autrui les conséquences de sa propre conduite, à intervertir les rôles et les situations, me fait un devoir de rétablir les faits dans toute leur exactitude et de protester énergiquement contre tout travestissement de la vérité.

Il serait superflu de retracer ici les origines et la marche de la révolution Crétoise. Tout le monde sait que les Chrétiennes de Candie voyant leurs justes demandes rejetées avec mépris par la Sublime Porte, et trouvant leur condition intolérable sous la domination Musulmane, ont pris les armes pour conquérir leur indépendance. Tout le monde sait que ce ne sont ni les menées des Comités formés en Grèce, ni l'ambition de cette Puissance, qui les ont conduits à cette extrémité. Ce sont plutôt les exactions et la mauvaise administration des Gouverneurs Turcs, les demi-mesures et le refus obstiné de la Sublime Porte de leur accorder les avantages que le Hatti-Houmayoun avait garanti à tous les Chrétiens, qui les y ont poussés.

Lorsque ces Crétois décidèrent, comme leurs frères et coreligionnaires les habitants du Royaume actuel de Grèce, et ceux de quelques Provinces de l'Empire Ottoman, l'avaient fait en 1821, de se révolter contre le Gouvernement Ottoman, ils manquaient presque de tout, et aucun Comité n'existait en Grèce. Ce n'est que plus tard que des secours leur sont arrivés de la Grèce comme de différentes autres parties du monde civilisé, et que des Comités d'assistance se sont formés dans le Royaume.

Dire que ces insulaires étaient contents de leur sort, qu'ils jouissaient de tous les bienfaits de la civilisation sous le Gouvernement paternel du Sultan, et que pourtant les

Comités et les agents secrets de la Grèce avaient réussi à leur persuader de sacrifier ce bien-être, d'errer dans les montagnes à demi-nus et affamés, d'endurer toute sorte de privations et de souffrances, de s'expatrier en masse et de se faire sauter plutôt que de tomber entre les mains de l'armée Turque, c'est faire bon marché de la logique et de la vérité.

Puisque vous me dites, M. le Ministre, que l'histoire des nations civilisées ne fournit aucun exemple du mépris avec lequel le droit des gens a été traité par les dits Comités, permettez-moi de vous faire observer que les annales du monde civilisé offrent peu d'exemples d'une guerre aussi barbare que celle qui désole la malheureuse Ile de Candie. Les atrocités inouïes commises par une soldatesque fanatique sur des prisonniers et sur des créatures faibles et inoffensives ont excité la commisération des peuples et des Gouvernements.

En disant que "les bandits qui auraient été envoyés en Crète par les Comités avaient décidé par des menaces une partie de ces malheureux à émigrer en Grèce, où ils n'auraient trouvé que misère et souffrance," vous oubliez que ce sont les bâtiments de guerre d'Angleterre, de France, de Russie, d'Autriche, de Prusse, d'Italie, qui en violant dans un but humanitaire un blocus fictif ont recueilli ces infortunés et les ont transportés en Grèce ; vous oubliez que ces réfugiés y ont trouvé une cordiale hospitalité, et que le Gouvernement du Roi continue de dépenser des sommes considérables pour leur entretien ; vous oubliez que cinq grandes Puissances ont donné itérativement à la Sublime Porte le conseil de faire constater par une enquête internationale les vœux des Crétois et de se conformer ensuite à ces vœux.

Il serait étrange que la Grèce et les Comités eussent pu exercer une influence sur les Grandes Puissances de l'Europe au point de les décider à faire une pareille démarche.

D'un autre côté, si le Gouvernement Ottoman était sûr de l'affection de ses sujets Chrétiens en Crète, "de l'attachement de l'immense majorité des habitants de l'île," ainsi que vous l'affirmez, pourquoi se serait-il refusé avec obstination à faire constater leurs vœux ?

L'histoire burinera les scènes du drame sanglant qui s'est déroulé en Crète, et dira si les Chrétiens, en prenant les armes contre un Gouvernement qu'ils considéraient comme étranger, ont obéi aux instigations venues du dehors, si c'est la première fois qu'ils se sont soulevés contre cette domination, et si leurs prétentions sont contraires aux maximes du droit des gens et du droit naturel.

Les cinq points de l'acceptation desquels la Sublime Porte fait une condition du maintien de relations de paix avec la Grèce sont :—1. Dispersion immédiate des bandes de volontaires dernièrement organisées dans différentes parties du Royaume et de toute autre bande à l'avenir. 2. Désarmement des corsaires "Enosis," "Crète," et "Panhellénion," ou, en tout cas, défense à ces corsaires d'entrer dans les ports Helléniques. 3. Autorisation aux émigrés Crétois de retourner dans leur pays et protection efficace de leur rapatriement. 4. Punition conformément aux lois de ceux qui se sont rendus coupables d'aggression contre des militaires et des sujets Ottomans, et indemnisation des victimes de ces attentats. 5. Engagement de suivre désormais une ligne de conduite conforme aux Traités existants et aux droits de gens.

Pour ce qui est au 1er et au 2me de ces points, je regrette, M. le Ministre, de n'avoir pas d'autres arguments que ceux contenus dans ma dernière note pour vous convaincre que les institutions du pays ne permettent pas au Gouvernement Royal d'enchaîner la liberté individuelle au profit d'une Puissance étrangère.

La Grèce ne saurait plus faire pour la Turquie qu'elle n'a fait pour d'autres Puissances. Dans les guerres qui ont eu lieu de nos jours en Europe et en Amérique, des volontaires Hellènes ont pris du service dans les armés belligérantes, et pourtant aucune réclamation de ce genre ne nous fut adressée. C'est que ces volontaires agissaient pour leur propre compte et ne pouvaient engager la responsabilité du Gouvernement Royal. En cela aucune innovation n'a eu lieu chez nous. Je vous ai déjà dit à plusieurs reprises que dans le long cours de l'insurrection de Candie des corps de volontaires s'y étaient rendus. La Sublime Porte a compris que le Gouvernement du Roi n'était pas armé par les lois du pays contre ces entreprises, et, par conséquent, elle n'a pas persisté dans ses réclamations. D'ailleurs, ce n'est pas seulement de la Grèce que des volontaires se sont rendus en Crète. A côté des Hellènes il y avait des Anglais, des Français, des Italiens, des Hongrois, des Américains, des Montenégrins.

"L'Enosis," la "Crète," et le "Panhellénion" ne sont point des corsaires armés dans nos ports. Ce sont des paquebots de la Compagnie Hellénique de Navigation à Vapeur qui font des voyages en Crète pour porter des vivres aux insurgés, tout en se livrant à des opérations de commerce. Si ces bateaux, dont l'un fait un service régulier de paquebot à l'intérieur du Royaume, sont pris en violant le blocus et en opposant de la résistance

aux croiseurs de l'escadre Ottomane, ou en ayant un chargement considéré comme contrebande de guerre, ils peuvent être passibles de confiscation comme bonnes prises, suivant les prescriptions du droit maritime. Aucune loi du pays ne défend aux sujets Hellènes d'aller ravitailler, à leurs risques et périls, un port étranger bloqué. Je ne sache pas que les bateaux en question soient armés ; mais si par hasard ils le sont, il ne faut pas perdre de vue que tous les paquebots et même les grands bâtiments de commerce à voile portent ordinairement un certain nombre de pièces d'artillerie qui leur servent à se défendre en cas de danger.

Pour ce qui est du 3e point, je n'ai qu'à vous rappeler les observations contenues dans ma dernière note sur le nombre des émigrés rapatriés par les soins de la Légation, et sur la protection qui leur a été toujours accordée par nos autorités. S'il me fallait produire une autre preuve des bonnes dispositions du Gouvernement Royal à ce sujet, je n'aurais qu'à citer le fait qu'après l'expédition de cette note et au moment où l'on annonçait de toutes parts que la Sublime Porte était décidée à rompre ses relations avec la Grèce, plus de 200 réfugiés Crétois s'embarquaient au Pirée pour Candie sans être aucunement molestés.

Pour ce qui est du 4e point, c'est avec étonnement que le Gouvernement du Roi apprend que des attentats auraient été commis contre des militaires et des sujets Ottomans dans le Royaume, et que ces attentats seraient restés impunis. Nous repoussons de toute notre force une semblable accusation. Si vous faites allusions à un soldat Albanais, qui se trouvant de passage l'année dernière à Syra, fut tué dans une querelle par un autre Albanais, je ne pense pas que ce soit là un fait pouvant motiver une réclamation de cette nature. Vous savez fort bien que les autorités de Syra prirent alors sans retard les mesures nécessaires pour l'arrestation du coupable, mais que celui-ci s'était évadé en Crète aussitôt le perpétration du crime. Toutes les informations vous avaient été données alors relativement aux procédés de nos autorités, et il ne résulte pas de la correspondance échangée à cette occasion que ces autorités eussent manqué à leur devoir.

Excepté cet attentat commis par un sujet Ottoman contre un autre sujet Ottoman, les sujets de la Sublime Porte ont joui sur le territoire Grec, comme tous les autres étrangers, de la plus complète sécurité.

Ce grief est tout aussi étrange que celui relatif à un de mes derniers discours à la Chambre, et aux paroles prononcées du haut de la tribune par un ancien Ministre touchant l'achat du vapeur "la Crète."

Je ne sais pas ce que d'anciens Ministres ont pu dire et quelle signification il faut attribuer aux paroles qu'ils auraient prononcées ; mais ce que je sais, c'est que le Cabinet actuel, désireux de maintenir des rapports de bonne harmonie avec la Sublime Porte, a fait preuve de la meilleure volonté. Vous vous rappelez quelle fermeté il a montrée dans la question de l'envoi de Députés Crétois. En ce qui concerne plus particulièrement les paroles que j'ai prononcées à la Chambre, je vous ai expliqué, dans un de nos entretiens, qu'elles n'avaient rien d'hostile à la Sublime Porte, qu'elles n'étaient que l'expression de notre opinion sur la solution possible de la question Crétoise, qu'il n'entrait pas dans les vues du Gouvernement Royal de détacher par la force Candie de l'Empire Ottoman, ainsi que son Excellence Safvet Pacha s'en était plaint dans une dépêche dont vous m'aviez donné lecture, et que les annexions de territoire n'impliquent pas toujours la nécessité d'une guerre.

Pour ce qui est enfin du dernier point, celui relatif à l'engagement que le Gouvernement devrait prendre de suivre une ligne de conduite conforme aux Traités et au droit des gens, je vous avoue, M. le Ministre, que je n'ai pas pu bien saisir le sens de ces mots.

Je voudrais savoir quel est le Traité que la Grèce aurait violé. Je ne parle plus des obligations du droit des gens, puisque j'ai suffisament établi que le Gouvernement du Roi n'en a violé aucune.

Si quelqu'un a le droit de se plaindre de la non-exécution des Traités, sans doute c'est la Grèce. En dehors des difficultés de tous genres que nos nationaux rencontrent ordinairement dans l'Empire Ottoman pour leurs affaires et des mauvais traitements auxquels un grand nombre d'entre eux y sont souvent exposés, deux Conventions pour la répression du brigandage, qui infeste nos provinces limitrophes de la Turquie et qui nous expose à des dépenses extraordinaires, ont été conclues dans l'espace de dix ans, et pourtant la Sublime Porte ne s'est jamais décidée à mettre aucune de ces Conventions à exécution, malgré les vives instances du Gouvernement du Roi. La plupart des notes adressées par le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères à la Légation Impériale n'ont pour objet que les encouragements donnés aux brigands par les troupes irrégulières chargées par la Sublime Porte de la garde des frontières, les méfaits commis dans nos provinces limitrophes par des bandes venant du territoire Ottoman, et la nécessité d'y mettre un terme par l'exécution de la Convention qui impose au Gouvernement Ottoman le devoir d'employer

exclusivement sur toute la ligne frontière des troupes régulières au lieu des Albanais Irréguliers. Le Ministre du Roi à Constantinople y a appelé bien des fois la sérieuse attention du Gouvernement de la Sublime Porte, mais ses représentations n'ont pas eu un meilleur résultat.

Par ce seul exemple on voit que si nous voulions accumuler des griefs contre le Gouvernement Ottoman pour motiver un rupture, nous en aurions et de bien réels. Mais nous avons toujours pensé que les intérêts multiples des deux pays commandaient de maintenir des relations d'amitié et de bon voisinage.

Il résulte de ce qui précède, M. le Ministre, que rien ne justifie l'attitude que la Sublime Porte vient de prendre à notre égard, et qui pourrait engendrer des complications de la plus haute gravité pour elle-même aussi bien que pour la Grèce. Quelques-unes de vos réclamations, comme par exemple le repatriement des réfugiés, la protection des sujets Ottomans en Grèce, le respect des Traités et l'observation de la neutralité du Gouvernement Royal dans la lutte de Candie, n'ont jamais été un sujet de discussion ou d'hésitation pour ce Gouvernement. Les autres ne reposent que sur des données vagues et erronées, ou sont inadmissibles par leur nature.

Mais la Sublime Porte est décidée à rompre les relations diplomatiques et commerciales avec la Grèce. Nous le regrettons vivement, mais nous n'y voyons pas de remède. Ce que nous regrettons davantage c'est de voir que votre Gouvernement, en prenant une mesure aussi grave, ne s'est pas inspiré des idées qui tendent à prévaloir aujourd'hui dans les pays du monde civilisé. Ainsi il est aujourd'hui admis dans le code international que l'on devrait chercher à atténuer, autant que possible, les calamités de la guerre, et surtout à éviter d'en étendre les effets immédiats aux personnes privées.

Dans les guerres qui ont eu lieu en Europe en 1859 et en 1866, les sujets des Puissances belligérantes n'ont point été expulsés de leurs territoires respectifs.

La Sublime Porte elle-même, en d'autres circonstances, a donné des délais de plusieurs mois aux sujets des Puissances avec lesquelles elle s'est trouvée en guerre, pour le règlement de leurs affaires. En obligeant maintenant nos nationaux à quitter son territoire dans le délai de quinze jours, en fermant ses ports à nos bâtiments de commerce, et en démentant ainsi la modération dont elle se vante, elle veut évidemment causer des pertes considérables à des individus qui n'ont d'autre tort que celui d'être des Hellènes. C'est d'autant plus déplorable et injuste que tous ces individus ont contribué par leur négoce et leur industrie à l'accroissement de la richesse publique de l'Empire Ottoman.

Fidèle aux principes des institutions nationales du pays, le Gouvernement du Roi ne suivra pas un exemple aussi contraire à l'humanité et aux idées du siècle.

En renvoyant les Consuls Ottomans résidant en Grèce, à la suite de la mesure prise à l'égard de nos Consuls en Turquie par la Sublime Porte, le Gouvernement du Roi ne se propose point d'expulser de son territoire les sujets Ottomans.

Le monde civilisé jugera de quel côté est la modération.

Comme vous m'avez fait connaître que, passé le délai de cinq jours, vous quitterez la capitale, j'ai donné l'ordre de tenir à votre disposition les passeports nécessaires pour vous et pour le personnel de la Légation Impériale. En même temps je viens d'inviter le Ministre du Roi à Constantinople à quitter cette capitale.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) P. DELYANNI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 122.

Consul Lloyd to Mr. Erskine.

Syra, December 6, 1868.

Extract.)

"ENOSIS" left Syra last night, having mounted the two Armstrong guns. Besides that "Enosis" decks were not fitted for them, parts of their carriages were wanting, to say nothing of sights, and scales elevation according to distance; and had Mr. Smith completed the carriages and laid the brass segments on the decks, it would have been too complicated for the Greeks, so he mounted them on pivots, and before starting they must needs try them here in the harbour, and without seeing that the gun was so secured so as not to fly from the pivot, they loaded it with a full charge and shot at its highest elevation; so the gun jumped out of its place, and could do nothing till Mr. Smith went on board to put all to rights, and explain what a child almost should have known; they fired two or three more shots (where they struck, nobody knows), and went away to Crete, thinking now they knew all about the guns. I do not know where "Enosis" is gone to land, but I doubt if they knew Admiral Hobart was in Cretan waters.

Inclosure 3 in No. 122.

Vice-Admiral Hobart Pasha to Capitaine De Meyer.

M. le Commandant, "*Hudavendikiar*," 16 *Décembre*, 1868.

COMME vous avez bien voulu m'informer ce matin que vous vouliez agir d'intermédiaire entre moi et les autorités Grecques, je viens vous prier de vouloir bien me faire avoir une réponse à la lettre ci-jointe, qui j'espère aura un bon effet, comme je veux éviter, autant que faire se peut, le commencement des hostilités.

Tout en vous remerciant d'avance, veuillez, &c.

(Signé) AUGUSTE HOBART.

Inclosure 4 in No. 122.

Vice-Admiral Hobart Pasha to the Captain of the "Hellas."

Monsieur, "*Hudavendikiar*," *ce* 16 *Décembre*, 1868.

J'ETAIS bien content de voir aujourd'hui flotter le pavillon de Sa Majesté le Roi des Hellènes, attendu que j'ai suivi ici un navire qui a brisé le droit des gens, et d'après moi a commis un acte de piraterie en faisant feu sur ma frégate après que j'avais fait tirer à blanc pour le forcer à "stopper." Je serais content de voir (comme ce navire s'est refugié dans un port Grec, où les autorités ne pouvaient pas le saisir) si vous voudriez vous charger d'arrêter ce navire, auquel cas je serais satisfait.

Je considère cette affaire complètement séparée des regrettables divergences entre la Turquie et la Grèce, et veux espérer qu'entre vous et moi, comme officiers de marine, il n'existe pas de différence d'opinion.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) AUGUSTE HOBART.

No. 123.

Safvet Pasha to M. E. Musurus.—(*Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by M. E. Musurus, December* 28.)

(Télégraphique.) *Constantinople, le* 23 *Décembre*, 1868

JE vous ai déjà fait connaître les raisons de la mesure de l'expulsion des Hellènes. La Commission instituée pour l'exécution de cette mesure ne pouvant terminer sa tâche dans le délai fixé de quinze jours, nous avons dû le prolonger de trois semaines. Pour ce qui concerne l'interdiction du pavillon Hellénique, cette mesure ne s'étend pas aux bâtiments qui, avant la notification faite par le Gouvernement Impérial, se sont trouvés en route chargés de marchandises en destination d'un port Ottoman.

Voilà tout ce que nous avons pu et tout ce que nous pouvons faire pour adoucir dans son application une mesure impérieusement commandée par les circonstances.

Quant à l'ordre qu'on dit avoir été envoyé par la Sublime Porte aux provinces vassales, il est loin d'avoir le caractère qu'on lui attribue.

No. 124.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 28.)

(No. 24.)

My Lord, *Berlin, December* 24, 1868.

THEIR Prussian Majesties received the French Ambassador and Madame Benedetti and Lady Augustus and myself, at dinner on the 22nd instant.

Nothing could exceed the gracious urbanity and attention shown to my French colleague and myself.

The King, on approaching M. Benedetti and myself, expressed his satisfaction that the Porte had agreed to grant a further delay for the expulsion of the Greek subjects residing in Turkey; and His Majesty seemed to entertain a hope that the quarrel between Turkey and Greece would be satisfactorily arranged.

For this end, His Majesty said it was most desirable that a perfect agreement should exist between the Powers of Europe.

Count Bismarck was prevented being present, having left Berlin for a few days on a shooting excursion.

I have, &c.
For Lord A. Loftus.
(Signed) GEORGE PETRE.

No. 125.

Safvet Pasha to M. E. Musurus:—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by M. E. Musurus, December 28.)

(Télégraphique.) *Constantinople, le 25 Décembre*, 1868.

ON vient de nous apprendre qu'il est question de réunir une Conférence pour notre conflit avec la Grèce. On connaît notre extrême modération et la nécessité où nous nous sommes trouvés de recourir aux mesures que nous venons d'adopter. Nous n'aurions pas pu les retarder plus longtemps sans nous exposer à toutes sortes de dangers. Une simple rupture diplomatique n'aurait pas suffi pour les conjurer. Ne voulant pas la guerre, nous avons dû nous arrêter à la mesure de l'expulsion des sujets Hellènes. Vous connaissez cependant les adoucissements que nous apportons dans l'exécution. La prolongation du délai primitivement fixé, les facilités accordées aux bâtiments de commerce, sont autant de preuves de notre modération; mais nous ne saurions aller plus loin sans nous perdre complètement. Il n'y a pas un seul Turc qui puisse prendre sur lui de reculer. Nous ne savons pas à quoi servirait une Conférence. A notre avis, le seul moyen de prévenir des conflits qu'on redoute, c'est de bien peser sur le Gouvernement Hellénique, ou de nous laisser complètement libres de nous entendre avec lui. Pas de provocation à la guerre de notre part, mais pas de refus non plus, si les Hellènes nous l'offrent. Nous ne pouvons rien dire sur la proposition d'une Conférence avant de connaître le programme de ses délibérations, qui doit être fixé et définitivement arrêté d'avance. Dans ce programme, il ne peut, il ne doit être question d'aucune concession de notre part relativement aux cinq points. En les posant, non seulement nous n'avons pas été exigeants, mais, à force de modération, nous nous sommes trouvés avoir réduit à leurs dernières limites les exigences de notre sûreté et de notre dignité. Nous demander de sacrifier un de ces points, c'est vouloir laisser la Grèce libre de continuer ses agressions envers nous en temps de paix, ce qui est inadmissible en présence du droit international qui régit l'Europe, et qui est supérieur à toutes les lois constitutionnelles de n'importe quel pays pris à part. D'ailleurs, nos demandes n'ont rien de contraire aux intérêts légitimes et à la dignité de la Grèce. Il serait, en outre, bien entendu que nous n'admettrons qu'aucune question intérieure, pas plus celle de la Crète que toute autre concernant un point quelconque, puisse être examinée et discutée dans la Conférence. Dans le cas contraire, le Plénipotentiaire Ottoman se retirerait immédiatement de la Conférence.

En d'autres termes, il nous serait impossible de participer à une Conférence qui aurait pour objet de modifier nos conditions ou de mettre sur le tapis des questions territoriales ou administratives.

Veuillez vous énoncer au plus tôt dans ce sens auprès du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté Britannique.

No. 126.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 28.)

(Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, December 27, 1868.*

I AM informed that Count Bismarck three days ago invited the French Ambassador here to draw up, in concert with him, a form of invitation to be issued by France on the proposition of Prussia for a Conference of the Treaty Powers of 1856 on the Turkish and Greek question. The ceremonious form was agreed upon, and sent by Bismarck to Paris on Thursday.

Bismarck appears to have taken this step spontaneously, without concert with Russia, and solely in the interest of peace.

Russia, I hear, claims admission of Greece to the Conference.

No. 127.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 1,092.)
My Lord, *Paris, December 27, 1868.*

EARLY on the day before yesterday, in obedience to your Lordship's orders, I read to the Marquis de Lavalette your Lordship's despatch No. 50 of the 23rd instant, respecting the proposed Conference on the Turco-Greek question, and placed a copy of it confidentially in his Excellency's hands.

After some conversation with me on the subject, M. de Lavalette said that he would take the despatch at once to the Emperor, and would see me again afterwards.

In the evening, M. de Lavalette told me that he should without delay send in the usual form, through the French Ambassador in London, his answer to your Lordship's despatch. He should state the views of the Government of the Emperor on the questions you had raised respecting the previous definition of the attributes of the Conference, and he was confident that they would be found to be in entire accordance with those of Her Majesty's Government.

There was a special point, however, on which he was anxious to know, without delay, the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, namely, the admission of Greece to the Conference. He gathered from your Lordship's despatch that the propriety of allowing to Greece some part in the proceedings had suggested itself to Her Majesty's Government. The Emperor, M. de Lavalette went on to say, was decidedly of opinion that it would not be advisable that, while Turkey was admitted, Greece should be altogether excluded. There were, indeed, reasons of considerable weight which might be alleged against the claim of Greece to be represented; but they were reasons which rested in part upon diplomatic forms and precedents, and in part upon considerations which could not be readily understood without a careful examination of the question. The common sense view of the question was that Greece, as a party concerned, ought to have a full hearing; public opinion, without weighing nice distinctions, would be formed by the dictates of common sense; and much of the benefit to be derived from the Conference would be lost if the fairness of its proceedings, and the justness of its decisions, were not apparent to all.

M. de Lavalette would, therefore, he said, suggest that the Plenipotentiaries of the Powers which were Parties to the Treaty of Paris should meet in Conference, and should agree to invite immediately a Representative of Greece to be present at their sittings, and take part in the discussions with a "voix consultative" though not with a "voix deliberative."

Yesterday, Count de Stackelberg, the Russian Ambassador, called on me, and told me that he had received a telegram from his Government instructing him to urge that Greece should be admitted to the Conference on precisely the same terms as Turkey. He had, he said, communicated this instruction to M. de Lavalette, who had insisted that Greece could not be treated either as one of the great Powers of Europe, or as a party to the Treaty of Paris, and that by allowing her voice to be fully heard in the Conference ample justice would be done to her. M. de Lavalette had added, that relying upon a note which he had received from M. de Stackelberg himself on the 24th instant, he had taken the orders of the Emperor and had proposed to England, to Austria, and other Powers, that Greece should have a "voix consultative" only. This note to which M. de Lavalette referred was, however, M. de Stackelberg said, merely the expression of his own opinion, not of that of his Government.

M. de Lavalette spoke to me on the subject this morning. He said that after an interview which he had had with Count Stackelberg on the 24th, the Count had written him a friendly note recapitulating what had passed, and stating in particular that he had urged that Greece should be admitted, "fut-ce à titre consultatif." Acting in perfect good faith on this note, M. de Lavalette had, he said, committed himself with the Emperor, with me, and with the Representatives of other Powers to the proposal that Greece should have a "voix consultative," but no more. He thought, moreover, that this proposal was both just and advisable, and he could not consent to depart from it. He had said this to Count de Stackelberg, and also to the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires, Count Solms Sonnenwalde, who had spoken to him in support of the Russian suggestion that Greece should be placed on exactly the same footing as Turkey.

I told M. de Lavalette that I would undertake to say that Her Majesty's Government would not object to the admission of Greece with a "voix consultative," but I did not feel authorized to go beyond this.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 128.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 28, 1868.

THE papers announce to-day that the Greek Government have purchased at Bordeaux two iron-clad vessels which were built for Chile. It may be as well that you should call M. de Lavalette's attention to this matter.

No. 129.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 28, 6·15 P.M.)

(Private.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, December* 28, 1868, 3·40 P.M.

WITH reference to my private and confidential letter of yesterday, M. de Lavalette authorizes me to inform you that, in consequence of our observations, French Government give up altogether the idea of employing the ships of the maritime Powers.

He is very impatient for our formal acceptance of the Conference. The Russian Ambassador pertinaciously insists that Turkey shall be excluded, or Greece admitted with a deliberative voice; but M. de Lavalette positively refuses to consent.

No. 130.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, December* 28, 1868.

INSTRUCTIONS to Russian Minister at Paris to accept English programme for deliberation of the Conference.

No. 131.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 21.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 28, 1868.

THE Turkish Chargé d'Affaires read to me to-day a telegram from his Government, dated the 25th instant, of which the substance is as follows:—

After alluding to the moderation shown by the Porte, and the necessity under which it laboured to have recourse to the measures that it had adopted, and which it could no longer have delayed without danger, the telegram goes on to say that the mere rupture of diplomatic relations would not have sufficed to avert such danger. Having no desire for war the Porte had confined itself to the expulsion of Hellenic subjects, and even as regards that measure, had in some degree modified its severity. It had extended the period at which it was to take effect; it had granted facilities for merchant-ships; but beyond this it could not go without utter ruin.

The Porte sees no good in a Conference: it considers that the only means of preventing a conflict are either to bring to bear strong pressure on the Greek Government, or to leave Turkey to come singly to an understanding with it. The Porte has no desire to provoke war, but neither will it refuse it if offered by the Greeks.

At all events the Porte can say nothing as to the Conference without having before it a fixed and definite programme, in which there must be no question of any concession on the part of Turkey in regard to the five points which it has laid down, and which express within the narrowest limits what is requisite for its security and for its dignity. To ask that the Porte should give up any of these points would, in effect, be to leave Greece free to continue its aggressive acts in time of peace, inconsistent as such acts would be with international law, which must be held to override municipal law; while, on the other hand, the Porte requires nothing from Greece incompatible with the interests or with the dignity of that country.

Moreover, the Porte cannot assent to any question whatever relating to its internal affairs or to Crete being discussed in Conference. If it were attempted to do so, the Ottoman Plenipotentiary would immediately withdraw.

In a word, the Porte will not take part in any Conference in which it would be sought to modify the conditions that it has laid down, or to enter upon questions bearing on the territory or administration of the Ottoman Empire.

I observed to M. Musurus that the telegram which he had just read, amounted, although not in express terms, yet virtually, to a refusal to attend the Conference, but I hoped that such would not be the ultimate decision of the Porte, whose object must be to avoid war by an arrangement that should be binding on Greece to abstain from those acts of aggression against which the Porte justly complained; and that such an arrangement might reasonably be expected from the Conference, before which the Porte would have ample opportunity to state its grievances against Greece.

M. Musurus replied that for the last two years the Porte had appealed in various ways to the Great Powers of Europe, and had besought them to put a check upon the proceedings of the Greek Government in favour of the Cretan insurrection; but that these appeals had been made in vain, and that Turkey was now compelled by her dignity and her interests to assert her authority as an independent Power, and to put an end to a state of things that had become intolerable.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 132.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Erskine.

(No. 8.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 28, 1868.

I HAVE to acquaint you that I approve the language which you held to M. Delyanni, as reported in your despatch No. 2 of the 16th instant, on the occasion of communicating to him the warning contained in Lord Stanley's telegram of the 7th of December, in regard to the serious danger in which the conduct of the Greek Government towards Turkey was likely to involve Greece.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 133.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Erskine.

(No. 9.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 28, 1868.

I HAVE to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve the course you adopted, as reported in your despatch No. 3 of the 16th instant, with reference to the proceedings of Hobart Pasha in connection with the blockade-runner "Enosis."

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 134.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Erskine.

(No. 10.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 28, 1868.

I HAVE to acquaint you that I approve the course which you propose to take, as reported in your despatch No. 5 of the 17th instant, with reference to Hobart Pasha's proposal for the trial of the "Enosis."

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 135.

Mr. Elliot to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 493.)

Constantinople, December 16, 1868.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith copies of the ultimatum addressed by the Turkish Minister at Athens to the Greek Government, and of the note of Safvet Pasha to the Greek Minister here, forwarding his passports upon its refusal being notified.

The Greek Consuls will, I understand, be allowed to remain during the fifteen days granted to their countrymen before leaving the country.

I have, &c

(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

Inclosure 1 in No. 135.

Photiades Bey to M. Delyanni.

Le 11 Décembre, 1868.

LE Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan ne croit pas devoir chercher à prouver combien est sincère et sérieux son désir d'entretenir des relations d'amitié et de bon voisinage avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Hellénique. Le monde entier a vu la longanimité dont la Sublime Porte a fait preuve en face de l'attitude prise à son égard par le Gouvernement Hellénique depuis bientôt trois ans. On connaît l'histoire de la dernière insurrection Crétoise. Il est superflu d'énumérer ici les machinations ourdies publiquement et sous les yeux du Gouvernement Hellénique par les Comités siégeant dans la capitale même du Royaume pour fomenter et entretenir la rebellion en Crète, malgré la volonté de l'immense majorité de ses habitants.

L'histoire des nations civilisées ne fournit aucun exemple du mépris avec lequel le droit des gens a été traité par les dits Comités. Ils n'ont épargné ni menace ni mensonge aux pauvres insulaires afin de les obliger à prendre les armes contre leur Souverain légitime. Les bandits pris à leur solde et envoyés en Crète s'y sont livrés à des actes du plus horrible brigandage contre ceux des habitants qui osaient leur résister. C'est donc en menaçant et faisant suivre leur menace par une exécution implacable ou par les promesses trompeuses qu'on est parvenu à décider une partie de ces malheureux habitants d'émigrer en Grèce, où ils n'ont trouvé que misère et souffrance. Détrompés, pressés par la misère et voyant la parfaite sécurité qui règne dans leur patrie, ces malheureux émigrés ont demandé et demandent à hauts cris leur rapatriement. C'est en vain qu'ils supplient qu'on les laisse jouir de leur libre arbitre; c'est en vain que la Sublime Porte fait depuis plus de trois ans des démarches pressantes auprès du Gouvernement Hellénique dans le but d'obtenir leur liberté. La majeure partie en reste encore exposée à toute sorte de vexation et de misère, et le petit nombre qui a pu retourner n'a pu effectuer son départ qu'au prix de son sang.

Le rétablissement de la tranquillité en Crète et l'agonie dans laquelle se débattent les quelques volontaires qui restent encore sur les sommets des montagnes de l'île, ont déterminé les meneurs Hellènes à empêcher à tout prix le retour des émigrés dans leurs foyers et à former des nouvelles bandes de volontaires pour donner le change à l'opinion publique sur l'épuisement entier de l'insurrection. Ce succinct et fidèle exposé de la situation nous paraît suffisant pour convaincre tout juge impartial qu'il ne s'agit nullement de délivrer un peuple opprimé, mais qu'il s'agit d'opprimer, de torturer toute une population dans l'intérêt de l'ambition d'un État voisin. Les documents échangés depuis plus de deux ans témoignent hautement de l'esprit de conciliation dont nous nous sommes montrés animés vis-à-vis du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi Georges, et du compte très grand que nous avons tenu de ses difficultés intérieures. Les sacrifices en tout genre que la Sublime Porte s'est imposée afin de ne pas démentir ses sentiments de modération sont connus de tout le monde. Toutes nos démarches auprès du Gouvernement Royal n'ont eu invariablement pour réponse ou qu'une fin de non-recevoir ou que des aveux d'impuissance de comprimer l'élan d'un parti qui veut soumettre tout aux exigences de sa passion. Cet état de choses va s'empirant en Grèce. Les derniers événements ont couronné l'édifice et ont enlevé au Gouvernement Impérial tout espoir d'un prompt retour de la part de la Grèce à des sentiments de justice et au respect du droit des gens.

En effet quelle espérance aurions-nous pu conserver (1) devant la déclaration du haut de la Tribune d'un des anciens Ministres qu'une partie du dernier emprunt avait été affectée à l'achat du bateau la "Crète," qui sert aujourd'hui au transport des volontaires et

des munitions en Crète au mépris de tous les droits internationaux—déclaration qui contredit d'une manière si solennelle les assurances que le Gouvernement du Roi nous avait données; (2) devant un discours Ministériel qui dénote clairement la résolution de poursuivre l'idée d'annexion de l'Ile de Crète à la Grèce; (3) devant la violence inqualifiable avec laquelle on cherche à empêcher le rapatriement spontané et volontaire des émigrés Crétois; (4) devant la persistance que le Gouvernement Royal met à ne pas réprimer ces violences; (5) devant la formation d'une nouvelle bande de volontaires qui s'organise non seulement sans la moindre opposition de la part des autorités, mais par leur concours presque avoué; (6) devant l'impuissance de nos représentations tant de fois réitérées; (7) devant la tendance ambitieuse de plus en plus accentuée et non déguisée des partis en Grèce; (8) devant l'impunité que rencontrent, auprès des autorités Helléniques, les agresseurs des officiers, soldats ou sujets Ottomans, assassinés ou maltraités sur le territoire du Royaume.

Le Gouvernement Impérial manquerait à ses devoirs les plus sacrés s'il continuait à se bercer d'une illusion qui lui a valu déjà tant de sacrifices.

En conséquence, dans le cas où dans le délai de cinq jours à dater d'aujourd'hui le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi ne prendrait pas l'engagement formel:—

1. De disperser immédiatement les bandes de volontaires dernièrement organisées dans différentes parties du Royaume et d'empêcher la formation de nouvelles bandes;—

2. De désarmer les corsaires "Enosis," "Crète," et "Panhellénion," ou en tout cas de leur fermer l'accès des ports Helléniques;

3. D'accorder aux émigrés Crétois non seulement l'autorisation de retourner dans leurs foyers, mais encore un aide et une protection efficace;

4. De punir conformément aux lois ceux qui se sont rendus coupables d'agression contre les militaires et les sujets Ottomans, et d'accorder aux familles des victimes de ces attentats une juste indemnité;

5. De suivre désormais une ligne de conduite conforme aux Traités existants et au droit des gens;—

Le Soussigné, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de la Sublime Porte, d'ordre de Sa Majesté le Sultan son auguste Souverain, a le regret de faire savoir à son Excellence M. Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté Hellénique que la Légation Ottomane à Athènes et les Consuls résidents en Grèce quitteront immédiatement le territoire Hellénique.

Comme déduction naturelle de cette détermination, les relations diplomatiques et commerciales entre la Turquie et la Grèce se trouvant interrompues, le Ministre, le personnel de la Légation et de la Chancellerie Hellénique à Constantinople, les Consuls Grecs dans l'Empire Ottoman, recevront leurs passeports. Les sujets respectifs des deux Etats devront quitter le pays qu'ils habitent dans le délai de quinze jours à partir du jour de la signification de la rupture des relations, et l'entrée des ports Ottomans se trouvera aussi interdite au pavillon Hellénique à partir de cette même date.

Le Soussigné, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 135.

Safvet Pasha to M. Delyanni.

Sublime Porte, le 16 Décembre, 1868.

LE Gouvernement Hellénique ayant répondu par le refus aux cinq conditions que la Sublime Porte avait proposés à son acceptation par le canal de son Représentant à Athènes, les relations diplomatiques et commerciales viennent d'être interrompues entre la Turquie et la Grèce.

En conséquent, j'ai le regret de vous transmettre ci-joint vos passeports, ainsi que ceux des personnes de la Légation et de la Chancellerie Hellénique à Constantinople. Les Consuls Grecs dans l'Empire Ottoman devront également quitter l'Empire; des instructions ont été adressées aux Gouvernements-Généraux des Provinces pour leur retirer leur exequatur. De même tous les sujets Hellènes doivent dans le délai de quinze jours, à partir d'aujourd'hui, quitter le territoire Ottoman. Ce délai commencera à courir pour les sujets Hellènes se trouvant dans les provinces, à partir du jour de l'arrivée de cet ordre aux autorités locales. Le Gouvernement Hellénique est également informé que l'entrée des ports Ottomans se trouve interdite au pavillon Hellénique.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) SAFVET.

No. 136.

Mr. Elliot to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 494.)

Constantinople, December 18, 1868.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose the copy of a note which I have received from the Greek Minister here, proposing on his departure to leave the protection of Greek subjects and interests to the Representatives of the Protecting Powers.

I likewise transmit a copy of a note from General Ignatieff, suggesting the course he would propose to follow if the French Ambassador and myself agreed to accept the protection.

Upon consulting M. Bourrée we found ourselves both strongly averse to accepting any such joint protectorate over the Greek subjects, the Porte having already caused it to be understood that they would themselves protect such as might be allowed to remain.

It appeared, moreover, both to M. Bourrée and to myself unadvisable to accept this duty as in any way resulting from the position of the Protecting Governments of Greece. I consequently declined the request by the note herewith inclosed, M. Bourrée having written in a very similar sense.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

Inclosure 1 in No. 136.

M. J. Delyanni to Mr. Elliot.

Pera, le $\frac{5}{17}$ *Décembre,* 1868.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

J'AI l'honneur de faire connaître à votre Excellence que la Sublime Porte Ottomane m'ayant communiqué, le $\frac{4}{16}$ Décembre, que les relations diplomatiques et commerciales entre la Turquie et la Grèce ont été interrompues, que tous les sujets Hellènes demeurant et domiciliés à Constantinople doivent quitter cette capitale dans le délai de quinze jours, à dater du $\frac{4}{16}$ Décembre, et que l'entrée dans les ports Ottomans est défendu au pavillon Hellénique, je dois partir pour la Grèce par le premier bateau des Messageries Impériales de France, en partance pour Pirée, avec les employés de la Légation.

Avant de quitter Constantinople, je me fais un devoir d'exprimer à votre Excellence combien j'ai à me louer des relations agréables que j'ai été à même d'entretenir avec elle pendant la courte durée de ma mission, et de lui annoncer à la fois que, à défaut d'une autorité quelconque Hellénique à Constantinople, je crois devoir placer mes nationaux et les affaires Helléniques en général sous la protection de leurs Excellences les Représentants des trois Grandes Puissances qui ont garanti l'indépendance de la Grèce, et qui n'ont jamais cessé de lui témoigner leur bienveillance.

Dans la conviction que votre Excellence voudra bien accueillir cette demande avec bienveillance, et s'entendre à ce sujet avec ses deux autres collègues, je la prie d'agréer, d'avance mes remercîments et ma reconnaissance, et saisis, &c.

(Signé) J. DELYANNI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 136.

General Ignatieff to Mr. Elliot.

Constantinople, le $\frac{5}{17}$ *Décembre,* 1868.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

M. DELYANNI vient de s'adresser à moi pour me confier, en même tems qu'à votre Excellence et à M. l'Ambassadeur de France, la protection des intérêts et des sujets Hellènes, aussi longtemps qu'il s'en trouverait dans l'Empire Ottoman.

J'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre, M. l'Ambassadeur, copie de la réponse que je fais à cette demande.

Dans la supposition que votre Excellence voudra bien l'accueillir également, je viens lui proposer d'instituer à cet effet une Commission Commerciale Mixte, composée des Délégués des trois Ambassades, et de charger en outre les Drogmans respectifs d'assister aux travaux de la Commission, qui doit se réunir à la Sublime Porte pour liquider les affaires des sujets Hellènes.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) N. IGNATIEFF.

Inclosure 3 in No. 136.

General Ignatieff to M. Delyanni.

Le $\frac{6}{18}$ *Décembre,* 1868.

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser pour me confier, en même temps que leurs Excellences MM. les Ambassadeurs de la Grande Bretagne et de France, la protection des intérêts et des sujets Hellènes aussi longtemps qu'il s'en trouverait sur le territoire de l'Empire Ottoman.

Tout disposé pour ma part à accueillir votre démarche en tant que mes collègues voudront y répondre, je vois leur proposer de concerter les mesures qu'il convient de prendre à cet égard.

Inclosure 4 in No. 136.

Mr. Elliot to M. Delyanni.

Constantinople, le 18 *Décembre,* 1868.

M. le Ministre,

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser la réception de la lettre de votre Excellence, en date d'hier, me communiquant son intention, en quittant Constantinople, de mettre les intérêts et les sujets Helléniques sous la protection des Représentants des Puissances Protectrices.

Ne reconnaissant pas que ce devoir découle de la position des Puissances, comme garantes de l'indépendance de la Grèce, je regrette, M. le Ministre, qu'il me soit impossible dans les circonstances actuelles d'accueillir la proposition que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser.

Je prie, &c.

(Signé) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 137.

Mr. Elliot to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 495.)

Constantinople, December 18, 1868.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship will already have received from other sources an authentic account of the proceedings of Admiral Hobart in regard to the Greek vessel "Enosis," and I therefore confine myself to inclosing copies of the correspondence between that officer and the Nomarch of Syra, and of two statements made by the Commander of the blockade-runner.

The question as to the distance from land at which the occurrence took place is one upon which it will not be easy to arrive at any conclusive result, but the declaration of Admiral Hobart, that it was in reply to a blank shot that the "Enosis" answered with round shot, will not be shaken by the improbable assertion of the Greek Commander that the Turkish cruizers had at once begun firing shot and shell.

I would beg to call your Lordship's attention to the statement of the Commander of the "Enosis," that he had carried to Crete an expedition of 900 men, with two guns and ammunition; and I would submit that no more complete justification could be found for the recent measures of the Ottoman Government than is afforded by this evidence of the scale upon which the aggressive proceedings of Greece are being carried out.

A letter which I had this morning received from Crete, written before the arrival of the expedition, represents the pacification as almost complete; but it now remains to be seen what amount of fresh vitality will have been infused by it into the insurrection.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

Inclosure 1 in No. 137.

Vice-Admiral Hobart Pasha to M. Dracopoulos.

[See Inclosure 2 in No. 116.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 137.

M. Dracopoulos to Vice-Admiral Hobart Pasha.

[See Inclosure 3 in No. 116.]

Inclosure 3 in No. 137.

Vice-Admiral Hobart Pasha to M. Dracopoulos.

[See Inclosure 4 in No. 116.]

Inclosure 4 in No. 137.

Report of Captain Sourmeli.

[See Inclosure 6 in No. 116.]

Inclosure 5 in No. 137.

Protest of the Captain of the "Enosis."

[See Inclosure 5 in No. 116.]

No. 138.

M. de Lavalette to the Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne, December 29.)

(Télégraphique.) *Paris, le 29 Décembre*, 1868.

LE Comte de Stackelberg vient de me faire savoir que la Russie a donné son assentiment à l'admission d'un Représentant de la Grèce au sein de la Conférence à titre simplement consultatif. Le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg acceptant également les bases sur lesquelles je suis tombé d'accord avec Lord Lyons et avec les autres Représentants, l'entente est complète aujourd'hui sur tous les points. Veuillez en informer Lord Clarendon, qui n'hésitera plus, j'en ai la confiance, à accorder un assentiment définitif. J'écris à Constantinople par le télégraphe pour réclamer l'adhésion de la Porte, en lui indiquant sommairement les raisons qui doivent la déterminer à accepter cette combinaison. Je serais heureux que Lord Clarendon invitât de son côté Mr. Elliot à appuyer les démarches de M. Bourée.

No. 139.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, December* 29, 1868, 12·10 P.M.

FRENCH Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that Russia agrees to Greece having only a consultative voice. He sent to the French Ambassador last night his answer to your despatch. He begs you to press the Porte to accept the Conference.

No. 140.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

(No. 65.)

Foreign Office, December 29, 1868.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your despatch No. 1,092 of the 27th instant, giving an account of a conversation which you had with M. de Lavalette on the question of the proposed Conference on Turco-Greek Affairs.

The French Ambassador called upon me to-day, but it appeared that he had not yet received any further instructions on the subject from his Government.

When suggesting in my despatch No. 50 of the 23rd instant the points on which it

seemed necessary, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, that the different Powers who were to be represented in the Conference should have a previous understanding among themselves, I did not think it necessary to consider what course the Powers should take in order to enforce their decision, or even to give effect to them in the event of both or either of the litigant parties demurring or signifying their willingness, but pleading their inability, to comply with the recommendations of the Conference.

The telegram from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople of the 26th instant, of which your Excellency has received a copy, appears, however, to Her Majesty's Government to render it necessary to consider this point, for the Porte it would seem, is prepared to make its assent to the matters being considered in a Conference, subject to certain conditions, from some of which it declares its determination not to depart.

Now it appears to Her Majesty's Government that the Powers should at the outset carefully guard themselves against taking any active part beyond the mere suggestion of bases of reconciliation, in the settlement of the dispute between Turkey and Greece. Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that it should be clearly understood among the Members of the Conference, that their recommendations are in no case to be supported by any intervention whether requested by or imposed on either or both parties, on the part of their naval forces.

I need scarcely say that Her Majesty's Government cannot contemplate the employment of coercive measures to enforce against either party the recommendations of the Conference. If those recommendations are not accepted by both, the only alternative which Her Majesty's Government can admit is, that the Powers will have no other course open to them but to withdraw from further interposition in the dispute.

This, indeed, is consistent with the principle of the recommendations of the Paris Conference of 1856, which merely expressed the hope that litigant parties would seek the good offices of a friendly Power for the adjustment of disputes between them, but studiously omitted all allusion to any penalty attaching to the refusal either to adopt that course, or to listen to the suggestions of the friendly Powers.

Her Majesty's Government, as your Excellency is well aware, have constantly declined to take any part in the repatriation of Cretan refugees. They do not feel disposed to depart from that policy, and it appears to them that if a reconciliation is brought about be the intervention of the Powers between Turkey and Greece, there can be no occasion for any Power (and all therefore might agree to renounce doing so) to intervene in order to convey back to Crete such refugees as might desire to return. If unmolested by the Greeks, the refugees might find their way back again to their homes, and at all events the Porte has shown itself ready to assist their return, and the arrangements for effecting it will, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, be much better left to themselves.

But if Her Majesty's Government think that in both the cases to which I have adverted, the naval interference of the Powers would be open to objection and uncalled for, they are no less strongly of opinion that the Powers should not step in to aid the efforts of the Porte to reduce the insurgents in Crete, if, notwithstanding the Conference, the insurrection should continue, by assisting to defeat attempts to introduce supplies into the island by means of so-called blockade-runners. Such an intervention would not only amount to a departure from the neutrality in the Cretan struggle, which the Powers have professed to maintain, and which, after the Conference, it would be still more incumbent on them to observe, but, if Greece honestly fulfilled any engagements which it might have entered into with the Conference to abstain from future acts of provocation towards Turkey, it would be altogether unnecessary; for it has been from Greek ports that the blockade-runners have drawn the supplies of arms, ammunition, and provisions, which they have introduced into Crete, and it is on Greek territory that levies of volunteers have been made, by whose active hostilities alone the insurgents have so long been able to maintain themselves against the forces of the Porte.

I should wish your Excellency to call M. de Lavalette's attention to these points without delay, for Her Majesty's Government attach to them great importance, and however reluctant they might be to stand aloof from a Conference having for its object to prevent war between Turkey and Greece, it would be impossible for them to take part in it unless assured that it would not be likely to place them in a position in which they would have to choose between withdrawing from the Conference, or declining, as they could not but do, to be a party to carrying out its decision.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 141.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

(No. 66. Private and Confidential.)
Foreign Office, December 29, 1868.

My Lord,

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith, for your information, a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Lord Augustus Loftus, recording a conversation which I have had with Count Bernsdorff in regard to what his Government appears to believe the disquieting influence of the policy pursued by Austria in the present state of affairs on the Continent.

I have to instruct your Excellency to report to me whether you have any reason to believe that the language attributed by the Prussian Government to Count Beust, as referred to by Count Bernstorff, is sanctioned by or is within the knowledge of the French Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 142.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 29, 1868.*

IT is desirable that you should state to the Porte that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, any hesitation on its side to take part in the proposed Conference would not be for its interest. From the communications which Her Majesty's Government have had with other Powers, they believe that there is no disposition on the part of any of them to enter upon any matter foreign to the immediate object of preventing war between Turkey and Greece by prevailing with the latter Power to give all due satisfaction and security to the Porte in regard to the points sent forth in the Turkish ultimatum, or to enter upon any question which the Porte might consider to involve interference with its territorial or administrative rights.

No. 143.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 23.)
Foreign Office, December 29, 1868.

Sir,

ALTHOUGH Her Majesty's Government trust that the Porte will not decline to take part in the Conference which it is proposed to hold in Paris with a view to the re-establishment of friendly relations with Greece, yet, having reference to the communication made to me by M. Musurus, of which I have given you an account in my despatch No. 21 of the 28th, I have to instruct you to state to the Porte that Her Majesty's Government consider that a due regard for its own interest should induce it to accept, without hesitation, the invitation that is made to it.

Her Majesty's Government believe that none of the Powers are disposed to extend the range of the deliberations of the Conference beyond the immediate object for which it is convened, and that their efforts will be confined to endeavouring to induce the Greek Government to satisfy the demands of the Porte as set forth in the ultimatum which it has addressed to Greece, and so to secure Turkey from a renewal of proceedings of which she has complained.

The Powers trust, by the intervention of the Conference, the breaking out of hostilities between Turkey and Greece may be prevented; and they have no desire to enter upon any questions which would appear to the Porte to affect her territorial rights, or administrative freedom.

Her Majesty's Government understand that the French Government have directed their Ambassador at Constantinople to make a similar communication to the Porte.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 144.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, December 29, 1868.*

THE Turkish Chargé d'Affaires communicated, yesterday, two telegrams to Gortchakoff, declaring determination of the Porte not to admit any discussion respecting Crete, or any modification of their demands on Greece. Gortchakoff received the communication very coldly, and merely said that he would record it.

No. 145.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 15.)
Foreign Office, December 29, 1868.

Sir,

THE Russian Ambassador called at this Office yesterday and read to me two despatches from Prince Gortchakoff, the first of which was a retrospective review of events in the East during the last two years. Turkey was represented to be the sole cause of trouble. The difficulties in Roumania, Servia, Bulgaria, and Greece were attributed to the Porte, and even the insurrectionary movements against the authority of the Sultan were laid to its charge.

Baron Brunnow said this despatch would be sent to the Russian Ministers at the principal Courts of Europe as a record of opinion, and not for the purpose of raising any discussion.

Upon his Excellency adding that he should decline a discussion, I said I had no desire to raise one, but I requested that my silence should not be taken as giving assent to the statements contained in the despatch, from the greater part of which I differed altogether.

The next despatch had reference to the recent acts of the Porte, which were described as violent and angry. The Porte, in the opinion of Prince Gortchakoff, should have referred to other Powers, and should have taken into consideration the danger to which its reckless policy might expose the peace of Europe.

I told Baron Brunnow that I had seldom listened to a despatch with greater regret; it was a bill of indictment against Turkey for acts done in defence of her territory and her interests, and professed to give an accurate description of her policy, and yet throughout the despatch the name of Greece or the acts of her government was not even once alluded to. The one-sided opinions of the Russian Government were, I said, set forth with so much bitterness that it argued ill for the result of a Conference in which the Russian Representative would be instructed to hold language calculated to make the Greek Government think that it was exempt from blame, and that Turkey alone was the disturber of peace.

Baron Brunnow said that he would report my opinions to Prince Gortchakoff.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 146.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 1,098.)
Paris, December 29, 1868.

My Lord,

THE Marquis de Lavalette told me this morning that he had sent last night to the Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne a despatch stating the views of the French Government with regard to the observations made in your Lordship's despatch to me of the 23rd instant, respecting the proposed Conference on the dispute between Turkey and Greece. He felt confident that the views of the French Government would be satisfactory to your Lordship, and he trusted that the final assent of Her Majesty's Government to take part in the Conference would be given without delay.

M. de Lavalette told me also that the Russian Ambassador had just announced to him that the Russian Government consented to a Greek Representative being admitted to the Conference with a consultative voice only. The Russian Government had for some time insisted either that Turkey and Greece should alike be excluded from the Conference,

or that Greece as well as Turkey should have a deliberative, as well as a consultative, voice. M. de Lavalette had, however, positively refused to agree to this, and Russia having now given up the point, there was, he conceived, little more to settle as far as France, England, Austria, Italy, Prussia, and Russia were concerned.

The difficulty now appeared to be raised by Turkey. He had received a telegram from Constantinople from which it would appear that the Porte was disposed to insist not only that no mention should be made of the future condition of Crete, or of its internal administration, but that the Turkish ultimatum should also be excluded from discussion. Objections to the Conference had also been urged personally by Djemil Pasha, the Ottoman Ambassador in Paris, and Musurus Pasha, the Ottoman Ambassador in London, who had arrived here on his way back to his post. M. de Lavalette had, however, pointed out to the two Ambassadors, in very forcible terms, the danger to the Porte of allowing matters to proceed to extremities; and had explained to them that to exclude the ultimatum from the discussion was equivalent to a total rejection of the Conference.

In conclusion, M. de Lavalette told me that he should lose no time in strongly urging the Porte to agree to the Conference; and that he trusted that the influence of Her Majesty's Government would, without delay, be exerted for the same purpose.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 147.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

(No. 78.)
My Lord,

Foreign Office, December 30, 1868.

THE French Ambassador has communicated to me a despatch from M. de Lavalette, dated the 28th instant, in reply to my despatch No. 50 of the 23rd, which I had instructed your Excellency to communicate to him.

In this despatch M. de Lavalette says, that the Government of the Emperor entirely concurs in the estimate formed by the British Government of the attitude of Greece towards Turkey, and of the dangers which, if it were maintained, it is calculated to create; and considers, in like manner, that the Greek Government cannot plead the difficulties of its internal situation as exempting it from the necessity of observing its international obligations.

Admitting, with the British Government, that the state of affairs calls for and justifies the intervention of the Powers, parties to the Treaty of 1856, the Government of the Emperor concurs in its opinion as to the manner in which the Conference should be composed, and as to the special objects to which its attention should be exclusively directed.

The Government of the Emperor considers the participation of Turkey in the Conference to be indispensable, inasmuch as its convocation mainly, if not entirely, results from antecedent transactions in which she took part; but, on the other hand, it is of opinion that it would not be possible to exclude Greece from it. But to get over the difficulty of form which would be opposed to the admission of this latter Power, the Government of the Emperor had proposed, and with the exception of Russia, all the other Powers seemed inclined to agree, that Greece should only appear "à titre consultatif."

The Government of the Emperor was, equally with that of Her Majesty, determined that no question foreign to that which had led to the Conference should come under discussion, and the invitation which it would address to the Powers to meet in Conference will distinctly set forth that the sole object for which it is convoked is to discover the means of allaying the difference between Turkey and Greece, and to examine to what extent the demands set forth in the Turkish ultimatum should be complied with. Thus, any proposal by which, as tending to interfere with the internal administration of Turkey and of the rights of the Sultan over his subjects, the principle of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire would be assailed, would be at the outset excluded from discussion.

The first point to which the attention of the Conference would be directed would be the maintenance of the *status quo* between Turkey and Greece until the close of the Conference.

The Conference would then proceed to inquire into the Turkish demands, with reference to their bearing on questions of right, and on the interests of peace in the East.

Such is the general tenor of the despatch which the French Ambassador communicated to me; and without specifically adverting to other points in M. de Lavalette's despatch, it is sufficient for the present purpose that I should authorize your Excellency

to make known to M. de Lavalette that, with the distinct understanding that no other question shall be mooted in the Conference save that of a settlement of the differen e between Turkey and Greece, and that no proposal shall be brought forward affecting the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, or involving interference in the internal administration of Turkey, or with the rights of the Sultan over his subjects, Her Majesty's Government agree to be represented in the Conference, and will in due time furnish your Excellency with the necessary authority and instructions to enable you to take part in its deliberations.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 148.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 1,099.)
My Lord,

Paris, December 29, 1868.

I SPOKE to the Marquis de Lavalette this morning of the report mentioned in the papers that the Greek Government had purchased at Bordeaux two iron-clad vessels which had been built for Chili.

M. de Lavalette said that he thought it very unlikely that this could be true, but he nevertheless gave directions that inquiry should be made about it immediately.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 149.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, December 29, 1868.

THE Russian Ambassador has informed the Porte that the Conference upon the difference with Greece is to assemble on the 2nd of January.

The Turkish Government appear surprised that this should have been decided on without reference to them, and without their being informed of its basis and object.

An appeal of the Russian Ambassador for the suspension of the measures taken with respect to Greek subjects and vessels has been answered by a peremptory refusal.

Nothing short of very strong language by all the Powers would now induce the Turkish Government to recede from the demands contained in their ultimatum, and they would regard it as disastrous if compelled to do so.

No. 150.

M. de Lavalette to Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne, December 31.)

(Confidentielle.)
Prince,

Paris, le 28 Décembre, 1868.

L'AMBASSADEUR de la Reine m'a communiqué, confidentiellement, la dépêche ci-jointe qui lui a été adressé, le 23 de ce mois, par Lord Clarendon, et que je vous transmets au même titre. Le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique expose le point de vue auquel le Cabinet de Londres envisage, tout à la fois, et le différend Turco-Grec et la combinaison proposée en vue de l'aplanir, et exprime, en même temps, le désir de connaître exactement, à cet égard, la manière de voir du Gouvernement de l'Empereur. Bien que les explications déjà échangées entre Lord Lyons et moi aient déjà fait pressentir au Gouvernement Britannique qu'aucune divergence d'opinion ne peut s'élever entre les deux Cours, je crois utile de vous mettre en mesure de fournir vous-même à Lord Clarendon les éclaircissements les plus complets.

Le Gouvernement de l'Empereur partage, de tous points, les appréciations émises par le Cabinet Anglais sur l'attitude de la Grèce à l'égard de la Turquie, ainsi que sur les dangers qu'elle serait de nature à créer en se prolongeant. Nous pensons, également, que le Gouvernement Hellénique ne saurait exciper des difficultés résultant de la situation intérieure de son pays pour se soustraire aux obligations internationales que lui imposent

les principes les plus élémentaires du droit des gens. En reconnaissant enfin, avec Lord Clarendon, qu'une telle situation appelle et justifie l'intervention des Puissances Signataires du Traité de 1856, nous n'hésitons pas à partager sa manière de voir quant à la composition de la future Conférence, et au but spécial qui devrait être exclusivement assigné à ses travaux.

Nous croyons indispensable que la Turquie prenne part à une réunion qui trouve sa principale, sinon son unique raison d'être, dans les actes extérieurs auxquels cette Puissance a participé. Nous ne pensons pas, d'un autre côté, qu'il soit possible d'en exclure la Grèce. L'admission d'un Représentant Hellénique ne soulève qu'une difficulté de forme. Nous avons proposé, en ce qui nous concerne, qu'il y figurât à titre consultatif, et à l'exception du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, qui manifeste à cet égard quelque hésitation, toutes les Puissances paraissent accepter cette combinaison.

Quant à la matière même des travaux de la Conférence, nous ne sommes pas moins résolus que le Cabinet de Londres à en écarter toute question étrangère à celle qui aura motivé la réunion des Plénipotentiaires. La communication que le Gouvernement de l'Empereur a l'intention d'adresser aux différentes Cours afin d'obtenir leur assentiment à la proposition d'une Conférence déterminera les limites dans lesquelles devra se renfermer la délibération. Les Plénipotentiaires auront uniquement à rechercher les moyens d'apaiser le différend qui s'est élevé entre la Turquie et la Grèce, et à examiner dans quelle mesure il y a lieu de faire droit aux réclamations formulées dans l'ultimatum du Gouvernement Ottoman. Tel est le but unique et précis tracé par le programme qui sera soumis à l'acceptation des Puissances comme base de l'entente commune, et ainsi se trouve exclue d'avance, de droit comme de fait, toute proposition tendant à porter atteinte au principe de l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, en constituant une ingérence dans l'administration intérieure de la Turquie et les rapports du Sultan avec ses sujets.

L'objet de la réunion se trouvant ainsi rigoureusement défini, la marche que la Conférence aurait à suivre dans ses travaux nous paraît indiquée par la nature même des choses.

Les Plénipotentiaires auraient à se préoccuper, tout d'abord, des mesures qui permettraient à la Conférence d'atteindre son but en assurant à ses délibérations le calme et la liberté nécessaires. Leur premier soin serait donc de s'entendre pour que le *statu quo* fût maintenu entre la Turquie et la Grèce jusqu'au terme de leurs travaux.

Après l'adoption de ces mesures préalables, et, en quelque sorte, conservatoires, la Conférence aborderait le fond même de la question, c'est-à-dire, l'examen, au double point de vue de droit et des intérêts de la paix en Orient, des demandes consignées dans l'ultimatum de la Porte.

Le résultat de cette étude ne saurait être douteux ; les faits dénoncés par le Gouvernement Ottoman n'étant point niés par le Cabinet d'Athènes et leur caractère moral ne faisant point question au point de vue du droit international, il nous semble difficile qu'il se produise, à cet égard, au sein de la Conférence, des appréciations différentes de celles que nous formulons, dès à présent, d'accord avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique.

Les explications qui précèdent, en constatant l'entière conformité de vues qui existe entre le Cabinet de Londres et nous, suffiront, je l'espère, pour amener Lord Clarendon à donner son assentiment définitif à la seule combinaison qui puisse conjurer les graves et prochaines complications dont l'Angleterre n'a pas à se préoccuper moins que nous.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) LAVALETTE.

No. 151.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 31.)

(Telegraphic.) *Athens, December 27, 1868.*

ON receipt of news of the day before yesterday that Conference is to be held at Paris, French Minister saw King and endeavoured to get His Majesty to promise that the "Enosis" shall not leave Syra until after her trial. Towards night a sort of engagement to that effect was taken by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and sent off by a French steamer, which returned this morning. It is now hoped that Hobart Pasha will not bring on a collision, his main object being to prevent "Enosis" from leaving port for a fortnight.

The language of the Government about Conference is, that they will accept its decisions if satisfaction is given to the just demands of Greece.

No. 152.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 31.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 30, 1868, 11·5 P.M.*

YOUR Lordship's telegram of yesterday has been communicated to the Grand Vizier.

As the Conference is to be confined to the points contained in the ultimatum, he is of opinion that the Porte should assent to it, but must consult his colleagues before pronouncing positively.

As Russia and perhaps other Powers are inclined to introduce discussions foreign to the five points and connected with the territorial and administrative rights of the Porte, Aali Pasha intimates that if England and France were to give assurances to the Porte of their support and countenance in such an emergency, he would not hesitate at once to accept the Conference on the terms laid down in your telegram.

He added that if any discussion unconnected with the above basis were to arise, the Turkish Plenipotentiary would at once withdraw from the Conference.

No. 153.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 31.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, December 31, 1868.*

YOUR despatch No. 50 was communicated confidentially to Lavalette. See the postscript to it. Do you wish me to withdraw the "Confidential?"

I think best course will be for me to give copies of your Nos. 67 nd 78 at the same time to M. de Lavalette. Do you approve? Please answer by telegraph.

No. 154.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 25.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 31, 1868.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 494 of the 18th instant, with its inclosures, respecting the wish of the Greek Minister, on his departure from Constantinople, to leave the protection of Greek subjects and interests to the Representatives of the Protecting Powers, and I have to acquaint you that I approve the course you adopted in declining to undertake the same.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 155.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 16.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 31, 1868.*

THE Russian Ambassador called here to-day and said that he had not failed to report by telegraph to Prince Gortchakoff the remarks I had made upon the two despatches he read to me on the 28th instant, and which are recorded in my despatch No. 15 of the 29th of December.

In reply, his Excellency had received a telegram from Prince Gortchakoff, stating that Her Majesty's Government might rely upon the complete impartiality of Russia in the Conference, and that the facts and evidence brought forward by either the Turkish or Greek Government would be considered in a spirit of justice, and with a view to an equitable and speedy conclusion.

Baron Brunnow again assured me that his Government had no wish or intention to enlarge the discussion, which ought to be strictly confined to the existing dispute, and the best mode of bringing it to a termination.

I assured Baron Brunnow of the satisfaction with which this information would be received by Her Majesty's Government.

His Excellency added that in his own opinion, and he believed he might say in that

of the Russian Ambassador at Paris, three sittings of the Conference ought to be sufficient for the purpose for which it was convoked.

Prince Gortchakoff's telegram likewise contained an expression of regret that the Greek Representative would only be admitted to have a "voix consultative" at the Conference, and of hope that in this arrangement there was no intention to humiliate Greece.

I said that, as far as Her Majesty's Government were concerned, there was not the smallest intention to humiliate Greece, and I thought I could say the same for the French Government, with whom the proposal had originated. It had probably been thought necessary to limit the number of Representatives at the Conference, and that consequently the Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris would alone be invited to attend. Greece was not one of those Powers, and could not therefore, in that capacity, be asked to send a Representative. A different form of invitation would, therefore, be addressed to Athens, but it was manifestly impossible that the business of the Conference should be carried on in the absence of a Greek Representative, who would have the fullest opportunity for stating his case.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 156.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 1, 1869.)

(No. 497.)
Constantinople, December 20, 1868.

My Lord,

THE inconveniences that would result to British subjects and others by the sudden closing of the Turkish ports against Greek vessels, which might have taken in their cargoes previous to the rupture, induced me to draw the attention of the Porte to the position in which such vessels would find themselves upon arriving at their port of destination.

The Sultan's Government readily took the subject into consideration, and decided that all Greek vessels which might be loading in Europe before the rupture, should be exceptionally allowed to enter the Ottoman ports to discharge their cargo.

The fifteen days' delay from the notification of the rupture of relations which was allowed to Hellenic subjects, applies equally to the Greek shipping.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 157.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 1, 1869.)

(No. 498.)
Constantinople, December 20, 1868.

My Lord,

THE expulsion of the Greek subjects will extend to Egypt as well as to the other parts of the Empire.

With regard to Servia and the Danubian Principalities, the Porte has confined itself to intimating to those Governments the measures which it has been thought necessary to adopt, leaving them free to act as they think proper in the manner.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 158.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 1, 1869.)

(No. 501. Confidential.)
Constantinople, December 22, 1868.

My Lord,

ALTHOUGH the period of fifteen days allowed for the departure of the Greek subjects appeared to me extremely short, both on account of the inconvenience it would entail, and because it left little time for finding means of warding off a final rupture, the Turkish Government had so evidently taken a decision not to allow themselves to be swayed from their purpose by foreign advice, that I abstained at first from urging a prolongation.

The Russian Ambassador having, however, confidentially showed me a telegram from Prince Gortchakoff, directing him as soon as M. Bourrée should be furnished with similar instructions, to ask, or "if necessary require," from the Porte a delay in the execution of the measures they had announced, I conceived it to be essential that they should avoid the risk of being subjected to a pressure which it would be difficult for them to resist, and mortifying to be obliged to submit to.

I therefore pointed out, first, that the time allowed was so short that it would be absolutely impossible to arrange many of the matters of business pending between Greeks and Turks or foreign subjects; and, secondly, I intimated confidentially, that I had reason to believe that if this prolongation were not voluntarily granted, there was a prospect of it being demanded in a manner that might complicate the question.

Aali Pasha at once recognized the expediency of acting as I suggested, and the additional delay (of the exact length of which I am not able to speak with certainty, though I believe it will be three weeks) was resolved upon, and announced before any representation was made to the Porte by the Russian Ambassador.

Your Lordship will, I do not doubt, recognize the importance of inducing the Porte to proceed with all moderation, but the feeling at present prevailing is that the national honour and interests have suffered too materially by the continued deference to the counsel of foreign Powers, for it to be possible any longer to show the same facility; and this sentiment pervading the public, no less than the Government, renders it for the moment a matter of much delicacy to give advice in such a manner as to afford a prospect of it being entertained.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 159.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 1, 1869.)

(No. 502.)
Constantinople, December 22, 1868.

My Lord,

M. DELYANNI, the Greek Minister here, whose official functions ceased upon receiving his passports nearly a week ago, proposes to quit Constantinople by to-morrow's packet.

I have within the last few days had two conversations with him, in which I expressed my anxiety to contribute in any way in my power to prevent the present state of things from being protracted, or from becoming aggravated.

Without dissembling my opinion that his Government was responsible for the threatening aspect of affairs, I assured him I should be always glad to exert at the Porte any influence I might possess, if I saw the possibility of bringing about an understanding, and I, therefore, especially wished to learn from him which of the Turkish demands he regarded as of a nature that could not be accepted by the Greek Government.

M. Delyanni, having premised that he now held no official position, and spoke only as a private individual, answered that it was not so much the substance as the form of the demands which caused the difficulty—for the honour of the nation forbade the Government to give way before a menace, forgetting apparently that the Turkish Government had exhausted every form of pacific remonstrance before resorting to stronger language.

I altogether failed in my endeavours to make M. Delyanni point out any part of the Turkish demands which they might be called upon to withdraw as exceeding what they were entitled to require, and I learn from my Russian colleague that he also has been equally unsuccessful, M. Delyanni confining himself to the complaint that, having submitted so long to the encouragement given by Greece to the insurrection, the Turkish Government should at last have resorted to such stringent measures.

His language was the fullest confirmation of Mr. Erskine's opinion that, up to the very moment of the rupture, the Greeks refused to entertain the belief that any aggression on their part would be seriously taken up by the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 160.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 1, 1869.)

(No. 503.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 22, 1868.

IT was generally believed here yesterday that an authority to sail under the Russsian flag was being indiscriminately granted to all Greek vessels.

General Ignatieff assures me that there is no sort of foundation for this report, and that Russian papers will be given to no vessels which do not strictly come within the usual regulations.

Some sales, real or fictitious, are taking place between Greek and Russian owners, and no doubt some vessels will fraudulently obtain the shelter of the Russian flag; but General Ignatieff informs me that out of sixty demands for the flag that had been made in the past week, only two had been granted.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 161.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 1, 1869.)

(No. 504.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 22, 1868.

A COMMISSION is instituted at the Porte for the regulation of all claims pending between Greek subjects and other parties.

Where foreigners are concerned, the dragoman of their Legation or Consulate will be present; but the Grand Vizier refused the request of the Russian Ambassador to allow one of his dragomans to assist in cases between Greek and Ottoman subjects.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 162.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 1, 1869.)

(No. 505.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 22, 1868.

THE inclosed extract of a report from Mr. Pisani, will show your Lordship how little disposed the Porte now is to listen to recommendations to modify the demands it has made against the Greek Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

Inclosure in No. 162.

Mr. Pisani to Mr. Elliot.

(Extract.) *Pera, December* 19, 1868.

THE Russian dragoman, M. Boguslawski, stated that information had reached the Ambassador that his Government were in communication with the other Protecting Powers, and that he entertained sanguine hopes that some fair means would be devised to bring about a conciliation between the two Governments.

The Grand Vizier replied, that if proposals tending to urge the Porte to recede from its demands, or to modify them, were made, he could tell him beforehand, that they would not be adhered to, as the Porte was resolved not to abate a jot of its conditions.

No. 163.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 1, 1869.)

(No. 506.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 22, 1868.

YOUR Lordship's telegraphic instruction, directing me strongly to recommend the Porte not to expel the inoffensive Greeks, has just reached me, but not in time to be communicated before the departure of the present packet.

I will not fail, however, at once to execute your Lordship's instructions, although they have become less pressing, owing to the prolongation of the delay allowed to the Greeks, of which I informed your Lordship this morning by telegraph.

In the meantime I believe I may assure your Lordship, that there is no intention on the part of the Porte to carry out the measure of expulsion with anything approaching to severity; and in the month which we have now before us, it may perhaps be possible to obtain a further relaxation.

With regard to the Greeks who will be the sufferers by the expulsion, it is to be remembered that there is hardly one of them, in any class of life, who has not regularly contributed to the maintenance of the insurrection: some giving willingly and out of sympathy for the cause, and the others because they dared not refuse the Revolutionary Committees which demanded their money.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 164.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 1, 1869.)

(No. 507.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 22, 1868.

EVEN under the present aspect of affairs the Russian Ambassador occasionally alludes to the notion of establishing an autonomic Principality in Crete.

I have no means of knowing whether this idea is still entertained either by his own or by any other Government, who possibly may not be aware that the Porte would certainly not listen to a proposal or suggestion from foreign Governments respecting the question of the internal organization of the island.

The Turkish Government hold that the only difficulty now left for them to deal with is a purely external one with the Greek Government, the population of the island being looked upon as having returned to its allegiance to the Sultan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 165.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 1, 1869.)

(No. 3. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Vienna, December* 29, 1868.

HAVING inquired of Count Beust if he could give me any information as to the prospect of the opening of a Conference on the Turco-Greek affairs, his Excellency said that his last accounts from Paris led him to believe the question was on the point of settlement, but that he did not yet know if any programme had been adopted; that he understood it would be composed of Representatives of all the Powers who had signed the Treaty of Paris in 1856, and that a Greek Representative would be admitted to some of the sittings, but that he was not to be a component element of the Conference.

He added that he himself was not going to suggest any particular course for the Conference, that he would agree to any reasonable programme, and that he did not care if even the whole Eastern question were brought under discussion, because he felt convinced some day or other this must be the case, and therefore the sooner it took place the better.

I told Count Beust that I was ignorant of the decision of Her Majesty's Government regarding the Conference, but that of one thing I was certain, they would be indisposed to go into Conference without a defined programme, unwilling to see the labours of the

Conference extend beyond the limits of the Turco-Greek quarrel, and would desire to see them strictly defined *ad hoc*.

I told Count Beust that he was accused of having stirred up this quarrel in the East. He declared it was false. He had done nothing to cause this disturbance in the relations of Greece and Turkey; neither had he taken any steps that were not perfectly legitimate in the Principalities, with which he was unceasingly reproached. He had naturally sought to protect the interests of Austria, and it was his duty to do so, and surely it would not be likely if these disturbances in the East had been promoted by Austria, that at the very moment of the crisis, Baron Prokesch, the Ambassador at the Porte, should have been granted leave of absence to travel in Egypt. All Austria wanted, was to exercise her just share of influence in the affairs of Turkey, and she certainly had no intention to abdicate the position she had a right to hold in the East.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 166.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 1, 1869.)

(Telegraphic.) *Athens, December 29, 1868.*

THE Prussian Government have directed their Minister here to recommend greatest moderation until the Conference shall assemble and propose a solution of the pending difficulty.

He has replied that the Greek Foreign Minister will consent to nothing short of the annexation of Candia to compensate Greece for the 30,000,000 on her part expended in the endeavour.

No. 167.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 31.)

(Telegraphic.) *Athens, December 30, 1868.*

I HAVE just received a letter from Hobart Pasha, announcing that all the volunteers in Crete, to the number of about 1,000, have surrendered, and are to be at Syra this day.

The Admiral now considers everything to be at an end in Crete.

No. 168.

Safvet Pasha to M. E. Musurus.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by M. E. Musurus, December 31.)

(Télégraphique.) *Constantinople, le 30 Décembre, 1868.*

PAR un télégramme daté d'hier le Gouverneur-Général de Crète nous communique les nouvelles suivantes.—Les dispositions militaires prises pour la destruction des restes des bandes de volontaires qui se trouvaient encore dans la partie de Sphakia appelée Calierati viennent d'être entièrement couronnées de succès. Petropoulaki et tous les volontaires étrangers qui se trouvaient dans l'île ont mis bas les armes, et se sont rendus aux troupes Impériales. Les membres du soi-disant Gouvernement Provisoire, et tous les Chefs de bandes Sphakiotes, se sont décidés à quitter définitivement la Crète; ils seront envoyés en Grèce à bord de bateaux à vapeur.

No. 169.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 1, 1869.)

(Private.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, December 31, 1868.*

I FEEL quite confident that my Austrian colleague has not given advice of an unconciliatory character. The reports mentioned by your Lordship are more likely to refer to Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople.

No. 170.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, January 1, 1869, 2 P.M.*

FRENCH Minister at Athens telegraphs yesterday to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that Turkish Admiral placed his charge against the "Enosis" in the hands of the Procureur on the 29th; also that the French Consul at Canea announces that the volunteers and insurgents have capitulated in mass; that Turkish vessels convey them to Syra; and that no serious insurrectionary force exists in Crete any more.

French Ambassador at Constantinople telegraphs yesterday that the Grand Vizier having taken the orders of the Sultan, announces that the Turkish Ambassador at Paris will receive to-day by telegraph, orders to take part in the Conference on the conditions stated in the telegram of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

This being new year's day I cannot give M. de Lavalette the copies of your Nos. 65 and 78 till to-morrow, but I have informed him of the general tenor of them.

No. 171.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, January 1, 1869, 3·55 P.M.*

FRENCH Minister for Foreign Affairs intends to telegraph to-morrow to the Powers parties to the Treaty of Paris, to propose the 7th of January for the assembling of the Conference.

The tone of the Emperor's speech to the Diplomatic Body was very pacific.

No. 172.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 1.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 1, 1869.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 497 of the 20th ultimo, and I have to acquaint you that I approve the course you adopted as therein reported, in inducing the Turkish Government to relax its orders, under certain circumstances, in favour of Greek vessels bound for Ottoman ports.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 173.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 2.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 1, 1869.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the course which you pursued, as reported in your despatch No. 501 of the 22nd ultimo, in order to induce the Porte to prolong the time allowed for the departure of Greek subjects from Turkey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 174.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 1, 1869.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the course you adopted, as reported in your despatch 502 of the 22nd ultimo, with the view of

obtaining from M. Delyanni some expression of opinion on the subject of the Turkish ultimatum.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 175.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 1.)

Pera, January 1, 1869.

(Telegraphic.)

THE Porte accepts the Conference on the condition of the discussions being limited to the points contained in their ultimatum: but before formally adhering to it the Turkish Ambassador at Paris is instructed to ascertain officially whether there is an intention of referring to the identic Declaration of the four Powers of October 29, 1867.

No. 175A.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 2, 1869.)

(No. 10.)

Athens, December 20, 1868.

My Lord,

WITH reference to Mr. Elliot's despatch No. 489 of the 16th instant, inclosing a translation of Article 127 of the Greek Penal Code which, it is assumed, would apply to the case of Petropoulaki's band of volunteers, I beg to call your Lordship's attention to my despatch No. 132 of the 3rd of May, 1867, to Lord Stanley, a copy of which was forwarded to Constantinople, in which translations of that Article and of Article 136 of the code were transmitted to Her Majesty's Government.

Article 127, as your Lordship will observe from that despatch, is considered more especially to apply to the case of enlistments against the Government of Greece; but Article 136 unquestionably prescribes a penalty of two years' imprisonment against any one enlisting troops for service under a foreign Government, the only question being whether Crete is to be deemed a recognized belligerent Government.

In my conversations with M. Delyanni, I have repeatedly called his attention to these Articles of the Greek Code as conflicting with his statement that there is no law in Greece prohibiting the enrolment of such bands as those of Petropoulaki, but he always denied that they were in any way applicable to the case, and he even informed me that he made this statement on the authority of the Minister of Justice who is of course responsible for the due interpretation and enforcement of the laws.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

No. 175B.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 2, 1869.)

(No. 13.)

Athens, December 23, 1868.

My Lord,

THE Chamber of Deputies was prorogued yesterday afternoon by a Royal Ordinance, and need not be again convoked for about eleven months.

I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith extracts from the recent correspondence of Mr. Consul Lloyd, respecting the state of affairs at Syra, the latest date being the 20th instant.

Yesterday morning the Greek corvette "Hellas" returned to the Piræus from Syra, and, after a few minutes, again left the port and anchored in the Bay of Salamis. I have not been able to ascertain why she left Syra, or what it is now intended to do with her.

By the last accounts received here, which are dated yesterday, the "Enosis" was still lying in the harbour of Syra, closely watched by the Ottoman squadron. Admiral Hobart, I am happy to say, has shown great moderation and forbearance in this matter, under provocation which might have irritated many men in his position into the adoption of extreme measures.

The Commanders of the French and Austrian vessels of war have offered to take charge of the "Enosis," and escort her to the Piræus, where she will be given over to the

Greek authorities for trial, and Admiral Hobart has accepted this offer. It was to be answered by the Greek Government yesterday evening. When I last spoke to M. Delyanni on the subject, he appeared to think it the best, if not the only means of avoiding a collision; but he said that he was anxious to defer coming to a final decision until the Chamber should have been prorogued, as the public excitement had reached so dangerous a point that the Government might be unable to make head against it, were a discussion to be raised in Parliament. I reminded M. Delyanni that there was no time to be lost, as it was all very well to talk of the excitement of the Greek public; but that he must also take into account the position of Admiral Hobart, and the necessity of settling the question without an hour's unnecessary delay.

I inclose some extracts from the "Grèce" newspaper, to show your Lordship the offensive terms in which Admiral Hobart is spoken of here. I likewise inclose extracts from the semi-official Government paper, "Courrier d'Athènes," declaring a "great war" to be imminent, and enumerating the imposing forces which are available for an attack against Turkey. M. Delyanni's speech on communicating to Parliament the documents relating to the diplomatic rupture with Turkey will also be found in this paper.

Amongst the papers forwarded to me by Mr. Consul Lloyd, without any observation as to its contents, is the accompanying translation of a letter addressed to him by the Syra Committee for the affairs of Crete, which purports to give the latest news from that island, more especially with reference to the movements of Petropoulaki.

In a country like Greece it is very difficult to speak positively as to what will under certain circumstances be done by the people and their Government, as the former are apt to be carried away by their passions and by their childish ignorance of the policy of the great Powers of Europe, whilst the Government are usually influenced by the sole consideration of what is most likely to contribute to their retention of office: but my own belief at this moment is that the danger of war with Turkey is becoming less every day, and that if the Guaranteeing Powers should eventually think fit to interfere in an authoritative manner to put a stop to the assistance almost overtly given to the insurgents in Crete, that interference would not only be quietly accepted, but would be hailed with satisfaction as the means of escaping from a state of things which has become intolerable.

Mr. Ongley, writing from Patras on the 21st instant, says:—"I think the excitement has a little calmed down now that people begin to think of the immediate effect to themselves of a rupture with Turkey. Butcher's meat has advanced 20 leptas per oke; probably because supplies from Turkey may be stopped." And Mr. Vice-Consul Wood is likewise of opinion that all who have anything to lose there are much averse to the idea of war.

The British Vice-Consul at Missolonghi writes on the 17th instant: "Missolonghi has not escaped a touch of the general excitement caused by the news of the rupture of diplomatic relations with Turkey. This excitement however, does not appear to be great. With the exception of a little blustering among some half-a-dozen well-known rabid haters of the Porte, the people are quiet and inclined to mind their own business if allowed to do so. There are not wanting men who hold their own against those who advocate war."

And Captain Mansell writes to me on the 18th instant, from Chalcis, in Eubœa:—

"Although affairs look very serious and war is spoken of as imminent, with the good fortune of the 'Enosis' in effecting her escape from Admiral Hobart, the intelligence has been received without any of those violent demonstrations of joy so common and natural to the Greeks.

"Here the greater part of the people begin to look at the state of things in their real light, and although all are ready to a man to shoulder their musket in defence of their country, they would much rather see peace established,—particularly the country people, some of whom came to see us yesterday. They were deploring the state of affairs. War, they said, would be their ruin—the little produce they have accumulated since the revolution would be lost. May God avert such a calamity. It is not the Turks they so much fear as their own countrymen; this feeling prevails where the land belongs to the villagers . . . . The state of things at present could not be much worse, but I do not think they will come to blows."

M. Delyanni continues to assure me that the Government have no intention to provoke war; but he professes to dread the effect on the public mind of the measures of coercion threatened by the Turkish Government in their ultimatum.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 175 B.

Consul Lloyd to Mr. Erskine.

Syra, December 17, 1868, 11·30 A.M.

(Extract.)

THIS night was calm, and all Admiral Hobart's vessels were off the entrance of the harbour and frequently close to it, to say nothing of boats, if the flash lights which I saw exhibited for an instant here and there came from them; and this evening another frigate has joined him, probably from Crete. Five vessels in all. I confess I was sorry to see the "Hellas" arrive, as with her miserable guns and the otherwise utterly defenceless state of the place it looks like a vain defiance; and I said so to the Nomarch. He, however, seemed of a contrary opinion. He said that the Commandant of the "Forbin" had represented to Admiral Hobart the illegality of his position inside the harbour of Syra (a French boat is now alongside Admiral Hobart's frigate in the offing) but the position of matters is altogether changed now by the rupture of relations. The Nomarch said the "Hellas" would not only fight, but other vessels as well; that it was proposed to erect fortifications on certain (supposed) advantageous places, and the people would allow Syra to become a heap of ruins before they accorded an iota of the demands of Admiral Hobart. I told him I did not expect war to be declared at all by the Turks; that Admiral Hobart, who had, I believe, full powers, would not retire from before the harbour, but quietly wait the expiration of the fifteen days (unless he got other orders from Constantinople); that if the "Enosis" attempted to run out she would be attacked, and captured or destroyed if possible; otherwise at the expiration of fifteen days he might require "Enosis" to be brought out to him; that if the demand was not executed he might give notice to vessels to clear out of the way and commence cannonading "Hellas," and this at such a distance that "Hellas" could not reach him, that the Custom-house would be knocked down, "Enosis" destroyed, and "Crete" as well, and also the works of the Greek Steam Navigation Company, and all this without Admiral Hobart receiving a single shot, unless the Greek vessels, "Enosis," "Crete," and other vessels of the Company chose to go out to fight the Turks, but which latter could always keep their distance; that I supposed Admiral Hobart might, perhaps, then be satisfied with what he had done, and that it would be evident to any reflecting person that resistance here is perfectly and utterly useless, and all this entirely independent, so to say, of the general question of war with Turkey, but in satisfaction of the deeds of "Enosis," &c.

Friday 18th.—I had written this for yesterday, when I received a note from Admiral Hobart requesting to see me on board by a boat of the "Forbin" to "Izzedin," which latter would bring me to the frigate. I accordingly went. I found Captain Meyer of the "Forbin," Captain Stephenson of the "Wall," and the French Consul, M. Muissonier, had been there. Admiral Hobart said, that in defence to the representation of Captain Meyer, he certainly would refrain from allowing his vessels to come so near the mouth of the harbour, but that he had received great provocation; it having been reported to him that the Captain of the "Hellas" had orders on his arrival here to intimate to him, (Admiral Hobart) in case the latter should be still in the harbour, the necessity of his moving out. I said all I could to Admiral Hobart to persuade him to avoid occasions for collisions which might lead to war before it was declared by his Government, who might yet not intend war, and to await instructions from Constantinople, as the rupture had so changed the situation of matters. On getting home, I found M. Hahn, the Austrian, and M. Dombnitsky, the Russian Consuls, in the house; and that Captain Meyer with the French Consul had been to call on me, as well as the Prussian Consul. The object of the Consuls were to concert measures to induce the Greek Government not to put in execution the idea of the erection of defensive works in and about the town—while deprecating the project, the Nomarch came, who seemed rather in favour of the defences; it was proposed that the various agents of the different Steam Navigation Companies, Austrian, French, English (Bibbys, Burns M'Iver, Papayani), &c.—should petition the Government and Consuls against the project as depriving the peaceable commercial town of Syra, already sufficiently compromised by the equipment of blockade-runners to Crete during the last two years, of this its character, and thus invite reprisals from the Turks. The Nomarch was convinced of the inutility of defences for the present crisis, but contested their inutility in case of war. I said it was useless to think even about preventing the construction of land defences so long as that more than useless floating fortification the "Hellas" remained here, and the removal of her should be included in the petition against the land defences. All agreed with me except the Nomarch, who, probably the Captain of the "Hellas," being sent here, and under his orders, dare not, if he wished it, order the "Hellas" to go. I mentioned the provocation offered to

Admiral Hobart, and the Nomarch denied the possibility of the thing, the Captain of the "Hellas" being instructed to put himself entirely under the orders of the Nomarch, but I am assured to day that the Captain of the "Hellas" had orders from Athens to intimate to Admiral Hobart, should the latter still be in the harbour, on the arrival of the "Hellas," to go away, and, some say, fight him.

I have just received an application to know if the Greek Steam Navigation Company's vessels were to be sold to a British subject; whether I could give them the British flag and provisional certificate of registry for the purpose of navigation; and whether the flag would protect them, and the certificate ensure their non-capture or indemnity if illegally captured. I replied that always, excepting the "Enosis" (to which, under the circumstances, and without superior authority to do so, I would not give a certificate), I could give them certificates, provided the Consular instructions were fully complied with; that I believed, if the sale of them took place before a declaration of war, or before an act of war be committed, the transfer by purchase so made would be valid; but I could not guarantee that the Turks would not capture them, or that, in case of such capture, the capture would not be judged to be legal. A British subject for purchaser is easily found, but there is some difficulty about British masters for them—and if a British master be required as well; to that I replied I did not know, having only to do with the ship's papers, and not the navigation, unless indeed the vessel were engaged in illegal transactions. I learn too that it is in contemplation to send the "Crete" to-morrow, as a regular boat, to Piræus, under the Greek flag, with letters and passengers—among the latter of whom will be M. Stillman, American Consul in Crete, with the American flag at the fore.

7 P.M. M. Stillman has just informed me that he has proposed to give the American flag to the "Enosis" by purchasing the vessel himself, and to take the vessel to-morrow to Piræus, subject to the result of a trial of a piracy there to be held, if Admiral Hobart will consent, and unless instructions to the Nomarch or news from Athens, expected this evening, should prevent this plan being carried out; but I do not see how, with the rupture of relations, a trial can be had at all, Admiral Hobart, the accuser, and the witnesses for the prosecution, being all Turkish functionaries, employés, or subjects.

I have not yet been able to fix on the chart the position of the three vessels when shots were exchanged between "Enosis" and Turkish vessels; I know, however, that the chase lasted between thirty-five and forty minutes, and that the full speed of "Izzedin" and of "Enosis" is about sixteen miles an hour, and they were probably going not that rate all the time.

Saturday 19th.—5·30 P.M.—I closed my letter, as I was going to see Admiral Hobart, and dispatched it, and have only to say that Admiral Hobart, having heard that "Crete" was going to Piræus, he wished me to inform the Nomarch that if any vessel at all like the "Enosis" leaves the harbour this evening he will certainly stop and over-haul her; but that if the Commander of the "Forbin" will guarantee to him, Admiral Hobart, that it is not the "Enosis," then Admiral Hobart will be satisfied not to stop or overhaul her. Admiral Hobart sent his secretary with me on board the "Forbin," where his secretary delivered the message; and as I was going to the Nomarch, Captain Meyer proposed to go together. We saw the Nomarch, who said he believed there had been an idea of sending the "Crete," but that it was abandoned; that "Byzantium" would go. Captain Meyer begged the Nomarch, in case of "Crete" going, to let him know, in order to inform Admiral Hobart, who would require time to give the necessary orders for non-interference, otherwise there might be mischief done.

Inclosure 2 in No. 175 B.

Consul Lloyd to Mr. Erskine.

Syra, December 20, 1868.

(Extract.)

I CLOSED and dispatched my letter of to-day's date, and was sent for by the Nomarch in consequence of the letter of Admiral Hobart to Captain Meyer of the "Forbin," copy of which is inclosed. I have barely time for details of the consultation at which all the Consuls assisted; but I was requested to go on board to propose to the Admiral again to wait for instructions from Piræus, by a boat to be sent hence for the purpose.

Foreseeing a refusal and difficulty, I suggested to the Nomarch to propose that "Enosis" should go to Piræus, escorted by "Hellas." Nomarch consented, if "Forbin" would also accompany "Enosis." I went to Admiral Hobart with Captain Meyer, the French Consul, and Captain Stephenson of "Wall." The Nomarch's proposition was discussed, and difficulties made by Admiral Hobart, who consulted with his officers; and

finally it was agreed, as it was too late, that Admiral Hobart would allow Captain Meyer, or rather the Nomarch, 10 A.M. to-morrow, to give his answer to Admiral Hobart's letter, if Nomarch would give guarantee to Captain Meyer and to the Consuls that "Enosis" do not slip away to-night.

I now go to the French Consulate to meet the Nomarch and Captain Meyer there, to draw up the guarantee, and discuss the answer to be given to-morrow, which will embody the proposal for "Hellas" and "Enosis" to go to Piræus, and arrange details for the voyage to which I hope Admiral Hobart will agree, unless he thinks better of what he has already nearly consented to.

The iron-clad "Omania" came to-day from Constantinople, and "Coscova" three-decker from Suda—nine in all.

Inclosure 3 in No. 175 B.

Vice-Admiral Hobart Pasha to M. Dracopoulo.

"*Hudaveudikiar*," *Rade de Syra, le* 20 *Décembre*, 1868.

Monsieur,

J'AI des instructions de demander aux autorités locales la consignation de "l'Enosis," ou à ce que ce steamer soit détruit, ou autrement gardé de manière à le rendre inoffensif jusqu'à ce qu'il soit jugé.

Pouvez-vous amener la paix, ou dois-je prendre des mésures énergiques?

J'apprends aussi qu'il y a un autre bâtiment appartenant à la même compagnie armé jusqu'aux dents, je veux parler de la "Crète:" l'on m'assure qu'il porte huit canons, et dans ce cas je me vois obligé de le surveiller aussi; j'ai peur néanmoins être mal renseigné.

Si je ne reçois pas une réponse satisfaisante je vous prierai de notifier à la population ainsi qu'au Capitaine de la frégate Grecque, que mon intention n'est pas de faire de mal à personne; mon but principal, comme vous l'ignorez pas, est "l'Enosis."

Je saisis, &c.

(Signé) AUGUSTE HOBART.

Inclosure 4 in No. 175B.

M. Dracopoulos to the Commander of the "Forbin."

(Traduction.)

Syra, $\frac{8}{20}$ *Décembre*, 1868.

M. le Commandant,

AYANT eu connaissance de la dépêche que M. le Vice-Admiral de Turquie vous a adressée aujourd'hui, et dont vous avez bien voulu me remettre copie, j'ai l'honneur de vous communiquer que, comme je n'ai pas des instructions de mon Gouvernement, je pense qu'il serait juste qu'un délai de deux jours me soit donné afin que j'aie le temps d'en demander et de les recevoir.

Dans le cas seulement que vous, qui aviez bien voulu vous charger de la mission amicale d'intervenir, pensiez que des mesures violentes seraient prises, je prendrais alors sur moi la responsabilité de l'expédition du Pirée de "l'Union," accompagnée par la frégate à vapeur "l'Hellas."

Quant à ce qui concerne l'autre piroscaphe la "Crète" il ne porte que trois canons, quand il pouvait en porter quatre conformement au privilege accordé à la Compagnie.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) G. P. DRACOPOULO.

Inclosure 5 in No. 175B.

M. Pappadaki to Consul Lloyd.

Syra, December $\frac{8}{20}$, 1868.

(Translation.)

LAST night the Austrian steamer arrived from Crete, by which we learn that in this division of Canea the insurrection is hard pressed on account of the winter which is severe, and the enemy has occupied Agia Roumeli; although on the 24th November 6th December a fight took place in the district of Apokorona, in which ours, under the Chief Gogoni, did a great deal of damage to the enemy.

In the central provinces the insurrection has been much encouraged by the arrival of

Petropoulaki; and before his arrival, the enemy having tried to enter the district of Amarion, was repulsed by ours near the village of Platania; the enemy is acting with energy in these parts, in order to occupy the sea coasts.

And in the Eastern provinces the insurrection is in great animation, and on the 21st November 3rd December ours attacked the Imperial troops in Kalucheria of Yerapetra, and in the village of the district of Ubdou of Pediades; on the 24th November 6th December in Kalucheria again, and in Malior of Pediades; and on 27th November 9th December in the village Embaro of Pediada. In the Eastern division the desertion of the Turkish troops continues.

From the Office of the Committee and for them,

(Signed) TH. PAPPADAKI.

Inclosure 6 in No. 175B.

Extracts from "La Grèce" of December 17.

Inclosure 7 in No. 175B.

Extracts from the "Courrier d'Athènes" of December 9.

No. 175C.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 2, 1869.)

(No. 15.)

Athens, December 24, 1868.

My Lord,

SINCE my despatch No. 13 of yesterday's date was written, I have received a further report from Mr. Consul Lloyd, an extract from which is herewith inclosed, transmitting copies of the correspondence which has been exchanged between Admiral Hobart and the Nomarch of Syra, &c., in regard to the "Enosis" being sent, under escort, to the Piræus.

I am further informed by the French Minister that, having been consulted by Admiral Moulac as to the expediency of permitting the "Forbin" to convoy the "Enosis" to the Piræus, he saw M. Delyanni, and ascertained from him that the Government had made up their minds, after taking the opinion of a Commission of the most distinguished jurists in Greece, to decline accepting Admiral Hobart's proposal in any shape whatever. The utmost they were prepared to do would be to receive any charge which Admiral Hobart might think fit to prefer against the "Enosis," and instruct the Crown prosecutor to proceed against that vessel in the usual way, and before the competent Tribunal, in the event of the charge and the evidence proving sufficiently conclusive to justify that course.

On receiving this answer Baron Baude saw at once that any further interference on his part in the affair would be useless, and he has written to Admiral Moulac to advise that the "Forbin" should be recalled from Syra, and that Admiral Hobart should be left to seek redress in his own way.

I omitted to mention yesterday that, before the Chamber was prorogued, the Government were asked whether war with Turkey was inevitable. M. Delyanni replied that the Government did not provoke war, but that they were obliged to defend the national honour, assailed by Turkey, and that force would be repelled by force. In answer to an inquiry as to what foreign Power would give its support to Greece, he said that "the policy of all the Powers had been the same, that is to say, all had advised moderation and prudence."

The project of a loan of 100,000,000 drachmas was eventually carried in the following terms by a majority of 90 to 55, viz.:—

"The Chamber grants to the Government charged with the defence of the nation, in the present extraordinary circumstances, the power of contracting a loan of 100,000,000 drachmas (3,571,428*l.*), by pledging or mortgaging the real or moveable property of the State, and by seeking also for other resources."

The first consequence of the passing of this law has been that the Government have summarily required the National Bank to advance them 4,000,000 drachmas (142,857*l.*) of the specie on which the whole paper currency of the kingdom is based to pay for certain iron-clad vessels of war which the Government are desirous of purchasing abroad. The Director of the Bank was informed that he would be allowed until to-day to consider the

matter, and that Government would then take the money by force if necessary. The Director adressed a note, received this day, of which a copy is herewith inclosed, to the Representatives of the three Powers, imploring our interference to prevent this threat being carried into effect. I inclose, likewise, a copy of an identic note which I and my two colleagues have addressed to M. Delyanni, in the hope of averting the very serious danger which must result from this act of folly and spoliation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 175c.

Consul Lloyd to Mr. Erskine.

Syra, December 22, 1868.

(Extract.)

I DISCUSSED the matter a long time with Admiral Hobart, and representing to him that the first act of violence would be the first act of war, which I could not think would be approved of, if possible to be avoided; and that there was a method of avoiding it without losing himself any ground at all in the matter. He consented, and I succeeded in obtaining from him the conditions, as stated in his letter to Captain Meyer, of the 21st of December, inclosed in copy. It was mid-day when I returned to "Forbin," and Captain Stephenson, of the "Wall," having joined us, we all three went to the French Consul, who accompanied us to the Nomarch, to whom Captain Meyer submitted the letter of Admiral Hobart, containing the conditions of the "Enosis'" departure under escort of "Hellas." The Nomarch seemed inclined to dispute the conditions one by one, but being convinced, not only of the impossibility of evading them, but also of their reasonableness under the circumstances, said he would consult with the Captain of the "Hellas" before replying. I then said there was another condition which Admiral Hobart required, though not expressed in his letter of conditions (which omission he, the Nomarch, should easily appreciate), and which letter limited the escort of the "Hellas" to the Piræus, and not into the harbour; that the "Hellas" would be free to enter or not, as she chose, but that the "Enosis" would have to remain outside the harbour till such time as a boat, sent by the "Hellas" or the "Enosis" for the purpose into the harbour, where Admiral Hobart did not intend to go, should return, with a written engagement from the local authorities there, that they will take charge of the "Enosis," and keep her there till such time as she would be tried later on the charge of piracy. Otherwise, if Admiral Hobart allowed the "Enosis" at once to enter into the harbour, he (the Admiral) might wait in vain for the document, as he has hitherto done here; his sole and immediate object at present being to ensure the non-escape of the "Enosis," which he was most effectually doing, and intended to do here at present. The Nomarch seemed to seize upon this condition to inveigh against what he called the exorbitant pretensions of Admiral Hobart, and said it was impossible to comply with them; that the "Hellas" could not abandon the charge of the "Enosis," nor consent even to be accompanied by the Ottoman fleet, still less to be detained outside the Piræus, or even endure the semblance of being under the constraint of Turkish vessels. I replied that the conditions mentioned nothing of the Turkish fleet, to which, as to the "Hellas," the sea was open; and that nobody here could pretend to dictate to Admiral Hobart when he might go to the Piræus; that when I first saw Admiral Hobart, the eve before, he seemed inclined to consent to the departure of the "Enosis" for the Piræus, under escort of the "Hellas," but that this morning, after consultation with his Turkish officers, I found him under the influence of very different sentiments. That I had laboured hard with arguments to persuade him to consent, and that I had succeeded in reducing his conditions to a minimum; that I could not go again to him for the purpose of trying to reduce them still further, though I would willingly accompany Captain Meyer for the purpose, if the latter thought he had any chance of success. All, except the Nomarch, agreed that, however hard for the captain of "Hellas," Admiral Hobart had right and reason under actual circumstances on his side in the conditions (to say nothing of might), his vessels having been all round the very entrance of the harbour ever since last night, and three now at the time inside, and exactly opposite "Enosis" and "Crete." The Nomarch then said he would rather send away the "Hellas," as he was sure the Captain of "Hellas" would not consent, nor could he (the Nomarch) put him in such a position, and that he would at once go to see the captain of the "Hellas."

I then returned home, and shortly after the Nomarch came and said he had given orders to "Hellas" to leave at once. I then said I would go and report the fact to

Admiral Hobart, and went on board for the purpose, accompanied by Captain Meyer and Captain Stephenson.

Admiral Hobart was delighted—the "Hellas" steaming out at the time just under his stern—and immediately applied to Captain Meyer and to Captain Stephenson to take charge, and escort to Piræus, the "Enosis" (as per inclosed), and required meantime a guarantee that "Enosis" would not leave the port. They, of course, could not undertake to do this without the request, or at least consent, of the Nomarch; and we all returned to the Nomarch, when it was arranged that the latter should have communication of the new proposal of Captain Hobart. That the Nomarch should consult with the owners of "Enosis," and then give his reply. Meantime he gave me the guarantee required (annexed in copy), which I took at once to Admiral Hobart, and it was 10 P.M. when I returned to my house.

This morning at half-past 8, I received a visit from Captain Meyer and the French Consul, who said the latter had late last night received a complaint and protest (copy and translation annexed) from the Nomarch against the presence in the harbour during the night of Turkish boats, which refused to reply to the challenge of the sentry of Guarda Costa; and this too while the negotiations for taking "Enosis" to Piræus were pending, and although he had guaranteed to me the stay of "Enosis" in harbour for three days. We all went to the Nomarch to learn the real meaning of this note, which looked like an endeavour to break the present tranquil state of affairs, and the complaint about boats in harbour, whilst there was a fleet in and off the entrance was absurd and ill-timed. The Nomarch exclaimed loudly against the illegality of Admiral Hobart's proceedings; declared his right to protest, but denied that he wished to prevent a pacific solution of difficulty by departure of "Enosis" under escort of "Forbin" and "Wall," and insisted on the right of armed men being as they were still on board "Enosis" and "Crete." (Inclosed is letter of Captain Stephenson to the Nomarch relative to the projected departure of "Enosis" to Piræus.) Captain Meyer has, I believe, received a similar one, and so matters remain at this time (2 P.M.), the Greeks choosing now to exercise the National Guard, which they are doing at this minute.

4 P.M.—I have just returned from the "Forbin" where I was requested to go, and there learnt that the Nomarch had informed Captain Meyer that the former must consult the owners of the "Enosis" and will reply this evening; that, consequently, Captain Meyer could not undertake to start so early as to-morrow morning; further, that Captain Meyer could not undertake to keep "Enosis" in Piræus till Admiral Hobart's arrival, as, though free here, he would there be under the orders of the French Admiral; and that he had informed Admiral Hobart of this, who is sending immediately letters to the French Admiral asking his approval of Admiral Hobart's proposal.

I went to the Nomarch and told him of the delay in "Forbin's" departure with "Enosis." He said he had just finished his reply to Captain Meyer. It is to the effect that under protest against *force majeure*, he accepts the proposal and conditions of Admiral Hobart; only stipulates that "Enosis" be not detained till Admiral Hobart's arrival, but be handed to local authorities. This will be communicated to Admiral Hobart, who will, I expect, require a receipt and obligation from local authorities in Piræus to detain "Enosis" there until such time as she be tried, and so more time will be lost, unless, indeed, the French Admiral should not approve of Captain Meyer's taking sole or joint charge at all of "Enosis."

7 P.M.—I have just received the inclosed formal protest from the Nomarch against Admiral Hobart's proceedings, and asking for Consular protection against the apprehended destruction of the "Enosis," and against the alleged violation of the laws of the country, and I am requested to go at 8 o'clock to the French Consulate, there to meet the other Consuls.

A.M., 23rd December.—The meeting was called by the Austrian Consul to consider the Nomarch's proposal of Consul's giving protection to "Enosis." The Russian Consul approved of the project, as did the Austrian Consul. I decidedly objected, and considered the document a subterfuge to gain time; the negotiations for taking "Enosis" to Piræus under French and Austrian protection being still pending. The French Commandant and French Consul were of my opinion. After separating I went to the Nomarch, and have just left him. I confess I have little hope of avoiding the extremes menaced by Admiral Hobart as I can [?] so little real assistance from the Nomarch, who still says he is without instructions, and confesses he is afraid of not acting as they would desire, his condition of "Enosis" being delivered direct to the local authorities without further obligation, and not to be detained till Admiral Hobart's arrival being, he says, *a sine qua non*, to his consent to "Enosis" being entrusted to "Forbin" and "Wall," and as Admiral Hobart will not consent to that without the assurance of her being arrested and tried, I see no prospect of "Enosis" going at all to Piræus; and we are just where we were, except that

Admiral Hobart is fast losing patience, urged on as he must be by his Turkish officers. To-morrow, however, I will probably see Admiral Hobart, and try to devise some other plan for avoiding a catastrophe.

Inclosure 2 in No. 175c.

Vice-Admiral Hobart Pasha to Capitaine de Meyer.

"*Hudavendikiar*," *ce* 21 *Décembre*, 1868.

M. le Commandant,

EN réponse à votre lettre de ce matin j'ai l'honneur de vous informer que je ne m'oppose pas à ce que "l'Enosis" quitte ce port pour le Pirée, escorté par le "Hellas," aux conditions suivantes:—

1. Que "l'Enosis" soit immédiatement désarmé sous tous les rapports.

2. Que le départ ait lieu le matin en plein jour, afin de pouvoir arriver avant la nuit au Pirée.

3. Que l'équipage de "l'Enosis" soit limité au nombre d'hommes essentiellement requis pour conduire le navire.

4. Que le Capitaine de la frégate "Hellas" s'engage par écrit d'escorter "l'Enosis" jusqu'au Pirée pour que ce steamer y soit jugé sur le chef d'accusation d'un acte de piraterie.

Si ces termes sont acceptés, "l'Enosis" doit quitter le port de Syra demain matin, le Capitaine de "l'Hellas" me notifiant deux heures d'avance son départ en me transmettant les documents demandés, et en s'engageant que "l'Enosis" ira directement au Pirée et ne se séparera pas de "l'Hellas."

Il est bien entendu que si les conditions ci-dessus ne sont pas acceptées et remplies, je me trouve dans la dure nécessité de donner suite à mes premières intentions de procéder à des extrêmes.

Tout en vous remerçiant cordialement pour les peines que vous vous êtes données dans cette malheureuse affaire, je vous prie de vouloir bien agréer, &c.

(Signé) AUGUSTUS HOBART.

Inclosure 3 in No. 175c.

Vice-Admiral Hobart Pasha to Capitaine de Meyer.

"*Hudavendikiar*," *ce* 21 *Décembre*, 1868.

Monsieur,

UN vapeur nommé "l'Enosis" s'étant réfugié dans le port après avoir commis un acte de piraterie en faisant feu sur la frégate battant mon guidon, je l'ai suivi en réclamant aux autorités locales sa mise en arrestation ou bien sa livraison.

Les autorités se déclarèrent incompétentes d'agir, et exprimèrent le désir d'en référer à Athènes. J'ai vainement attendu huit jours pour une réponse. Mes instructions m'ordonnent de procéder à l'arrestation de ce navire, ce que je crains amènerait des complications sérieuses à la suite des relations critiques qui existent entre la Turquie et la Grèce. Or, en votre qualité de Représentant exécutif d'une des Puissances Protectrices de la Grèce et de la Turquie, je viens vous prier, pour éviter des conséquences qui pourraient être fatales au renouement des relations amicales entre les deux pays, de vouloir bien vous charger de cet ennemi commun au monde maritime, et de conduire "l'Enosis" au Pirée et l'y retenir jusqu'à mon arrivée, qui ne se fera pas attendre.

Je saisis, &c.

(Signé) AUGUSTUS HOBART.

Inclosure 4 in No. 175c.

M. Dracopoulo to Consul Lloyd.

(Translation.)

Syra, December $\frac{9}{21}$, 1868.

Sir,

IN reply to your question, I can assure you that the "Enosis" will not leave this harbour for the next three days, at least, without your knowledge and consent.

I have, &c

(Signed) G. P. DRACOPOULO, *Nomarch.*

Inclosure 5 in No. 175c.

M. Dracopoulo to the French Consul at Syra.

(Translation.)

Syra, December $\frac{8}{20}$, 1868.

Mr. Consul of France,

I AM informed this moment that boats of the Ottoman fleet are cruizing in the harbour, and that they do not answer to the challenge of the Royal coast-guard vessel.

Against this illicit act of the Ottoman fleet, of which acts I have before complained to you, Mr. Consul, I am obliged to protest, seeing its continuation, especially after my assurance that the "Enosis" will not leave, and the negotiations still pending. Reserving the official form of this my protest, receive, &c.

The Nomarch of Cyclades,

(Signed) G. DRACOPOULO.

Inclosure 6 in No. 175c.

Captain Stephenson to M. Dracopoulos.

Syra, le 22 *Décembre*, 1868.

Monsieur,

J'AI eu l'honneur de vous donner hier communication de la lettre que m'a adressé son Excellence Hobart Pacha, Commandant-en-chef la flotte Ottomane. Je lui ai répondu que pour éviter un acte d'hostilité tel que l'enlèvement de "l'Enosis" dans le port de Syra, je consentirais, malgré mon manque d'instructions à cet égard, à prendre sous ma garde "l'Enosis" pour la conduire au Pirée. L'Amiral a demandé que l'avviso de Sa Majesté le "Forbin" fut adjoint au "Wall" pour ce voyage. Je désirais savoir si vous consentez à la proposition de l'Amiral Hobart, et dans le cas de votre acceptation après en être concerté avec le Capitaine Meyer, nous désirons que les conditions suivantes fussent réglées pour la sûreté de la mission toute pacifique que nous aurons à accomplir:—

1. L'Enosis ne conservera à bord ni armes ni munitions de guerre quelconques.

2. Le bâtiment n'aura pour faire le voyage de Syra au Pirée que l'équipage absolument indispensable pour chauffer la moitié des chaudrières et manœuvrer le gouvernail.

3. Les chaudrières qui ne seront pas allumées devront être mises provisoirement hors de service.

4. Une garde composée de matelots Autrichiens et Français avec un officier de chaque nation sera installée à bord pour le voyage.

5. Le capitaine devra s'entendre avec les commandants du "Forbin" et du "Wall" pour l'exécution des mesures ci-dessus, afin que les trois bâtiments puissent faire route demain matin à six heures pour le Pirée.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) M. F. STEPHENSON.

Inclosure 7 in No. 175c.

M. Dracopoulo to the Consuls of the friendly Powers at Syra, and to the Commanders of the French and Austrian vessels of war.

(Translation.)

Syra, December $\frac{13}{25}$, 1868.

I INCLOSE herewith copy of a protest, which I was last night obliged to address to the French Consul at this place, against the breach of international law and of the laws of this kingdom, committed by the Ottoman fleet. I consider it desirous to make a brief statement of what has taken place for some days past.

When, about ten days ago, the Greek steamer "Enosis" was seen steering towards this port, pursued and fired at by two Ottoman ships at a short distance from the harbour, which ships afterwards anchored in the harbour, you, MM. les Consuls, at my request, met and heard my statement as regards the illegal step of the Ottoman ships, and my protest against this highly inimical act, and this whilst Greece was still in friendly relations with Turkey.

Present at this interview was the Ottoman Consul-General, who expressed to me his surprise in respect to this act of the Ottoman vessels, and went to call upon their superior officer.

Meanwhile, the Commander of the Austrian ship "Wall," on this station, having

joined us, he communicated to me, in your presence, on the part of the Turkish Vice-Admiral, that he, the Admiral, demanded the arrest and prosecution of the "Enosis," which he considered as being a piratical vessel, as otherwise he would commence hostilities.

Then the British Consul, at your request as well as mine, went on board the flag-ship to ask the Turkish Admiral to make his demands in writing.

On his return, he transmitted to me the document which was brought to your knowledge, and to which I answered immediately, that I could not decide previous to receiving instructions from the Government of my Sovereign.

Then the Admiral replied, and thanked me for my promptness in answering him, stating that he had no hostile intentions against the town, and that his sole view was to impede the escape of the "Enosis."

Nevertheless, without necessity, the two Ottoman vessels were gradually reinforced by eight other vessels, amongst which there are iron-clads and two-deckers.

You can well understand, Gentlemen, that the presence of such a colossal naval force in a state of war, against an ungarrisoned and unarmed commercial town, was naturally considered as a hostile demonstration, disturbed the mind of the inhabitants, and has brought on a commercial stagnation, to the great loss of private interest, with which are bound up and endangered many serious European interests.

I have not been able to accept the proposal made to me, to send the "Enosis" to the Piræus in company with the "Hellas," as I could not accept the condition which obliged the authorities of the Piræus to give a receipt to the Vice-Admiral on the arrival of the "Enosis" there, which showed me his decision to follow the "Hellas" to the Piræus with his fleet, though I had agreed that such a receipt should be given by the Commander of the "Hellas."

Having often heard repeated by some of you that the presence here of the "Hellas" made the state of things more critical, and to prove to you my desire to avoid a conflict which would inevitably make matters worse, I decided to take upon myself the responsibility of sending the "Hellas" to the Piræus, which I have done.

About two days ago the Turkish Vice-Admiral, addressing himself to the Commander of the "Forbin," demanded either the surrender of the "Enosis," her arrest or destruction, or that she should be deprived of the power of doing injury; otherwise, he threatens to use coercive measures. To remove this new difficulty, I advised the Steam Navigation Company to disarm the steamer in question, though by law it has the right to be armed, a right which all the vessels of the Company have. This measure has also been executed.

After the disarmament of the "Enosis" and the departure of the "Hellas," the Turkish Vice-Admiral demanded that the "Enosis" be sent to the Piræus, accompanied by the French and Austrian vessels, this was communicated to me verbally by the Commanders (of these vessels) yesterday evening. I replied that if this is laid down as a condition, without which hostilities will not take place, and with the desire of again avoiding the consequences, I would agree to their accompanying the "Enosis" to the Piræus.

To-day was communicated to me by the Commanders of the French and Austrian vessels, a letter addressed to them yesterday by the Turkish Admiral, in which he proposes that the said Commanders should accompany the "Enosis" to the Piræus, and keep her until the Vice-Admiral arrives there, the "Enosis" being considered as a common enemy to navigation; a copy of the said document was sent to me, with a view to my complying with this measure, and to my accepting certain conditions which the Commanders proposed for the safe transport of the said ship.

I replied to them, that, since they believed that unless the "Enosis" be sent to the Piræus, force would be certainly used, I agreed to the measure proposed, and also to the conditions added by the Commanders on the formal condition that the said vessel be given up to the Greek authorities at the Piræus immediately on her arrival, a[illegible]bout this I should be consenting to the illegal withdrawal of a Greek vessel from the jurisdiction of the competent authorities, and from the laws which govern the Kingdom.

Being unaware whether the Turkish Vice-Admiral will be convinced by the reason and legality of my observation, what will be the measures to be taken in the event of their rejection? And as I cannot under any consideration infringe the laws of the Kingdom, or be a party to their being infringed, I address myself to you, MM. les Consuls and MM. les Commandants, and lying before you the facts, I request your intervention, as the Representatives of friendly Powers and of civilized nations, in favour of the menaced private wealth, and the respect for the laws of the State and placing in your hands the protection of the ship in question. I am certain you will act so as to avoid the necessity of force being employed, and the consequences which might result therefrom.

Meanwhile, protesting against the presence of the Ottoman vessels in this Hellenic harbour, after relations have been broken, and without a declaration of war, especially after demanding and obtaining assurances of the departure of the "Enosis," and after the measures taken up by me, which I have mentioned here above, confident in your judgment and impartiality, and in your corresponding activity.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) G. P. DRACOPOULOS.

Inclosure 8 in No. 175 c.

M. Stavros to Mr. Erskine.

Athènes, le $\frac{12}{24}$ *Décembre*, 1868.

M. le Ministre,

LE Gouvernement Hellénique est en instance auprès de la Banque pour obtenir un prêt considérable et dont la réalisation menace de compromettre son crédit et son existence même. Nous apprenons de l'autre côté qu'on s'occupe de la réduction d'actes en vertu desquels on emploierait, en cas de refus, la violence, pour s'emparer du numéraire existant dans les caisses de la Banque.

Dans de telles circonstances la Direction de la Banque croit de son devoir de mettre sous les yeux de votre Excellence les suites désastreuses que de pareilles mesures peuvent avoir contre les intérêts des sujets des Puissances étrangères. Beaucoup de sujets étrangers sont actionnaires de la Banque. Tous les étrangers résidant en Grèce sont détenteurs de ses billets et il y en a qui possèdent des obligations pour des dépôts fait à la Banque. Plusieurs des principaux banquiers de Londres, de Paris, et même de St. Pétersbourg sont en compte courant avec la Banque. Notre commerce, que la Banque alimente, est débiteur de sommes importantes à l'étranger et notamment à Londres, à Marseilles, et à Odessa. Or, toute violence exercée contre la Banque pour lui enlever, sans son consentement, n'importe à quel titre, son numéraire, est une atteinte directe à tous les intérêts étrangers que je viens d'énumérer.

La Banque est en même temps dépositaire, en vertu de l'entente entre le Gouvernement et les trois Puissances, des sommes affectées au paiement annuel pour compte de l'emprunt des 60,000,000 et provenant des recettes des douanes. Dans la prévision de ce péril imminent dont la Banque est menacée, et pour mettre à couvert sa responsabilité vis-à-vis des intérêts étrangers, j'ose adresser la présente à votre Excellence afin que, d'accord avec ses collègues de France et de Russie, elle avise aux moyens de sauvegarder les intérêts par une efficace protection, qui dans d'autres circonstances périlleuses ne leur a pas fait défaut.

Veuillez, &c.
Le Gouverneur,
(Signé) G. STAVROS.

Inclosure 9 in No. 175 c.

Mr. Erskine to M. Delyanni.

Athènes, le 24 *Décembre*, 1868.

M. le Ministre,

M. le Gouverneur de la Banque Nationale de Grèce a appelé mon attention sur des démarches faites auprès du Conseil de cet établissement et qui seraient de nature à altérer gravement les conditions de son existence.

Vous n'ignorez pas, M. le Ministre, que la Banque Nationale a pour actionnaires un grand nombre de sujets étrangers, et qu'elle est l'intermédiaire le plus accrédité du commerce de la Grèce avec les principales maisons d'Angleterre.

En outre la Banque Nationale reçoit, en vertu d'une entente entre la Grande Bretagne, la France, et la Russie, les sommes affectées au payement annuel pour compte de l'emprunt de 60,000,000 provenant des recettes des douanes Helléniques.

A ces différents titres, M. le Ministre, je crois devoir signaler au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Hellénique la gravité qu'aurait toute mesure susceptible d'altérer, par acte du Gouvernement, les bases de la Constitution de la Banque, et faire les réserves en faveur des droits des actionnaires et des créanciers Anglais.

Intéressées par leur bienveillance particulière envers la Grèce et par leur situation spéciale de garantes de l'emprunt de 1832 et des créanciers du Gouvernement Hellénique à tout ce qui touche à la prospérité du Royaume, les trois Puissances ne sauraient voir sans

regret adopter des mesures qui, en atteignant le principal établissement financière du pays, porteraient infailliblement atteinte à son crédit général.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) E. M. ERSKINE.

No. 176.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 2.)

(No. 4.) *Paris, January 1, 1869.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of two telegrams dated yesterday, and addressed to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

One is from the French Minister at Athens announcing that Hobart Pasha had lodged with the Procureur du Roi his charge against the "Enosis," and that the French Consul at Canea reported that the volunteers and insurgents in Crete had surrendered *en masse*.

The other, which is from the French Ambassador at Constantinople, states that instructions were to be sent to-day to the Turkish Ambassador at Paris to take part in the Conference.

These telegrams were brought to me this morning, on behalf of the Marquis de Lavalette, by his Chef de Cabinet, the Vicomte de St. Ferriol. On learning from M. de St. Ferriol that, this being new year's day, it would be inconvenient to M. de Lavalette to receive a visit on business, I authorized him to tell his Excellency that, on the distinct understanding that the discussions in the Conference should be limited in the manner which had been agreed upon, Her Majesty's Government consented to take part in it. I begged him to mention, also, that I had received from Her Majesty's Government a very positive statement of objections which they entertained to any notion of using coercive measures to enforce the recommendations of the Conference. I added that I would wait upon M. de Lavalette early to-morrow morning and make him fully acquainted with the instructions I had received.

I have received this afternoon an unofficial note from M. de Lavalette, informing me that he intends to send to-morrow by telegraph to the Powers parties to the Treaty of Paris of 1856 a proposal that the Conference shall assemble on the 7th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 176.

Baron Baude to M. de Lavalette.

(Télégraphique.) *Athènes, le 31 Décembre, 1868.*

HOBART PACHA a déposé sa plainte contre "l'Enosis" le 29 Décembre entre les mains du Procureur du Roi. Le Consul de la Canée m'annonce en même temps que les volontaires et les insurgés ont capitulé en masse. Des bâtiments Turcs les amènent à Syra. Cet événement met fin aux hostilités, et il n'existe plus aucune force insurrectionnelle sérieuse en Crète.

Inclosure 2 in No. 176.

Baron Baude to M. de Lavalette.

Pera, le 31 Décembre, 1868.

(Télégraphique.)

AALI PACHA m'annonce, après avoir pris les ordres du Sultan, que Djemil Pacha recevra demain par le télégraphe, l'autorisation de prendre part à la Conférence dans les conditions indiquées par votre télégramme.

No. 177.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *Pera, January 2, 1868.*

I BELIEVE that there is no ground whatever for supposing the Austrian Ambassador to have suggested the adoption of strong measures towards Greece.

General Ignatieff maintains it to be so, but he had previously said the same thing of the French Ambassador, and, I am told, of myself also.

No. 178.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *Athens, January 2, 1869.*

EIGHT hundred and sixty four volunteers captured in Crete, under the elder Petropoulaki, have arrived at Syra in a Turkish frigate; the greater portion of them returned yesterday to Laconia, where they had been raised, in a Greek ship-of-war.

No. 179.

Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 3.)

Londres, le 2 Janvier, 1869.

M. le Comte,

LE Cabinet de Berlin, se référant au Protocole du 14 Avril, 1856, a, comme le sait votre Excellence, proposé que les Puissances signataires du Traité de Paris fussent appelées à se réunir en Conférence pour rechercher les moyens d'apaiser le différend qui s'est élevé entre la Turquie et la Grèce. La France a adhéré à cette proposition et l'a immédiatement recommandée à l'assentiment de toutes les Cours, en convenant avec elles que la délibération aurait pour but unique et précis, d'examiner dans quelle mesure il y a lieu de faire droit aux réclamations formulées dans l'ultimatum de la Porte. D'accord, également, avec les Puissances, pour qu'un Représentant de la Grèce soit admis au sein de la Conférence, à titre consultatif, le Gouvernement de l'Empereur pense qu'il importe de procéder, sans retard, à la convocation des Plénipotentiaires, et je suis, en conséquence, chargé de demander à votre Excellence de vouloir bien, en raison de l'urgence, faire parvenir, sans retard, à l'Ambassadeur de la Reine, les pleins-pouvoirs qui lui sont nécessaires. Si rien ne s'y oppose, la réunion aurait lieu le 9 Janvier.

En réclamant de l'obligeance de votre Excellence une réponse aussi prompte que possible, je profite, &c.

(Signé) PCE. DE LA TOUR D'AUVERGNE.

No. 180.

Safvet Pasha to Musurus Pasha.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Musurus Pasha, January 4, 1869.)

Le 23 Décembre, 1868.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

POUR faire suite à mes communications précédentes, je vous transmets, ci-joint, copie des différents rapports que Photiades Bey nous a adressées la veille de la rupture des relations diplomatiques et commerciales entre la Turquie et la Grèce.

La lecture de ces pièces vous fera comprendre jusqu'où le Gouvernement Hellénique a poussé son hostilité à notre égard.

En vous autorisant à faire de ces rapports tel usage que vous jugerez convenable, je saisis, &c.

(Signé) SAFVET.

Inclosure 1 in No. 180.

Photiades Bey to Safvet Pasha.

Athènes, le 25 Novembre, 1868.

Excellence,

POUR faire suite à mon télégramme du 21 de ce mois, par lequel, en revenant sur l'ardeur ouvertement déployée ici dans la poursuite des recrutements de volontaires et des préparatifs extraordinaires pour le ravitaillement de l'insurrection de Crète, je priais votre Excellence de vouloir bien me tracer les limites d'une démarche énergique à tenter auprès du Gouvernement Hellénique en raison de sa connivance évidente, je m'empresse de lui soumettre plus en détail les informations que j'ai eu occasion de recueillir et qui ont motivé mon télégramme précité.

Pétropoulaki, dont j'ai fait mention dans mon rapport, non content d'avoir enrôlé dans la capitale même très ouvertement des volontaires, comme pour donner plus d'ostentation à son équipée, passa en voiture devant la Légation Impériale le jour de son départ pour Gythiau; son homme, assis à côté du cocher, portant déployé, de l'aveu de témoins oculaires, le drapeau de sa bande.

Le bateau corsaire "l'Enosis," qui était venu du Pirée pour embarquer des munitions de guerre, fut chargé par le Comité avec de l'argent fourni par le Gouvernement Hellénique à cet effet.

Sur ce même clipper ont été embarquées deux pièces de montagne provenant de l'arsenal du Gouvernement à Nauplie, et cinquante artilleurs avec leurs sous-officiers destinés à desservir ces canons, ont été adjoints à la bande de Pétropoulaki sous prétexte de congé.

Aussi d'autres pièces de gros calibre pour armer en guerre le corsaire la "Crète" sont sorties du même arsenal et ont été transportées dans ce but à Syra.

Tous les militaires détenus dans la forteresse de Nauplie seront mis également à la disposition de ce chef de bande.

Afin de régulariser la comptabilité de la bande, des commissaires de l'armée Hellénique y seront adjoints, en vertu toujours d'un congé déguisé.

Selon mes renseignements la bande dont il s'agit, composée de 1,000 hommes environ, doit se rallier à Cérigo, d'où les trois clippers "l'Enosis," la "Crète," et le "Panhellénion," la transporteront sur la côte de Sphakia. Je n'ai pas manqué d'en faire part à votre Excellence par mon télégramme, afin de faire attirer la vigilance de nos croiseurs de ce côté-là.

Tout cela s'est passé et se passe au grand jour et en dépit de mes représentations itératives à MM. Bulgaris et Delyanni, et de leurs déclarations formelles tendant à repousser toute connivence avec les Comités qui agiraient indépendamment du Gouvernement, lequel n'aurait à son tour aucune espèce d'action sur eux pour empêcher leurs menées.

Les faits qui précèdent étant du domaine de notoriété publique ne laissent pas que de justifier une démarche énergique de la part de la Légation Impériale; mais pour qu'elle promette un effet quelconque il faut qu'elle sorte des formes jusqu'à présent employées et dont la stérilité a été suffisamment démontrée par l'expérience du passé.

J'ose par conséquent émettre l'opinion qu'elle devrait contenir la menace d'une rupture immédiate des relations entre les deux Etats, et, au besoin, être suivie de près des conséquences que cette menace comporte. Toute autre démarche n'aboutirait qu'à un échange de notes roulant dans le cercle vicieux de vaines récriminations.

Mes collègues d'Angleterre et de France, à qui j'ai fait part et des faits qui précèdent et des considérations qu'ils m'inspirent, se sont associés à ma manière de voir et ont télégraphié en conséquence à leurs Gouvernements respectifs.

Je dois ajouter que le revirement de politique du Gouvernement Hellénique a été provoqué d'une part par le retour dans la capitale de M. Coumoundouros, qui, s'étant mis à la tête de l'Opposition, a repris avec plus de violence ses attaques contre le Gouvernement en l'accusant hautement de trahir la cause Crétoise pour complaire à la Turquie, et par les encouragements, de l'autre, venus de dehors. D'après mes informations, des avis reçus des Principautés Danubiennes, de Servie, et des provinces Slaves de l'Empire, y ont aussi beaucoup contribué.

Je ne parle pas des folles espérances dont on se berce ici, soit à cause du changement prochain du Cabinet Britannique et de la probabilité de l'entrée au pouvoir de MM. Gladstone et Bright, soit par suite de la nomination de M. Grant à la Présidence des Etats Unis d'Amérique. Toutefois, il est positif que, depuis quelques jours, tout a changé d'aspect, Gouvernement et Comités étant confondus dans la même direction d'idées et d'action.

J'ai, &c.

(Signé) PHOTIADES.

P.S.—J'apprends à l'instant que le Colonel Scaltraz, Commandant des Colonnes préposées à la garde de la frontière, a été appelé à Athènes pour être placé à la tête des volontaires destinés à se rendre en Crète.

P.

Inclosure 2 in No. 180.

Photiades Bey to Safvet Pasha.

Le 9 Décembre, 1868.

(Extrait.)

AFIN de ne pas laisser ignorer à votre Excellence la tendance de l'esprit public dans le pays, je dois la prévenir que la rupture, tout en étant désirée par ceux qui n'ont rien à perdre ou qui espèrent gagner dans une aventure, épouvante les hommes bien pensants et qui ont quelque chose à risquer. Comme les premiers l'emportent sur les derniers, on pourrait dire que l'opinion publique s'est prononcée pour la rupture.

L'espoir qu'une grande partie des négociants Grecs établis en Turquie seraient obligés de rentrer en Grèce avec leurs capitaux sourit aux adeptes de la grande idée, qui se flattent de croire qu'ils pourraient profiter de ces capitaux pour mettre à exécution leurs projets aventureux du côté de l'Epire et de la Thessalie.

Inclosure 3 in No. 180.

Photiades Bey to Safvet Pasha.

Athènes, le 9 Décembre, 1868.

Excellence,

EN me référant à mes Rapports en date du 2 Decembre, j'ai l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que les Délegués Crétois envoyés sur un voilier à Egine en vue d'y recueillir leurs familles, et de les ramener au Pirée pour être repatriées par le bateau Français la "Ville de Marseille," nolisé par le Gouvernement Impérial, n'ont pas communiqué avec leurs parents se trouvant en cette île, et en sont retournés après y avoir été l'objet d'une cruelle agression. Un de ces Délégués ayant débarqué a été assailli et maltraité, et a dû se jeter dans la mer pour échapper à ses persécuteurs; un autre d'entre eux ayant également débarqué, n'a plus reparu et on ne sait encore ce qu'il est devenu.

J'ai l'honneur de soumettre, ci-joint, à votre Excellence copie de la note que j'ai adressée en cette occasion à M. Delyanni.

Le 3 de ce mois j'ai repatrié par la "Ville de Marseille" 200 émigrés, tous embarqués en Pirée. A son retour de la Canée le susdit bateau, ayant à bord les Délégues Crétois, a touché à Egine, qui se trouvait sur sa route; mais cette nouvelle tentative, essayée sur les instances de son Excellence Hussein Pacha d'activer par tous les moyens le repatriement, n'a eu aucun succès, les Délégués n'ayant pu cette fois non plus communiquer avec leurs familles, nonobstant l'envoi récent en cette île du Nomarque de l'Attique avec la mission de prendre des mesures efficaces pour la protection des émigrés qui voudraient rentrer dans leur pays.

J'ai l'espoir de repatrier demain près de 250 Cretois qui se sont déjà inscrits pour être transportés dans leur pays.

En exécution des ordres contenus dans la dépêche télégraphique de votre Excellence datée du 1 Décembre et reçue le 4 du même mois, je me bornerai dorénavant à faire partir les familles Crétoises des échelles seules du Pirée et de Cérigo.

J'ai, &c.

(Signé) PHOTIADES.

Inclosure 4 in No. 180.

Photiades Bey to M. Delyanni.

Le [illegible], 1868.

M. le Ministre,

LA scène déplorable qui vient de se reproduire à Egine à l'égard des Crétois rendus dans cette île pour recueillir leurs familles, par suite d'une entente établie à cet effet entre le Gouvernement du Roi et la Légation Impériale, m'impose le devoir d'attirer votre attention sérieuse sur la gravité des incidents qui s'y rattachent.

En effet, je ne me suis décidé à envoyer à Egine les vingt Crétois désireux d'y

recueillir leurs familles afin de les ramener chez eux, que sur la promesse préalable du Gouvernement du Roi d'aviser aux moyens propres à garantir leur libre circulation dans cette île et à les préserver de l'agression dont ils étaient menacés de la part d'une bande de Sphakiotes organisés à cet effet, selon les informations que je me suis empressé de vous communiquer en temps opportun.

D'après les dépositions de ces gens revenus depuis peu au Pirée, mes appréhensions ont été malheureusement confirmées. Non-seulement il leur a été défendu de communiquer avec leurs familles, mais, assaillis par la bande mentionnée plus haut, leur vie a été exposée au plus grand péril. L'un d'eux, le nommé Antoine Sérétaki, serait massacré, aussitôt sa descente à terre, s'il ne se jetait pas à la mer pour regagner le voilier qui l'avait conduit; son compagnon, le nommé Draconicoli, a disparu, et son sort ne peut qu'inspirer de vives inquiétudes.

Vous conviendrez, M. le Ministre, que ces faits déplorables, ajoutés à tant d'autres, ne laissent pas que de faire peser une grande responsabilité sur le Gouvernement Hellénique, les engagements mêmes qu'il prend à l'égard des Crétois désireux de se rapatrier devenant non-seulement illusoires, mais tournant, pour la plupart, au préjudice de ces malheureux.

En vous priant de prendre acte de ma présente communication, je saisis, &c.

(Signé) PHOTIADES.

Inclosure 5 in No. 180.

Photiadès Bey to Safvet Pasha.

Athènes, le 9 Décembre, 1868.

Excellence,

J'AI l'honneur de transmettre à votre Excellence, ci-joint, copie de la note que j'ai adressée à M. Delyanni à l'occasion de l'attentat dont le commis de notre Consul-Général à Syra a été dernièrement l'objet.

J'ai, &c.

(Signed) PHOTIADES.

Inclosure 6 in No. 180.

Photiades Bey to M. Delyanni.

Le $\frac{22 \text{ Novembre}}{4 \text{ Décembre}}$ 1868.

M. le Ministre,

LE Consul-Général de la Sublime Porte à Syra m'a annoncé que son premier commis, M. Xantaki, a été attaqué ces derniers jours par des Crétois armés de bâtons, et qu'il reçut des coups qui lui causèrent de graves blessures. M. le Préfet a vu la victime de l'attentat et constaté de ses propres yeux son état.

D'après mes récentes informations les auteurs de cette odieuse agression, commise en plein jour contre un employé du Consulat-Général Ottoman, n'ont pas encore été arrêtés.

En signalant à votre sérieuse attention ce déplorable incident, je saisis, &c.

(Signed) PHOTIADES.

No. 181.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 4, 1869.)

(No. 310.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December* 28, 1868.

I HAD the honour to receive yesterday evening your Lordship's despatches by the messenger Bigge, and I called upon Prince Gortchakoff to-day, to have some further conversation with his Excellency respecting the differences which have arisen between Turkey and Greece. His Excellency said that instructions had been sent to the Russian Ambassador at Paris to accept the programme of Her Majesty's Government for the deliberations of the Conference to be held on the subject, and he hoped that there would be no difficulty in arriving at an understanding as to the advice which should be given at Constantinople and Athens, with a view to the preservation of peace. I answered that while I felt equal confidence with his Excellency in a satisfactory settlement of the question I thought it important towards the attainment of that object, that he should be made fully acquainted with the language which you had held to Baron Brunnow, previously to accepting the proposal for a Conference, and I quoted to him from your Lordship's

despatch of the 18th instant, the paragraphs in which you inform me that you had stated to the Russian Ambassador on that day, that Her Majesty's Government were most anxious to take no step in the matter except in conjunction with Russia, and that there was no wish to bear harshly on Greece, or to leave out of consideration the strong national feelings which had prompted her late proceedings, but you hoped, though the Russian Government might not sympathize with the Turks, that as a want of sympathy does not imply a want of justice, if the provocations offered to Turkey were fairly considered, Russia would join in giving such advice to Greece as it would be manifestly her interest to adopt.

Prince Gortchakoff said he did not deny that he preferred the Greeks to the Turks, and the Royal Family at Athens to the Sultan; but that he would be found, notwithstanding, entirely impartial in considering what concessions the King of Greece could make to the Porte. For instance, he said, he was of opinion that the Greek Government should engage to prevent the organisation of armed bands in Greek territory; to cause an inquiry to be made into the complaint of alleged violence against subjects of the Porte; and to give due protection to refugees wishing to leave the country; but, on the other hand, it would be necessary to consider whether the King had not been obliged by the Greek Constitution to decline the demand made upon him with respect to armed blockade-runners, and to inquire how far it might be possible to satisfy the Porte upon this subject with regard to the future.

I then read to him an extract from your Lordship's despatch of the 19th instant, in which you report that you had stated to Baron Brunnow on that day that Her Majesty's Government had no wish, as they had no such intention themselves, that the Emperor should take part against the Greeks; but that, as His Imperial Majesty was known to be eminently just, you felt assured that if he would fairly weigh the evidence respecting the acts committed by the Greeks, and the amount of satisfaction demanded by the Porte, there would be no disagreement with Her Majesty's Government as to the advice that should be given both at Constantinople and at Athens. I also touched upon your Lordship's fears as to the inconveniences which might arise if the Conference were to discuss any question beyond that of the re-establishment of friendly relations between Turkey and Greece, and his Excellency assured me that he entirely concurred in your Lordship's opinion on that point.

Without being aware of the views of Her Majesty's Government, I felt that it would be inexpedient for me to invite any explanations as to the manner in which Prince Gortchakoff conceives that the difficulty with respect to armed blockade-runners may be arranged; but from his apparent wish to draw a distinction between the past and the future, I presume that if it be admitted by the Conference that the Greek Government have been prevented by the Constitution from interfering with the proceedings of these vessels, he will be prepared to concur in any recommendation which may be offered to Greece, to take immediate measures for so far amending the Constitution that the Government may not feel itself obliged in future to treat with impunity acts on the part of Greek subjects which it cannot sanction without a violation of international law.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 182.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 4, 1869.)

(No. 311.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December* 29, 1868.

CONOMENOS BEY, the permanent Turkish Chargé d'Affaires, who returned from leave of absence a few days ago, received yesterday a telegram from Constantinople, declaring the determination of the Porte to enter into no negotiations with the Conference about to meet at Paris on the subject of the differences between Turkey and Greece, which might involve the possible cession of territory, or discussions respecting Crete, or a modification of the ultimatum lately presented to the Greek Government.

Prince Gortchakoff received this communication very coldly, and saying he would record it, "en prendre acte," declined to enter into any conversation upon the question to which it referred.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 183.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 4, 1869.)

(No. 312. Most Confidential.)
St. Petersburgh, December 29, 1868.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my preceding despatch of this date, with respect to a telegram received yesterday by the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I advised Conomenos Bey to show it to the Director of the Asiatic Department, and to express surprise that Prince Gortchakoff should have appeared displeased with a document, which did little more than declare the intention of the Porte to negotiate only on the basis, which he understood from the French Ambassador and myself had been recommended or approved of by our respective Governments, and had been already accepted by Russia.

Conomenos Bey having adopted this suggestion, Mr. Stremoonkoff, as I expected, spoke to him very frankly, and gave him nearly the same explanations, as to the views with which Russia would enter the Conference, as I had received from Prince Gortchakoff, but stated further, that though Russia is of opinion that the King of Greece cannot agree to the Turkish demand respecting armed blockade-runners whilst the existing Constitution remains in force, Russia will support the western and Constitutional Powers if they think fit to recommend Greece to amend those Articles of her Constitution which are inconsistent with international law.

With regard to the fifth clause of the Ultimatum, he said the Russian Government are of opinion that its discussion would involve a reference to the state of affairs in Crete, and that it would be in the interest of the Porte to abandon it. Conomenos Bey has communicated to the Porte this confidential information which he has received from Mr. Stremoonkoff.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 184.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 4.)

(No. 5.)
Berlin, January 2, 1869.

My Lord,

THE various phases through which the negotiations on the Turco-Greek question have passed having been brought under your Lordship's notice directly through Count Bernstorff, there remains little for me to report to your Lordship on the subject. I may, however, state that on the 25th ultimo M. Benédetti, the French Ambassador at this Court, communicated to Count Bismarck a despatch from his Government, stating that the Prussian proposal was approved at Paris; that the proposed Conference was accepted in principle by the several Powers, on the basis of the Turkish ultimatum; and that the invitations were on the point of being dispatched to the several Courts. Everything, then, appeared fair and smooth, and the Conference it was expected would meet on the 2nd of January.

On the 26th ultimo, Aristarchi Bey, the Turkish Minister at this Court, waited on Count Bismarck, and communicated to him a telegraphic instruction from his Government, stating that the Porte had heard unofficially of a Conference to be held on their differences with Greece. In view of such an eventuality, the despatch stated that the Porte would require that the five points submitted in her ultimatum to Greece should be accepted as the basis, and that no question should be mooted either affecting the territorial rights or administrative jurisdiction of the Porte in Crete, or in any other part of the Empire.

M. Aristarchi said that he found Count Bismarck extremely irritated by the delay and obstructions caused to the issue of the invitations to the Congress by the demand of Russia for the admission of Greece, which had been telegraphed from St. Petersburgh to London and Paris.

In conversation with M. Aristarchi, Count Bismarck stated that Prussia considered the basis of the Conference to be the examination of the Turkish ultimatum, and of the reclamations addressed by Turkey to Greece, and that no question should be raised or discussed affecting the integrity of the Turkish Empire.

His Excellency did not add "the administrative jurisdiction" of Turkey, and from this circumstance M. d'Aristarchi opines that Count Bismarck may have intentionally

made this reserve, with a view to enable the Conference to discuss any matters relating to the future government of Crete.

On leaving Count Bismarck, M. Aristarchi was authorized by his Excellency to inform his Government of these views, and his Excellency further stated that Prussia would support them in the Conference.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 185.

Mr. Lumley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 4.)

(No. 3. Confidential.)
Brussels, January 3, 1869.

My Lord,

IN the course of a conversation I had a few days ago with M. de Balan, the Prussian Minister, he was kind enough to show me an inclosure in a despatch from Count Bismarck, which he said might interest me. It was the copy of a despatch from Count Bernstorff to Count Bismarck, giving an account of a conversation he had held with the Italian Chargé d'Affaires in London. Count Maffei, who had just come from the French Ambassador, said he had asked the Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne whether he considered there was reason to believe that the energetic action of the Turkish Government towards Greece had been instigated by the Representatives of any of the European Powers at Constantinople; for instance, by the English Ambassador, or by Baron Prokesch. To this question the Prince replied in the negative; but on Count Maffei returning to the charge and asking his Excellency whether he did not think the Austrian Government might have encouraged the Porte to take the line it had adopted, the French Ambassador replied that might be possible. This admission, Count Bernstorff adds, he considers to be of importance, coming as it does from the Representative of a Power which is on such friendly and intimate terms with the Austrian Government.

I told M. de Balan that the French Ambassador's observation did not appear to me to be intended to bear the interpretation thus put upon it; that with regard to the facts referred to, I considered it incredible that Count Beust should have taken upon himself the responsibility of advising a step which might have embroiled Europe in war; nor did I believe that Baron Prokesch, who was past 80, was likely to be selected to inaugurate such an energetic line of policy. I said it appeared to me that the Turkish element had been taken too little into consideration on this occasion; that the exaggerated comments of the Russian press on a late speech of Lord Stanley's had excited the Greeks to such extravagant hopes, and to such violent demonstrations at Athens and elsewhere, as were well calculated to alarm the Porte, and were sufficient to account for the defensive measures the Turkish Government had thought it advisable to adopt.

It was necessary also to take into consideration the effect produced on the Sultan's mind by his late visit to the different capitals of Europe in company with Fuad Pasha and some of the most enlightened men of his empire; nor ought we to lose sight of the exceptional position of the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs at the present moment. It was impossible that able statesman and clever politician should not comprehend and avail himself of the advantages of the independence his ill-health procured for him, unhampered as he was by the responsibilities of office, with the opportunity of testing public opinion, and of forming an unbiassed judgment on passing events; in addition to which, he was in all probability in direct communication with his Sovereign on all subjects affecting the welfare of the Turkish Empire. These circumstances, I said, appeared to me to be sufficient to explain, without seeking elsewhere the motives for the initiative taken by the Porte, and which had evidently surprised the Foreign Representatives at Constantinople as much as it had M. de Moustier.

M. de Balan said he had not reflected on the circumstances to which I alluded, but the restless activity of M. de Beust was so well known that it was not unnatural to seek for evidence of it in events like those now taking place in the East.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. SAVILE LUMLEY.

No. 186.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 4.)

Constantinople, January 4, 1869.

(Telegraphic.)

PORTE has made an important modification with reference to the expulsion of the Greeks.

All *bonâ fide* Hellenic subjects will be allowed to remain under the protection of the laws of the country during the interruption of relations, so long as they conduct themselves peaceably.

Ottoman subjects who had obtained Greek protection will be allowed to remain only upon permanently resuming their original and proper nationality, and those who are expelled will not be again received except as Ottoman subjects.

More than two-thirds of the nominal Greek subjects are Turks with a fictitious Hellenic nationality.

The exclusion of Greek vessels from the ports is maintained.

Copy of this telegram sent to Athens.

No. 187.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 4, 7 P.M.)

Paris, January 4, 1869, 5·10 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

THE Russian Ambassador has just read to me a despatch of the 20th instant from Baron Brunnow to Prince Gortchakoff. He reports a conversation in which you are stated to have expressed the opinion that Greece should be as nearly as possible on a par with Turkey in the Conference, and to have pointed out that a consultative voice would in practice effect this. Baron Brunnow adds that the French Ambassador in London spoke much to the same effect, with the difference that he thought Greece should not sign the Protocols, while you seemed to be of opinion that she should sign. The Russian Ambassador also showed me a telegram *en clair* from Prince Gortchakoff, stating that Baron Brunnow reported that you thought Greece should be on a par with Turkey, and hoping that the French Government would adopt your highly honourable sentiments.

No. 188.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir A. Buchanan.

Foreign Office, January 4, 1869.

(No. 1.)

Sir,

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to Prince Gortchakoff, as reported in your despatch No. 310 of the 28th ultimo, respecting the proposed Conference on the subject of the differences between Turkey and Greece.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 189.

The Earl of Clarendon to Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne.

Foreign Office, January 4, 1869.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 2nd instant, informing me that the Government of the Emperor consider it of importance that the Conference, having for its object the settlement of the questions now pending between Turkey and Greece, should assemble without delay; and I have the honour to state to your Excellency that full powers will immediately be sent to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, to enable him to take part in the Conference, as the Representative of Her Majesty's Government.

I have at the same time to express the hope of Her Majesty's Government that the meeting of the Conference will not be delayed beyond the 9th of January.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 190.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

Foreign Office, January 5, 1869, 8 A.M.

(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE been misrepresented by Russian Ambassador.

He expressed hope of his Government that there was no intention to humiliate Greece. I said there was not; but that as the Conference would consist of Powers who had signed Treaty of Paris, a different form of invitation must be addressed to Greece, who, however, would have full opportunity of making known her case. I did not say a word to either Russian or French Ambassadors about Greece being upon a par with Turkey, or the signature of Protocols; but it will be matter for consideration whether Greece should not sign Protocols as a means of binding her to decision of Conference.

No. 191.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 5.)

Paris, January 5, 1869, 3·15 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

TELEGRAM dated yesterday, from French Ambassador at Constantinople to M. de Lavalette, states that the Porte has divided Hellenic subjects into two classes, those born in Greece and those in Turkey. That with regard to the first, only those who are dangerous will be expelled; the quiet and peaceful will be allowed to remain, but must submit to Ottoman jurisdiction during interruption of relations. That the second must return definitively to their Turkish nationality, or leave the country. That in consideration of these measures, and in order to give time for instructions to be sent to the Turkish Ambassador at Paris, the Grand Vizier wishes the Conference to be postponed until the 16th, adding intimation that the Ottoman ports will be closed to the Greek flag at the time fixed.

Lavalette thinks that the measures respecting Greeks are in themselves very ill-judged; that the adoption of them, and the closing of the ports, would defeat the object of the Conference; that any postponement of the meeting of the Conference is most unadvisable. He intends to propose to the Emperor to direct the French Ambassador, by telegraph, to remonstrate energetically, and would be very glad if similar instructions were sent to our Ambassador.

No. 192.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 5.)

Paris, January 4, 1869.

(No. 11.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith to your Lordship, extracted from the "Journal Officiel" of yesterday, a short notice upon the subject of the coming Conference for the settlement of the differences between Turkey and Greece.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 192.

Extract from the "Journal Officiel" of January 3, 1869.

Paris, le 3 Janvier, 1869.

DES que la rupture des relations diplomatiques entre la Turquie et la Grèce a été un fait consommé, les Cabinets se sont montrés animés du désir d'en prévenir les consé-

quences. La Prusse, se référant au vœu pacifique émis dans le Protocole du 14 Avril, 1856, a été d'avis de recourir à la médiation amicale des Puissance signataires du Traité de Paris réunies en Conférence. Le Gouvernement de l'Empereur a reconnu l'opportunité de cette proposition et l'a immédiatement recommandée à l'assentiment de toutes les Cours, en convenant avec elles que la délibération aurait pour objet unique et précis d'examiner dans quelle mesure il y a lieu de faire droit aux réclamations formulées dans l'ultimatum adressé par le Gouvernement Ottoman à la Grèce.

Une dépêche télégraphique de l'Ambassadeur de France à Constantinople en date du 31 Décembre annonce que la Porte est prête à participer à cette Conférence. Il a été convenu également qu'un Représentant de la Grèce y serait admis à titre consultatif. L'entente est donc complète entre toutes les Puissances pour ouvrir à Paris une délibération commune sur les bases que nous venons d'indiquer, et, par ordre de l'Empereur, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères a proposé aux divers Cabinets de fixer au 9 Janvier la première réunion des Plénipotentiaires.

No. 193.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

(No. 12.) *Foreign Office, January 5, 1869.*

My Lord,

I RECEIVED late yesterday evening your telegram respecting a report made by Baron de Brunnow on the 2nd instant to Prince Gortchakoff, stating that I had expressed an opinion that in the Conference Greece should be as nearly as possible on the same footing with Turkey, and that this result would practically be obtained by allowing Greece to have a consultative voice.

Furthermore, Baron de Brunnow appears to have reported to his Government that I thought that the Protocols should be signed by the Greek Representative.

I lose no time in acquainting your Excellency that my language has been misrepresented by Baron de Brunnow.

In the conversation to which he alludes, he said that the Russian Government hoped that it was not intended to humiliate Greece; to which I replied, that there was no such intention, but that a different form of invitation must necessarily be addressed to Greece, inasmuch as the Conference would be composed of Powers parties to the Treaty of Paris of 1856, and Greece was not one of those parties. Nevertheless, Greece, I said, would have full opportunity of stating her case; but I did not say either to the Russian or French Ambassador, whom Baron de Brunnow appears to have represented as holding nearly the same language as myself, that Greece should be on the same footing with Turkey, or that her Representative should sign the Protocol.

It may, perhaps, be a matter for the consideration of the Conference hereafter whether the Greek Representative should not affix his signature to the Protocols, since, by so doing, the decisions recorded in them would be more obligatory on Greece.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 194.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 6.) *Foreign Office, January 5, 1869.*

Sir,

I HAVE been informed by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, that the Grand Vizier had expressed to M. Bourée the wish of the Porte that the opening of the Conference should be postponed till the 16th of January, while the Ottoman ports would still be closed to the Greek flag at the time now fixed, which according to the calculation of the Turkish Ambassador at Paris is the 20th or 21st of the present month.

I have to instruct your Excellency to acquaint the Grand Vizier that Her Majesty's Government strongly recommend the Porte not to insist upon the Conference being postponed. You will say that the European Powers are looking forward with the greatest anxiety to its early meeting; and you will add that as the basis on which the Conference is assembled is fixed, and the limits within which its deliberations are to be confined are strictly laid down beforehand, its sittings must be few in number.

Furthermore, you will point out to the Grand Vizier that inasmuch as war has not

been declared between Turkey and Greece, no operations of a warlike character should be undertaken until it is ascertained what has been the result of the Conference.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 195.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 6.)

(No. 7.) *Florence, January 2, 1869.*

My Lord,

ALTHOUGH in signifying to the French Government their readiness to take part in the proposed Conference for the settlement of the pending differences between Greece and Turkey, on a formal invitation being addressed to them to this effect, the Italian Government did not make any stipulations as to the limits within which the discussions at the Conference were to be confined: I am, nevertheless, informed, by Count Menabrea, that he is decidedly of opinion that it is most desirable that no other questions but the one actually at issue, and the measures necessary for preventing a recurrence of the present complications, should be touched upon, for he considers that the more strictly the deliberations of the Conference are narrowed within this circle, the less chance will there be of misunderstandings arising between the Powers represented, and consequently of the general peace, which it is the object of the Italian Government to maintain, being disturbed.

Count Menabrea appears to incline, very unmistakeably, to the side of Turkey, in this dispute. Making every allowance for the national sympathies under which the Greek Government has been acting, he considers that the complaints of the Turkish Government against Greece are well founded, and that the Greek Government is consequently bound to afford adequate satisfaction.

His Excellency assured me again, in an interview which I had with him yesterday, that he had sent instructions in this sense to the Italian Minister at Athens, and also that he continued to give counsels of moderation at Constantinople.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. PAGET.

No. 196.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 6.)

(No. 8.) *Florence, January 2, 1869.*

My Lord,

RUSTEM BEY, the Turkish Minister, having accompanied Fuad Pasha to Nice, and there being no Secretary to the Turkish Legation at this Court, the Turkish Government is, during Rustem Bey's absence, not officially represented at Florence.

Under these circumstances, such communications as are made to the Italian Government on the part of the Ottoman Government, pass in the shape of *notes verbales* from Rustem Bey through the hands of M. Gaston Morel, his Private Secretary.

This gentleman called upon me yesterday with a message from Rustem Bey, to the effect that his attention had been attracted by a report that the Italian Government had entered into an alliance or understanding with the Governments of Prussia and Russia in regard to the affairs of the East, which was based on a line of policy at variance with that of the Western Powers and Austria, and hostile to Turkey.

Rustem Bey, M. Morel said, would be very much obliged to me if I could tell him if I had any information on this subject.

I said, that I had seen a report of the nature alluded to in the newspaper, but that I did not attach the least importance to it, and had not even thought of asking any question of Count Menabrea as to its truth, for that, putting aside the friendly disposition which I had always observed on the part of the Italian Government towards Turkey, the interests of Italy were a sufficient guarantee to me that the Italian Government had not entered into any engagements of the kind referred to.

As, however, I had occasion to see Count Menabrea in the course of the afternoon, I took an opportunity of casually alluding to the report in question (without, however, mentioning the message which I had received from Rustem Bey), stating that I merely did so in order to be able to assert, on his Excellency's authority, that there was not the slightest foundation for it.

Count Menabrea replied, that I might give the report the most categorical and

absolute denial. The Italian Government, he said, had entered into no engagements or alliance whatever either with Prussia or Russia, or any other Power, in regard to Eastern affairs; and he took the opportunity of again repeating to me, that the only object and desire of the Italian Government was the maintenance of peace not only in the East, but throughout Europe; that peace was absolutely necessary for the interests of Italy, and that to secure its preservation was the sole aim of the foreign policy of the Italian Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. PAGET.

No. 197.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 6.)

(No. 14.)
My Lord, *Paris, January 4, 1869.*

THE Russian Ambassador, the Comte de Stackelberg, called upon me to-day, and read to me a despatch from Baron Brunnow to Prince Gortchakoff, which had come to him under flying seal.

The despatch was dated the day before yesterday, and contained a report of a conversation which Baron Brunnow stated himself to have had with your Lordship on the subject of the position to be assigned to Greece in the proposed Conference. If I recollect rightly its contents, it stated that your Lordship had expressed an opinion that Greece should be on a par with Turkey in the Conference, and had pointed out that this would in practice be effected by the admission of Greece with a consultative voice. Your Lordship had, it went on to say, observed that at a Conference Board all the Powers represented were on an equal footing; that all the Plenipotentiaries had the same opportunities of making their voices heard; that there was no distinction between great and small Powers. Very much the same sentiments had, the despatch affirmed, been expressed to Baron Brunnow by the Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne, but he had observed this difference between the Prince and your Lordship. The Prince was of opinion that the Greek Plenipotentiary could not pretend to affix his signature to the Protocols, while your Lordship appeared to think that he ought to be invited to sign them.

On finishing the despatch Count Stackelberg proceeded to read to me a telegram which he had received from Prince Gortchakoff *en clair*. It stated, if I remember right, that Baron Brunnow had telegraphed that your Lordship thought Greece should be admitted to the Conference on equal terms, and it expressed a hope that the French Government would adopt this very honourable opinion.

Count Stackelberg asked me if I had received anything from your Lordship in confirmation of Baron Brunnow's report. I answered that I had not received anything of the kind. In fact, so soon as I learned that Russia had agreed to the admission of Greece with a consultative voice only, I considered the whole matter as settled, and had ceased to advert to it. Count Stackelberg said that he should, without delay, communicate Baron Brunnow's despatch and Prince Gortchakoff's telegram to M. de Lavalette, and that he should have been very glad if I could have enabled him to say something from me in support of them; as it was, he could only tell M. de Lavalette that I had not heard anything from your Lordship to the same effect.

In the course of a conversation which I had later in the day with M. de Lavalette, he mentioned that Count Stackelberg had read to him a despatch and the telegram, but added that he himself did not attach much importance to them.

I told him that I had not received any account of your Lordship's conversation wth Baron Brunnow, nor any communication from you in the sense in which the despatch reported you to have spoken. When M. de Lavalette had proposed that Greece should be admitted to the Conference, I had undertaken to say that Her Majesty's Government would not object to this, but I had not felt authorized, in the absence of positive instructions, to go beyond this. Two days afterwards his Excellency had informed me that Russia had been induced to consent to the admission of Greece with a consultative voice only, and that thus all the Powers were agreed upon the point. This being the case I had considered the matter as settled, and had neither written nor thought much more about it.

M. de Lavalette showed no disposition to dwell upon the subject; he simply repeated that he did not attach much importance to it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 198.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 6.)

(No. 17.)
My Lord, *Paris, January 5, 1869.*

M. DE LAVALETTE read to me this morning a telegram dated yesterday, which he had received from M. Bourrée, the French Ambassador at Constantinople. The following is the substance of it:—

"The Porte has of its own accord determined upon mitigating the measures concerning Hellenic subjects. It has divided these subjects into two categories: those born in Greece, and those born in Turkey who have become by naturalization Hellenic subjects. As regards the first, the Porte will expel those only who have been concerned in hostile proceedings against the Ottoman Government, and whose presence appears to be dangerous to public tranquillity; those who are quiet and peaceable may remain, but must submit to Ottoman jurisdiction during the interruption of relations. On the other hand, persons born in Turkey, who have become naturalized Hellenic subjects, must return, once for all, to their original Ottoman nationality, or quit the Ottoman Empire.

"In answer to the invitation to the Conference on the 9th, Aali Pasha requests that the meeting of the Conference may be postponed until the 16th, in order to give time for the Porte to send detailed instructions to its Plenipotentiary at Paris. He thinks that the mitigation of the measures regarding Hellenic subjects will prevent any inconvenience arising from the postponement; and adds that the ports will be closed against the Greek flag at the time fixed."

Having finished reading the telegram to me, M. de Lavalette said that the intelligence it conveyed was thoroughly unsatisfactory to him. In the first place he thought the measures with regard to Hellenic subjects, which were termed mitigations of those originally threatened, were extremely injudicious. They were calculated to raise very inconvenient questions respecting nationality and jurisdiction, and they established a sort of "loi des suspects" with respect to the native Hellenes in Turkey, which would be liable to very great abuse. It was, however, in another point of view that the mention of them alarmed him. It looked as if the Porte, notwithstanding its acceptance of the Conference, still hankered after a recourse to the violent proceedings it had threatened. Aali Pasha, indeed, distinctly announced that the exclusion of Greek vessels was to be carried into effect at the time which had been announced, and his Highness proposed to put off the meeting of the Conference till within a day or two of that time. In fact, the Porte seemed to contemplate taking a course which would defeat the pacific objects for which the Conference was to be assembled.

M. de Lavalette was, he went on to say, expressing merely his own personal sentiments, as he had not yet laid the telegram before the Emperor, but he proposed to take His Majesty's orders with regard to sending by telegraph instructions to M. Bourée to remonstrate energetically with the Porte, and to urge strongly that it should adhere to the day named for the Conference, the 9th instant. It would be very satisfactory to him if Her Majesty's Government should deem it right to send instructions to the same effect to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

This afternoon, the Turkish Ambassador, Djemil Pasha, called upon me and told me that M. de Lavalette had communicated to him the contents of M. Bourée's telegram, and had spoken strongly to him on the subject. He had not, he said, received any similar communication from his own Government, but had come to me, at the request of M. de Lavalette, to hear my opinion from my own mouth.

I told Djemil Pasha that I agreed with M. de Lavalette in thinking that what were termed the mitigations of the measures threatened against Hellenic subjects were in themselves open to many objections, but that I did not care to dwell upon this point. The suggestion that the mitigation of these measures would enable the Conference to be postponed without inconvenience was, I said, a more serious matter. Coupled as it was with an announcement that the exclusion of Greek ships from the Ottoman ports would be carried into effect at the time which had been announced, it certainly led to the fear that the Porte, while accepting the Conference, was disposed to render it nugatory, and to counteract the conciliatory and pacific endeavours of the other Powers. I added, that I could not believe that such were the real objects of his Government, but that I thought he would do well to lose no time in making his Government aware of the impression which M. Bourée's intelligence had produced, and in urging, above all things, that the Porte should take steps to insure the meeting of the Conference on the 9th instant.

In the course of conversation, I asked Djemil Pasha at what date, according to his

calculation, the delay specified with regard to the expulsion of Greek subjects and the closing of the ports would expire.

He said that the rejection of the ultimatum had taken place on the 16th December; that, consequently, the original delay of fifteen days expired on the 30th or 31st of that month; and that the three additional weeks subsequently accorded would come to an end on the 20th or 21st of the present month of January.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 199.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

Foreign Office, January 6, 1869.

(Telegraphic.)

HER Majesty's Government strongly urge the Porte not to insist upon any postponement of the Conference, the meeting of which is expected with anxiety by European Powers. Its basis being fixed and discussion limited, the meetings must be few, and, as war has not been declared between Turkey and Greece, all warlike operations should be suspended until the result of the Conference is known.

No. 200.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 7, 1 P.M.)

Paris, January 7, 1869, 11·25 A.M.

(Telegraphic.)

FRENCH Ambassador at Constantinople telegraphs that Grand Vizier has consented to the Conference meeting on the 9th.

No. 201.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 7.)

Athens, January 7, 1869.

(Telegraphic.)

A ROYAL Ordinance authorizes the issue of Treasury notes for 15,000,000 drachmas in place of a legal tender in all transactions, past or future, throughout the kingdom.

The manager of the Ionian Bank considers that this measure will entail the immediate ruin of that and the National Bank, and it must produce complete anarchy throughout the country.

Perhaps your Lordship would communicate with the London Directors of the Ionian Bank.

No. 202.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 7.)

Constantinople, January 7, 1869.

(Telegraphic.)

THE Porte consents to the immediate meeting of the Conference.

The delay was wished for to allow time for the arrival of the instructions which were sent yesterday to the Turkish Ambassador at Paris.

No warlike operations will be commenced by the Turks, but aggression by Greece will not be submitted to.

No. 203.

Safvet Pasha to M. E. Musurus.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by M. E. Musurus, January 7.)

Constantinople, le 5 Janvier, 1869.

PAR suite des difficultés démontrées dans l'application de la mesure d'expulsion des sujets Hellènes, la Sublime Porte vient de décréter quelques dispositions destinées à sauvegarder tant les intérêts du commerce que la sûreté générale de l'Empire.

Ces conditions sont :—

1. Les Traités de la Sublime Porte avec la Grèce se trouvant suspendus par suite de la rupture des relations entre elles, tous les Hellènes établis en Turquie sont placés sous la protection des lois du pays pour toutes les affaires, soit de commerce, soit du ressort de la police, soit de toute autre nature.

2. Sont considérés de vrais sujets Hellènes, ceux qui sont issus de parents sujets Hellènes, ou ceux qui ont acquis cette nationalité en vertu du Protocole de Londres; pour les individus de cette catégorie le Gouvernement Impérial avisera à l'expulsion de ceux dont il ne voudrait plus permettre le séjour dans l'Empire. En conséquence les autorités Impériales auront partout à s'enquérir dûment sur le compte des sujets Hellènes de la catégorie en question afin de discerner les gens honnêtes des gens turbulents, et de les faire connaître au Gouvernement Impérial. Quant aux individus qui, étant sujets Ottomans, sont parvenus à se faire délivrer, soit par l'entremise des Consuls Hellènes, soit d'une autre manière, des passeports Helléniques, ils devront ou abandonner leurs passeports pour se faire réintégrer dans leur nationalité primitive, au bien quitter l'Empire pour ne plus y retourner, sauf à être considérées comme sujets Ottomans s'ils y retournaient plus tard. Les individus de cette catégorie seront invités à quitter le territoire Ottoman pour aller où ils voudront; et, s'ils ne partent pas dans le délai fixé, ils seront contraints à se soumettre à cet ordre dans les formes requises.

3. Ces dispositions ne modifient en rien la décision prise antérieurement à l'égard de la marine marchande Hellénique.